HARD TIMES FOR RUSSIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 013172

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2027
TAGS: PHUM PREL KDEM PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: HARD TIMES FOR RUSSIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY

REF: A. MOSCOW 11834

B. MOSCOW 07956

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Civil society and liberal political party leaders are
sharply divided over the role of NGOs in partisan politics.
While Moscow's most prominent human rights activist strongly
defends the policy of overt political opposition, many NGO
representatives are uncomfortable with, or opposed to,
anti-Putin campaigns. Other NGO leaders argue that the
politicization of the human rights community reveals the
extent to which Russia's "flagship" NGOs are far removed from
the mainstream issues that concern most Russians, poorly
equipped to build bridges to middle class Russia, dominated
by leaders more comfortable with dissidence than dissent, and
on the sidelines of social movements that may be the best
hope for demanding GOR accountability. These nongovernmental
organizations need to extend their outreach and appeal, and
strengthen their own internal procedures and
self-sustainability. To do that at a time when the NGO
community is increasingly embattled, continued international
support is crucial. End summary.

--------------
To Be, or Not To Be, Political
--------------


2. (C) Debates in Russia over the role of NGOs in partisan
politics have intensified, with back-to-back December
sessions of the Second Human Rights Conference, the Civil
Forum, and Other Russia precipitating open feuding among
civil society and "democratic" party leaders, as well as the
creation of yet another front -- the "Political Other
Russia." Yabloko and SPS party chairmen publicly criticized
Indem's Georgiy Satarov and Other Russia leader Garry
Kasparov for using NGOs as vehicles for advancing their
political agendas. Overt politicking, they argued, weakened
the NGO movement and reinforced stereotypes that NGOs were
mouthpieces for foreign (and hostile) interests. Privately,
Demos Center's Tanya Lokshina, who has avoided any linkage
between Demos and opposition politicians, told us that the
division was deep, with many human rights activists insistent
that the movement remain apolitical. Human Rights Watch
Director Allison Gill termed the merger of human rights
activists and opposition parties under the "Other Russia"
banner a step backwards, as it led human rights groups to
"hunker down" rather than expand their reach.


3. (SBU) The doyenne of Russia's human rights movement,
Moscow Helsinki Group Chairwoman Ludmila Alekseeva defended
taking on the Putin government, while acknowledging the
broader critique of human rights activists. She told us the
fusion of human rights groups with opposition parties of all
stripes was legitimate, despite the public controversy and
her own apprehensions about neo-Bolshevik Eduard Limonov and
neo-Stalinist Anpilov. While Yeltsin's government violated
democratic principles during the 1996 presidential elections,
she explained, it did not threaten to destroy the rights of
its citizenry. The Putin government, she maintained, was
intent on doing so. It was time for Russian activists to
bury political differences, and unite around a common
opposition to the government.


4. (SBU) Alekseeva minimized the costs to the NGO movement
of direct opposition to the government. The fact that
Yabloko and SPS had refused to join Other Russia, she
attributed to craven political interests in securing Kremlin
support (or at least tolerance) during the 2007 elections.
She noted the irony of having lost the democratic parties,
while gaining the extreme nationalists as allies; at the same
time, individual Yabloko and SPS members remained supportive.
While noting the accomplishments of the human rights
community-- primarily, the establishment of a nationwide
network, where none existed in 1976 -- Alekseeva was quick to
concede its weakness. Of the 2,000-plus organizations, she
noted, maybe 20 were influential. Even the most influential,
she added, folding her own Moscow Helsinki Group into the
mix, were weak structurally. By definition, she argued,
human rights activists were "altruists" and not motivated by
"interests"-- even important social interests that are
fueling burgeoning grassroots movements against corruption,
housing scams, pollution, and abuse of drivers by traffic
police.

--------------
Human Rights: Unpopular; HR NGOs Disengaged
--------------

MOSCOW 00013172 002 OF 004




5. (C) Contributing to the controversy over the role of human
rights organizations is the fact that their work is still not
viewed as vital by most Russians. Chairwoman of the
Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society
Institutions and Democracy, Ella Pamfilova recently told
Itar-Tass that human rights were not a priority for Russian
citizens. She expressed frustration that Russians still do
not understand that their living standards and social
well-being are directly connected with the level of human
rights and freedoms. Likewise, Moscow Ford Foundation
Director Steven Solnick commented that only two percent of
Russian citizens express concern about violations of civil
liberties. A recent public opinion survey by the All-Russia
Public Opinion Center, ranked human rights almost at the
bottom of the list of pressing concerns. The overwhelming
majority of citizens are focused on questions of economic and
social justice. Head of Memorial Oleg Orlov concurred,
saying that society is not active enough in protecting its
rights because it has more immediate concerns.


6. (C) Solnick argues that these attitudes reflect the
failure of human rights organizations to create linkages and
constituencies with the population. Chairman of the
Department of Political Science at the Institute of State and
Law William Smirnov seconded Solnick, but traced the
disconnect between human rights standard bearers and society
to the failure of the former to speak out when Yeltsin
attacked the White House or when the GOR in the '90s violated
Russians' economic rights by failing to pay salaries or
pensions on time.


7. (C) Many here believe that the human rights community was
tarred by its too close association with the West. Smirnov is
among those who argued that international human rights
organizations had discredited themselves in the eyes of
"average Russians," by worrying more about the rights of
ex-oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskiy than of those "whom he
deceived in order to accumulate his fortune." The
international community's preoccupation with human rights in
Chechnya resonated similarly with Russians, Smirnov
continued. The perceived role of the United States in the
economic difficulties experienced by many Russians in the
'90s made it advisable, Smirnov said, that it "keep a low
profile" on human rights issues.


8. (C) Deputy Chairman of Yabloko and Moscow City Duma
Deputy Sergey Mitrokhin echoed this criticism, charging to us
that human rights organizations issued "hysterical"
pronouncements on events in Russia to please Western
sponsors, without whom they would not have a leg to stand on.
Mitrokhin argued that human rights flagship organizations
did not pay attention to the "vital" questions confronting
average Russians. For example, there was no NGO to whom he
could send petitioners complaining about housing and
construction scams, which was one of the most pressing
problems in urban Moscow. Until these NGOs broadened their
focus, Mitrokhin concluded, they would remain on the fringes.


-------------- --------------
The Problem of Charismatic Leaders, and Sloppy Files
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Despite the intensive engagement of Western
governments and NGOs, many of the flagship human rights
organizations remain poorly equipped to function in the new
Russia. Solnick itemized the shortcomings as follows:
virtually none has a press secretary, a membership
coordinator, or a fundraising strategy. They depend on a
"charismatic leader" to pull in foreign grants. Ford's own
efforts to provide USD two million in seed money for a
completely indigenous human rights organization had come to
naught. Ford had been unable to entice a Russian human
rights organization to hire a director and become organized
enough to tap into the Foundation's available monies. Over
the last fifteen years, Solnick said, the international
community has become an "enabler" of NGOs that cannot survive
on their own. After five years of work in country, his
personal conclusion was that many leading Russian human
rights NGOs were undemocratic, non-transparent, and averse to
courting public support. "When is the last time," he asked
us, "that you've seen an NGO advertise for position of deputy
director?"


10. (C) Human Rights Watch Director Allison Gill told us that
even an NGO as respected as Memorial had not developed the
professional management, nor had it diversified funding
beyond its core Western donors. Memorial's Chechnya offices
were currently unfunded while waiting for new grants to be
disbursed, in large part because grant writing still fell to
Memorial's executive director. The dissident past of many

MOSCOW 00013172 003 OF 004


human rights leaders and organizations, she argued, left them
ill-equipped and non-inclined toward professionalizing their
organizations, or making themselves relevant to the Russian
public. Moreover, some well-known NGOs are vulnerable to GOR
tax and registration scrutiny by not adhering to transparent
accounting. Few question the politicized nature of GOR tax
reviews; however, in an era of greater GOR harassment, NGOs
do not advance their cause by being vulnerable to charges of
keeping double books, or not keeping books at all.

-------------- --------------
Is Dissidence the Right Course in Putin's Russia
-------------- --------------


11. (C) There is now a tendency, Gill told us, of human
rights organizations reacting to the increasingly adversarial
relationship with the GOR by reverting to the familiar
methods of Soviet era dissidence. According to Director of
the Donors Forum Natalya Kaminarskaya, Moscow Helsinki
Group's Alekseeva's generation of human rights activists
remained Soviet dissidents, who would always be "against
whatever government was in power." If the human rights
movement was to make progress in Russia, it would have to let
go of that past. Kaminarskaya believed there were ways to
work with the authorities to achieve mutually desirable
outcomes. She mentioned her work with the Ministry of
Economics and the Public Chamber to get an endowments law
developed. Although some compromises had to be made, she
believed each side was satisfied with the final result.
Kaminarskaya believed human rights organizations would not be
discredited if they worked with the government on issues of
common concern, like xenophobia. Kaminarskaya did not attend
the Civil Congress or Other Russia conferences because "all
they do is talk and make the same resolutions. Nothing
concrete gets done."


12. (C) Solnick agreed that the various and sundry human
rights congresses have become a "sideshow." The organizers do
not have the moral legitimacy that certain dissidents of the
Soviet period earned, and are not seen as moral compasses by
the Russian populace. There are no modern Sakharovs; in
part, he quickly noted, because the incorruptible and
uncompromising, e.g., Politkovskaya, are increasingly being
silenced. At the Second Human Rights Congress and Civil
Forum, Embassy officers witnessed first-hand Solnick's
description of a typical human rights gathering: charismatic
leaders delivered repetitive speeches, uncoordinated among
themselves, and lacking a coherent message or action plan.

--------------
Next Generation Still Waiting in the Wings
--------------


13. (C) Soviet-era human rights leaders continue to play a
disproportionate leadership role in the human rights
movement. Darya Miloslavskaya, local representative of the
International Center for Non-Profit Law, said there was no
room for new leaders. Ego and personalities played a large
role in this, she thought, with the older generation of
leaders not willing to make room for a new generation like
Demos Foundation Chair Lokshina, who recently received the
Andrey Sakharov Award; SOVA Deputy Head Galina Kozhevnikova;
or herself. Solnick pointed to Lokshina's decision to leave
Moscow Helsinki Group as emblematic of the fact that
prominent human rights organizers were unwilling to cultivate
the next generation of activists. Director of the Center for
Extreme Journalism Oleg Panfilov agreed with Miloslavskaya,
adding that a new generation of human rights leaders will
probably emerge from the regions and from smaller NGOs, while
the "dinosaurs" continue to monopolize the big cities and
established NGOs.

--------------
Social Movements: Democracy's Guarantor?
--------------


14. (C) Increasingly, hopes are pinned here on the success
of social movements -- often spontaneous, rarely registered,
but sometimes effective citizen efforts to reverse
bureaucratic wrongs and leadership indifference. Carnegie
Foundation's Lilia Shevtsova told us that Russia's
Western-oriented NGOs tended to underestimate these social
movements, which do not speak the language of international
human rights treaties, but are instead focused on concrete
actions.


15. (C) Alekseeva does not necessarily disagree with this
critique. On the one hand, she expressed admiration for
Vyacheslav Lysakov, who spearheaded the grass roots movement
that overturned the conviction of a driver falsely accused of
being responsible for the automobile crash-related death of
the Altai Governor, and identified defrauded apartment buyers

MOSCOW 00013172 004 OF 004


and investors as two other potent movements. However,
Alekseeva maintains a hands off attitude toward most of the
other "movements", which she described as headed by people
"who want to do good things," rather than "people who want to
fight for rights."


16. (C) Alekseeva concluded that she was an optimist.
Russia was changing, Russian society was evolving, and social
movements, "in the hundreds," would emerge as a force that
could not be ignored by the Russian government, but would
spur the development and strengthening of democratic
institutions.

--------------
Comment
--------------


17. (C) The plight of Russia's flagship human rights
organizations in many ways mirrors that of the country's
liberal parties. Both, unfortunately, have failed to adapt
in order to attract popular support and become
self-sustaining. That said, at a time when non-governmental
forces face more restrictions and a worsening environment,
they need international support to stay afloat and continue
their work. To help become self-sustaining and able to
withstand intensifying government pressure, these
organizations need more help with both internal institutional
development, and external outreach. They themselves need to
take a hard look at revamping their leadership, recruitment
and public engagement strategies to become a more integral
part of contemporary Russian society.
BURNS