ZHIRINOVSKIY,S LDPR LOOKS TO THE 2007 ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 013136

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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: ZHIRINOVSKIY,S LDPR LOOKS TO THE 2007 ELECTIONS


Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4(b)

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Summary
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1. (SBU) December marks the 17th anniversary of the
establishment of the Liberal Democrat Party of Russia (LDPR).
LDPR's lack of any discernible platform is compensated for
by the indomitable LDPR Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, whose
instinct for the outrageous continues to resonate with a
significant minority of the Russian electorate. Changes in
the party's leadership, including the exclusion of one Duma
Deputy, have led some to speculate that the party may be
losing its luster, but members of LDPR's Duma faction are
confident that, in the 2007 Duma elections, LDPR will cross
the seven percent threshold required for continued
representation. Some in LDPR see the creation of a second
Kremlin-backed party, Spravedlivaya Rossiya, as a welcome
move toward a more balanced, multi-party system that could
collaterally benefit LDPR and other small parties. End
summary.

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The Man Behind The Party
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2. (C) While analysts differ about LDPR Chairman Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy,s intellectual capabilities and many of them
find his rhetoric distasteful, all admit that his flair for
publicity remains undiminished. New Director of the Levada
Center Lev Gudkov in a recent conversation highlighted
Zhirinovskiy's ability to use outrageous rhetoric to
camouflage his continued affiliation with the Kremlin.
Aleksey Mitrofanov, the Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on
Constitutional Legislation and State Structure and the
party's spokesperson, seconded that assessment. Mitrofanov
said that Zhirinovskiy,s shrewdness and his ability to
maintain links with the changing power brokers over the years
had protected himself and his party from the whims of the
Kremlin while leaders of other parties had been purged,
destroyed, or effectively stripped of power. Gudkov thought
that Zhirinovskiy continued to stay afloat by helping the
Kremlin in imperceptible ways. Among them, Gudkov said, was
Zhirinovskiy's usefulness in floating Kremlin-concocted
policy trial balloons that were used to gauge the reaction of
the population. Both Gudkov and Mitrofanov rejected rumors
that Zhirinovskiy was contemplating retirement although
Mitrofanov allowed that there may be "some significant
changes in the party" following the 2007 and 2008 elections.

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Presidential Aspirations
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3. (SBU) According to Levada Center surveys, Zhirinovskiy
ranks second only to Putin in name recognition among
Russians. However, Putin is recognized for positive reasons,
while Zhirinovskiy,s name tends to be linked with the
negative and/or polarizing things he has said or done.
Although Zhirinovskiy may secretly harbor the dream of
becoming President of Russia, our contacts said he would do
so only in the highly unlikely event he got the nod from the
Kremlin. As it is, Zhirinovskiy is comfortable with the
status quo and, in fact, enjoys playing the diverse roles
which ensure his party's continued presence on the political
scene.

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Member Maneuvers: Keeping It In the Family
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4. (C) In late November, the media reported that:

-- Nikolai Kuryanovich, one of the party's more radical Duma
deputies, had been excluded from the party. On his website,
Kuryanovich claimed that he was expelled because he was
beginning to "eclipse" Zhirinovskiy. Mikhail Vinogradov,
Deputy Director of the Center for Current Politics, told us
that Zhirinovskiy dumped Kuryanovich because the Kremlin did
not like his excessively nationalistic rhetoric. Mitrofanov
told us that the real reason was Kuryanovich,s unwillingness
to cancel his participation in the November 4 "Russian
march," even after ordered to do so by Zhirinovskiy.

-- Yegor Solomatin, one of the party's most influential
members and its manager of regional and local relations, has
also recently left the party. The media reported he had left
to pursue a job in the Federal Audit Chamber. Solomatin
refused to comment about his reasons for leaving, or to

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confirm that Zhirinovskiy and he had disagreed on key issues;
however, he denied that he had the Audit Chamber in his
sights. Mitrofanov described Solomatin as irreplaceable, and
traced his departure to the accumulated strains of
intra-party sniping. He admitted that Zhirinovskiy had
unsuccessfully tried to woo Solomatin back, and that efforts
to find a successor had to date been in vain. Mirofanov
discounted rumors that Zhirinovskiy had appointed his 34 year
old son Igor Lebedev, a Duma Deputy since 2003, to serve in
Solomatin,s place. (Contacts describe Lebedev as an unknown
quantity who has done little in his three years as Duma
Deputy.) Mitrofanov predicted that Solomatin might
eventually join the "second" Kremlin party, Spravedlivaya
Rossiya (SR).

-- Sergey Abeltsev, LDPR member and Deputy Chairman of the
Duma,s Security Committee, is rumored as a possible
contender for the governorship of Belgorod Region if the term
of the current governor, Evgeniy Savchenko, is not extended.

-- Maksim Rokhmistrov is rumored to be leaving the party in
order to pursue a job in the Federal Property Agency. (Note:
Mitrofanov said that rumors of the impending departures of
Abeltsev and Rokhmistrov were premature. Some in the media
predict they will leave in spring 2007.)

-- On December 21, the LDPR website reported that four
members of the LDPR,s St. Petersburg faction had defected to
SR.

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LDPR Voters: "Rednecks" and "Stars"
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5. (C) Mitrofanov said that Zhirinovskiy,s style and
rhetoric consistently attracted a core group of voters whom
he described as "rednecks who vote." The "rednecks" were
middle to lower-middle class men who are not well educated,
but who have strong opinions about how things should be done
and who want to "make something with their lives." LDPR's
"rednecks" are discontented, said Mirtorfanov, and "not very
smart." In order to retain their loyalty, Zhirinovskiy
focuses on the issues that are the source of their
grievances. That means, he said, that the party has no
consistent policy, as it must constantly zigzag in its
efforts to plumb its electorate's discontents.


6. (C) Mitrofanov predicted that LDPR would win the seven
percent of the vote necessary to maintain its seats in the
2007 Duma elections. (His prediction tracked with current
polling from Russia's three major public opinion research
organizations: the Levada Center, The Foundation of Public
Opinion (FOM),and the state-controlled All Russia Public
Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM).) All three organizations
maintain that over the past three years support for LDPR has
remained constant, and ranges from six to eight percent. The
recent decision to have Zhirinovskiy head LDPR's party lists
in the Duma contests should ensure that the party crosses the
threshold.

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Party Financing ) Russian Style
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7. (C) Mikhail Vinogradov, Deputy Director of the Center for
Current Politics, told us that the LDPR receives most of its
financial support by selling spaces on its voter lists to
well-heeled businessmen who want access in order to be able
to influence legislation and other decisions. Vinogradov
cited several examples of seats that had been sold to the
likes of businessman Yevgeniy Ivanov and billionaire Suleyman
Kerimov. Vinogradov said it would not surprise him if
Zhirinovskiy had been compensated for helping the Kremlin
advance its agenda.

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LDPR,s Future
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8. (C) Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Director of the Institute for
Applied Politics; Tatyana Stanovaya and Yelena Bashkirova of
the Center for Political Technologies, and Vinogradov were,
unlike LDPR contacts, not optimistic about the party's
future. Since LDPR is a party of "personality," they
predicted its influence would naturally wane, but admitted
that their prognosis had little to do with LDPR's prospects
in 2007. Vinogradov thought the party might be more
successful among voters in the long term if it focused on one
issue of importance: illegal immigration, for example. He
suggested that, given Zhirinovskiy,s helpful relationship

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with the Kremlin, it would not be surprising if LDPR would be
considered as a possible third party in the Kremlin's
multi-party initiative.


9. (C) Levada Director Gudkov believed that Zhirinovskiy was
astute enough to remain aligned with the "powers that be."
Mitrofanov was optimistic about the future of the party, even
given the creation of the "second" Kremlin party "A Just
Russia" (SR). He believed SR would dilute the monopoly
currently held by United Russia, allowing the remaining
parties greater entree into the legislative and governing
process. (Note: Mitrofanov told us that since 2003 when
United Russia consolidated its stranglehold on the Duma, not
one bill or amendment proposed by LDPR deputies had been
adopted.)

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Comment
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10. (SBU) LDPR's ability to both allow Russia's "rednecks"
to vent their unhappiness with the status quo and to aid in
the implementation of an agenda amenable to the Kremlin
should ensure that it remains a player, if only a secondary
one, on the political scene for the foreseeable future. It
remains to be seen what inroads "A Just Russia" will make on
its LDPR's core electorate in 2007. As with so many other
hypotheses about developments here, the March regional
elections should serve as a good indicator of LDPR's
medium-term prospects.
BURNS