MIDDLE EAST: MFA ON LEBANON, SYRIA AND IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 013098 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV LE SY IZ RS SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST: MFA ON LEBANON, SYRIA AND IRAQ REF: A. MOSCOW 13073 ¶B. MOSCOW 12986 ¶C. STATE 197800 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Putin sought to lower tensions between Lebanon and Syria during back-to-back mid-December visits by PM Siniora and President Asad, according to the Russian MFA, and had urged that a solution to Lebanon's ongoing political crisis be found through negotiations and not in the streets. MFA Director for the Middle East and North Africa Sergey Vershinin said that Moscow had told both Asad and Siniora that Russia supported the normalization of relations and a "depoliticized" Lebanese Special Tribunal, and was considering providing non-lethal assistance to the Lebanese military. Siniora did not raise the question of weapons transfers to Hizballah, nor did Putin discuss it with Asad. Russia urged Asad to use Syria's influence with Hamas to lower tensions in Gaza. Vershinin raised the Yusifiyah power plant in Iraq and noted that while the GOR had no official reaction to the Baker-Hamilton report, the MFA embraced calls for dialogue with the SARG and Iran, along with the creation of a Madrid 2 peace process. Russia's high-profile, but low-result Middle East diplomacy will now focus on Putin's planned January-February visit to Egypt and the Gulf. End Summary. . TALE OF TWO VISITS -------------- ¶2. (C) Vershinin stressed that PM Siniora's December 14-16 Moscow visit had been scheduled far in advance and focused on Lebanon's internal situation. It had involved a range of GOR interlocutors and included meetings with Muslim and Orthodox religious figures. By contrast, Asad's December 18-20 visit was more impromptu, and official discussions had been limited to a one-on-one and expanded meeting with Putin that covered a broader range of topics, including Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinians. ¶3. (C) Noting that the back-to-back meetings had provided Russia a unique perspective on the situation in Lebanon, Vershinin stressed that Russia had not attempted to mediate separately between Damascus and Beirut, but had delivered a consistent message to both leaders -- Lebanon's political situation needed to be resolved in accordance with Lebanon's laws and not in the streets and that Lebanon and Syria should build a "normal" relationship by opening embassies and delineating their border. Russia wanted to aid in lowering tensions and have a voice in any diplomatic solution. In this context, Moscow also supported Arab League SYG Moussa's efforts to help resolve Lebanon's political crisis. . LEBANON'S INTERNAL POLITICS -------------- ¶4. (C) Vershinin said that Russia had consistently opposed "revolutions in the streets," and had made plain its views on this point to both Siniora and Asad. The MFA understood that Lebanese political forces could have sharply differing views on what Lebanon's confession-based governance system might allow, but these differences needed to be sorted out through discussion. Vershinin noted that "there was no love lost between Asad and Siniora," but the MFA assessed that each actor would make decisions "without emotions" to preserve national interests. Vershinin asserted that Siniora had not raised the issue of Russian weapons passing from Syria to Lebanon nor had Putin discussed this issue with Asad. ¶5. (C) According to Vershinin, Siniora had emphasized the importance of resurrecting a comprehensive peace process and the need to strengthen Lebanon's government structures. No Lebanese leader could make a separate peace with Israel, Siniora told the GOR. Turning to reconstruction issues, Siniora had been grateful for the work performed by a Russian military engineering battalion that had rebuilt nine bridges destroyed in the past summer's fighting. The GOR was now weighing providing additional reconstruction assistance; Russia intended to participate in the January Paris reconstruction conference and was focusing on working with the Lebanese military. (Vershinin noted that the GOR engineering battalion left all its equipment behind, excepting weapons, as an in-kind contribution to the GOL.) . LEBANON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶6. (C) Vershinin noted that Russia had supported the UN Security Council's decision to bless the agreement negotiated between the UN and Beirut to establish a Lebanon Special Tribunal. Moscow supported the Brammertz investigation into MOSCOW 00013098 002 OF 002 Hariri's assassination and believed that those responsible needed to be brought to justice, but at the same time was opposed to the establishment of a "politicized" tribunal that did not hew closely to the evidence produced through the UN-sponsored investigations. Moscow had reassured Asad that it supported a "judicially clean" mechanism for trying those responsible for Hariri's assassination. . SYRIA, THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND IRAQ -------------- ¶7. (C) Characterizing the discussions between GOR officials and Asad as regionally focused and more wide ranging, Vershinin said that Russia viewed current tensions in the Middle East as interconnected and argued that while each situation had its own special characteristics, resolution of problems could not develop in isolation. Asad and Putin had traded views on the ongoing political crisis in the Palestinian Authority, with Vershinin noting that the GOR saw little likelihood of the formation of a unity government. Russia had encouraged Syria to use its relationships with Hamas to lower tensions in Gaza. ¶8. (C) On Iraq, Russia had been encouraged by Syria's efforts to normalize relations with Baghdad and to work on cross-border infiltration; Vershinin wondered if the U.S. had taken another look at joint Syria-Iraqi-U.S. efforts in this area. Asad had expressed growing concern about the possibility of Iraq's breakup and Syria had interpreted Baghdad's willingness to enter into discussions with Damascus as a "green light" from the U.S. for increased engagement. Both Syria and Iran were concerned and threatened by the prospect of a fragmented Iraq, as such, Vershinin discounted the possibility of "delinking" Syria from Iran. . YUSIFIYAH POWER PLANT -------------- ¶9. (C) Vershinin noted that completion of the eight-generator power plant was important to the long-term energy security of Iraq, but that Iraqi government requests for a Russian company to recommence construction work were complicated by security concerns and unresolved questions over responsibility for damages to the plant incurred during military operations. Vershinin took on board the unanswered Embassy Baghdad offer to brief the Russian Embassy and undertook to encourage the GOR mission to respond. He noted the continued difficult working conditions for the Russian Embassy, including a recent cut-off in electricity. . BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT -------------- ¶10. (C) After stressing that the GOR did not publicly comment on the Baker-Hamilton report because Moscow viewed it as a set of unofficial recommendations, Vershinin said that many of the proscriptions contained in the report were based on a widely-shared expert consensus that Moscow had long supported. Responding to our expressions of U.S. concerns about Iran's destabilizing activities in Iraq, Vershinin argued that Tehran's growing influence in Iraq and in the region was natural and inevitable and that the U.S. needed to have a dialogue with Iran. Russia continued to support the idea of an international conference similar to the November 2004 Sharm El Sheikh Iraq conference that could allow regional states and UN Security Council members to provide support for Iraqi solutions. Vershinin also reiterated Russian views on the need for a Madrid 2 process to restart a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East. The GOR sought to play a helpful role in Iraq, Vershinin concluded, but did not know what specifically the U.S. and Iraqi governments sought. . COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) An increasingly confident Russia has stepped up its diplomatic visibility on Middle Eastern issues, which will receive yet another boost when President Putin travels to the region in late January or early February. However, the lack of any concrete results from the back-to-back visits by the Lebanese and Syrian leadership illustrates the limitations on Russia's regional role. Moscow is willing and able to offer advice from the sidelines and is always ready to encourage "dialogue," but it lacks both the capacity and leverage needed to independently broker a resolution to the most pressing conflicts. Moscow will continue to advocate for regional tensions to be resolved through the sort of international mediation that ensures that Russia has a seat at the table. BURNS