MIDDLE EAST: MFA ON LEBANON, SYRIA AND IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 013098

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE SY IZ RS
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST: MFA ON LEBANON, SYRIA AND IRAQ

REF: A. MOSCOW 13073

B. MOSCOW 12986

C. STATE 197800

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: President Putin sought to lower tensions
between Lebanon and Syria during back-to-back mid-December
visits by PM Siniora and President Asad, according to the
Russian MFA, and had urged that a solution to Lebanon's
ongoing political crisis be found through negotiations and
not in the streets. MFA Director for the Middle East and
North Africa Sergey Vershinin said that Moscow had told both
Asad and Siniora that Russia supported the normalization of
relations and a "depoliticized" Lebanese Special Tribunal,
and was considering providing non-lethal assistance to the
Lebanese military. Siniora did not raise the question of
weapons transfers to Hizballah, nor did Putin discuss it with
Asad. Russia urged Asad to use Syria's influence with Hamas
to lower tensions in Gaza. Vershinin raised the Yusifiyah
power plant in Iraq and noted that while the GOR had no
official reaction to the Baker-Hamilton report, the MFA
embraced calls for dialogue with the SARG and Iran, along
with the creation of a Madrid 2 peace process. Russia's
high-profile, but low-result Middle East diplomacy will now
focus on Putin's planned January-February visit to Egypt and
the Gulf. End Summary.
.
TALE OF TWO VISITS
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2. (C) Vershinin stressed that PM Siniora's December 14-16
Moscow visit had been scheduled far in advance and focused on
Lebanon's internal situation. It had involved a range of GOR
interlocutors and included meetings with Muslim and Orthodox
religious figures. By contrast, Asad's December 18-20 visit
was more impromptu, and official discussions had been limited
to a one-on-one and expanded meeting with Putin that covered
a broader range of topics, including Lebanon, Iraq and the
Palestinians.


3. (C) Noting that the back-to-back meetings had provided
Russia a unique perspective on the situation in Lebanon,
Vershinin stressed that Russia had not attempted to mediate
separately between Damascus and Beirut, but had delivered a
consistent message to both leaders -- Lebanon's political
situation needed to be resolved in accordance with Lebanon's
laws and not in the streets and that Lebanon and Syria should
build a "normal" relationship by opening embassies and
delineating their border. Russia wanted to aid in lowering
tensions and have a voice in any diplomatic solution. In
this context, Moscow also supported Arab League SYG Moussa's
efforts to help resolve Lebanon's political crisis.
.
LEBANON'S INTERNAL POLITICS
--------------


4. (C) Vershinin said that Russia had consistently opposed
"revolutions in the streets," and had made plain its views on
this point to both Siniora and Asad. The MFA understood that
Lebanese political forces could have sharply differing views
on what Lebanon's confession-based governance system might
allow, but these differences needed to be sorted out through
discussion. Vershinin noted that "there was no love lost
between Asad and Siniora," but the MFA assessed that each
actor would make decisions "without emotions" to preserve
national interests. Vershinin asserted that Siniora had not
raised the issue of Russian weapons passing from Syria to
Lebanon nor had Putin discussed this issue with Asad.


5. (C) According to Vershinin, Siniora had emphasized the
importance of resurrecting a comprehensive peace process and
the need to strengthen Lebanon's government structures. No
Lebanese leader could make a separate peace with Israel,
Siniora told the GOR. Turning to reconstruction issues,
Siniora had been grateful for the work performed by a Russian
military engineering battalion that had rebuilt nine bridges
destroyed in the past summer's fighting. The GOR was now
weighing providing additional reconstruction assistance;
Russia intended to participate in the January Paris
reconstruction conference and was focusing on working with
the Lebanese military. (Vershinin noted that the GOR
engineering battalion left all its equipment behind,
excepting weapons, as an in-kind contribution to the GOL.)
.
LEBANON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


6. (C) Vershinin noted that Russia had supported the UN
Security Council's decision to bless the agreement negotiated
between the UN and Beirut to establish a Lebanon Special
Tribunal. Moscow supported the Brammertz investigation into

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Hariri's assassination and believed that those responsible
needed to be brought to justice, but at the same time was
opposed to the establishment of a "politicized" tribunal that
did not hew closely to the evidence produced through the
UN-sponsored investigations. Moscow had reassured Asad that
it supported a "judicially clean" mechanism for trying those
responsible for Hariri's assassination.
.
SYRIA, THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND IRAQ
--------------


7. (C) Characterizing the discussions between GOR officials
and Asad as regionally focused and more wide ranging,
Vershinin said that Russia viewed current tensions in the
Middle East as interconnected and argued that while each
situation had its own special characteristics, resolution of
problems could not develop in isolation. Asad and Putin had
traded views on the ongoing political crisis in the
Palestinian Authority, with Vershinin noting that the GOR saw
little likelihood of the formation of a unity government.
Russia had encouraged Syria to use its relationships with
Hamas to lower tensions in Gaza.


8. (C) On Iraq, Russia had been encouraged by Syria's
efforts to normalize relations with Baghdad and to work on
cross-border infiltration; Vershinin wondered if the U.S. had
taken another look at joint Syria-Iraqi-U.S. efforts in this
area. Asad had expressed growing concern about the
possibility of Iraq's breakup and Syria had interpreted
Baghdad's willingness to enter into discussions with Damascus
as a "green light" from the U.S. for increased engagement.
Both Syria and Iran were concerned and threatened by the
prospect of a fragmented Iraq, as such, Vershinin discounted
the possibility of "delinking" Syria from Iran.
.
YUSIFIYAH POWER PLANT
--------------


9. (C) Vershinin noted that completion of the
eight-generator power plant was important to the long-term
energy security of Iraq, but that Iraqi government requests
for a Russian company to recommence construction work were
complicated by security concerns and unresolved questions
over responsibility for damages to the plant incurred during
military operations. Vershinin took on board the unanswered
Embassy Baghdad offer to brief the Russian Embassy and
undertook to encourage the GOR mission to respond. He noted
the continued difficult working conditions for the Russian
Embassy, including a recent cut-off in electricity.
.
BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT
--------------


10. (C) After stressing that the GOR did not publicly
comment on the Baker-Hamilton report because Moscow viewed it
as a set of unofficial recommendations, Vershinin said that
many of the proscriptions contained in the report were based
on a widely-shared expert consensus that Moscow had long
supported. Responding to our expressions of U.S. concerns
about Iran's destabilizing activities in Iraq, Vershinin
argued that Tehran's growing influence in Iraq and in the
region was natural and inevitable and that the U.S. needed to
have a dialogue with Iran. Russia continued to support the
idea of an international conference similar to the November
2004 Sharm El Sheikh Iraq conference that could allow
regional states and UN Security Council members to provide
support for Iraqi solutions. Vershinin also reiterated
Russian views on the need for a Madrid 2 process to restart a
comprehensive peace process in the Middle East. The GOR
sought to play a helpful role in Iraq, Vershinin concluded,
but did not know what specifically the U.S. and Iraqi
governments sought.
.
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) An increasingly confident Russia has stepped up its
diplomatic visibility on Middle Eastern issues, which will
receive yet another boost when President Putin travels to the
region in late January or early February. However, the lack
of any concrete results from the back-to-back visits by the
Lebanese and Syrian leadership illustrates the limitations on
Russia's regional role. Moscow is willing and able to offer
advice from the sidelines and is always ready to encourage
"dialogue," but it lacks both the capacity and leverage
needed to independently broker a resolution to the most
pressing conflicts. Moscow will continue to advocate for
regional tensions to be resolved through the sort of
international mediation that ensures that Russia has a seat
at the table.
BURNS