BLACK SEA FLEET RELOCATION: A PORT TOO FAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 013074 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP RS UP SUBJECT: BLACK SEA FLEET RELOCATION: A PORT TOO FAR Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 b an d d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Nearly ten years after the 1997 bilateral agreement with Ukraine to use Sevastopol as a base for its Black Sea Fleet, Russia is doing little to plan for the Fleet's possible relocation after the agreement expires in ¶2017. While the Black Sea Fleet will be on the agenda for the Putin-Yushchenko summit December 22 in Kyiv, it will be a low priority. The Russian government's overall approach to the fleet's future seems simply to wait and see if improving bilateral relations will allow the fleet to remain in Sevastopol. The only credible option appears to be Novorossiisk, but its modest naval facilities and growing commercial importance make it a poor choice. END SUMMARY. . -------------- BSF: LOW ON GOR-GOU AGENDA -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Vladimir Dorokhin, MFA's Special Advisor on the Black Sea, confirmed to us that, officially, in 2017 the GOR will be prepared to vacate Sevastopol and relocate the BSF to a Russian port as per the 1997 bilateral agreement with Ukraine. While the BSF will be on the agenda of the December 22 Putin-Yushchenko summit, Dorokhin told us the BSF negotiations were a low priority. Dorokhin said Ukrainians dramatized Black Sea negotiations, citing two recent incidents -- demands on the GOR to pay higher rent in Sevastopol and increased fees for ecological damage caused by the BSF. Though these issues were not spelled out in the 1997 agreement, Dorokhin emphasized that Russia was working with Ukraine in good faith to resolve these differences and had consistently met its financial obligations. ¶3. (C) Dorokhin, however, condemned the seizure of lighthouses based on local Ukrainian court decisions. (Russia has staffed and operated twenty-two lighthouses in the Crimea since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Stewardship of these lighthouses was not addressed in the 1997 agreement.) Dorokhin claimed that a judicial decision on the lighthouses was not within the competency of local courts -- the issue must be resolved between the GOR and GOU. Dorokhin feared Ukraine would use ambiguities in the 1997 agreement to gain leverage on other Russia-Ukraine bilateral issues. (NOTE: The Ukrainian Embassy rebutted this analysis, noting that under international law, Ukraine must properly maintain (and staff) such facilities, since they are located on Ukrainian territory.) . -------------- 2017 TOO FAR AWAY: NO DECISION YET -------------- ¶4. (C) Alla Yazkova, specialist on the Mediterranean and Black Seas at the Institute of Europe, said 2017 was too far away to predict whether the BSF would pull out of Sevastopol. She cited recent contradictory statements by Yushchenko and Yanukovych -- the former declared that in 2017 there would be no legal grounds for the continued presence of the BSF on Ukrainian territory, while the latter suggested it might be possible for the BSF to remain beyond that date. Yazkova opined that such uncertainty encouraged Russia not to take action and to wait for an opportunity either to extend or modify the 1997 agreement. The GOR sees BSF relocation as a last resort; only when other options are exhausted will the process of relocating the BSF start. Sergey Markov, pro-Kremlin Director of the Center for Political Studies, recently told us that the GOR fully expected the BSF to remain in Sevastopol after 2017. . -------------- FROM FLEET TO FLOTILLA ? -------------- ¶5. (C) Aleksandr Golts, editor of the on-line "Weekly Gazette," told us that the BSF has no future - the BSF will become a flotilla like the Caspian Sea Fleet. Golts dismissed Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov's recent comments that Russia intends to upgrade the BSF and adapt it for combat missions in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans as "rubbish." Golts pointed out that most BSF warships are old and in desperate need of repair and upgrade; moreover, there currently are not any ocean-going naval ships under construction earmarked for the BSF -- the few blue-water warships now under construction for the Russian Navy are slated to go to the Pacific or Baltic Fleets. . -------------- A TALE OF TWO CITIES MOSCOW 00013074 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (C) The naval facility in Sevastopol is one of the city's largest employers, and BSF activities contribute significantly to the local economy. Sevastopol is also home to many BSF personnel, who maintain deep roots in the city which has been home to the fleet for over 200 years. During his October 25 interactive call-in show, President Putin promised that Moscow would provide for the relocation of sailors and their families to Novorossiisk or elsewhere in Russia. Institute of Europe Director Sergey Karaganov identified this as the toughest domestic political issue related to the BSF. Putin also reminded Ukraine of the negative economic impact that departure of the BSF and its personnel would have on the Crimean economy. Yazkova said that as 2017 approached, the GOR would increasingly emphasize the economic impact on the region of the BSF's withdrawal. ¶7. (C) While Novorossiisk's commercial facilities are well-developed, its naval facilities are modest and would require major investment to host the BSF. Embassy's Naval Attache estimated that, at a minimum, Novorossiisk would need seven years to prepare for the Fleet's relocation. Golts noted that Novorossiisk, upgraded with the proper naval facilities, would still be too small to support the complement of ships currently in the BSF. The Russian Navy has a limited presence -- several coastal patrol boats and a destroyer. Competition for space is also keen because Novorossiisk is one of Russia's two main ports for oil exports. With nearly a million barrels a day leaving the port now and a likely increase in seaborne energy exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, displacing commercial facilities to make room for the BSF makes little economic sense. . -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) While 2017 seems a long way off, the Russian government and military appear to be doing little to modernize the Black Sea Fleet or to plan for a possible new home port. While the fleet (and the Crimea) will continue to be populist hot buttons for Russian politicians, fiery rhetoric alone is not going to maintain the Black Sea Fleet's blue water capability in the future. RUSSELL