SOUTH OSSETIA: TALKS AND OBSERVERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 012999 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR OSCE GG RS SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: TALKS AND OBSERVERS REF: STATE 200939 Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) We met with Russian MFA Ambassador-at-Large for South Ossetia Yuri Popov on December 19 and 20, delivering reftel demarche on the latter date. Popov said he had not been following the budget issue -- he has just returned from leave -- and said he was unwilling to repeat previous Russian statements on the question of expanding the number of OSCE monitors. He preferred to make no comment and promised to "process" the issue with his superiors and get back to us. ¶2. (C) Popov was focused on the prospect of two meetings. The first, less controversial, was a meeting proposed by OSCE HOM Reeve to take place in January in Yerevan. More immediate was a newer proposal by the South Ossetians for an informal meeting December 27 in Tskhinvali. Popov showed us a December 12 fax from Kokoity to the JCC chiefs. It began with the ritual cursing of Georgia but went on to invite the JCC, EU, OSCE and UNHCR chiefs to meet informally with him in Tskhinvali to revitalize both the JCC Working Groups and the SIPDIS Authorized Delegations Experts Groups. ¶3. (C) Popov then showed us the December 19 reply from Georgian State Minister Antadze. It began with the ritual cursing of the Ossetians but went on to accept the invitation to meet with the JCC and to request a direct bilateral meeting with Kokoity. Popov said Antadze's reply was problematic: Antadze mentioned only a meeting with the JCC Co-Chairs, and Popov feared he would walk out if Kokoity tried to join in. He also noted that Kokoity was unlikely to grant Antadze a bilateral meeting, as the South Ossetians would consider Antadze's "level" inappropriate. ¶4. (C) We replied that Antadze had not mentioned the EU, OSCE or UNHCR in his acceptance either, but he would clearly be willing to include them; nor had he made his acceptance conditional on getting a bilateral meeting with Kokoity. We urged Popov to take yes for an answer and contact Antadze directly to work out any protocol problems. Popov said the issue was between the South Ossetians and Georgians; he had called the South Ossetians and urged them to work out the issues directly with Antadze. ¶5. (C) Popov thought Russian relations with Georgia have stabilized at their current low level, neither dropping further nor improving. He said press and politicians' fulminations about upcoming Georgian military actions were nonsense, and believed the chances of military confrontation are now very low. He assured us that the MFA -- including the Minister -- believed that sanctions against Georgia must be relaxed. Russia's Ambassador to Georgia is "desperate" to return, and Popov believed he might be sent back to Tbilisi early in the new year. ¶6. (C) Comment: Diplomatic presence is the only sanction against Georgia over which the MFA has jurisdiction or, possibly, influence. Publicly, the GOR line remains as hard as ever. With the press on December 19 and 20, FM Lavrov accused Georgia of bad faith, hostile actions, and gearing up to use force. He placed all blame on Georgia for current cold relations, and claimed that Georgia had left Russia's offered hand of friendship "hanging in the air." RUSSELL