SOUTH OSSETIA: TALKS AND OBSERVERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 012999

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: TALKS AND OBSERVERS

REF: STATE 200939

Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) We met with Russian MFA Ambassador-at-Large for South
Ossetia Yuri Popov on December 19 and 20, delivering reftel
demarche on the latter date. Popov said he had not been
following the budget issue -- he has just returned from leave
-- and said he was unwilling to repeat previous Russian
statements on the question of expanding the number of OSCE
monitors. He preferred to make no comment and promised to
"process" the issue with his superiors and get back to us.


2. (C) Popov was focused on the prospect of two meetings.
The first, less controversial, was a meeting proposed by OSCE
HOM Reeve to take place in January in Yerevan. More
immediate was a newer proposal by the South Ossetians for an
informal meeting December 27 in Tskhinvali. Popov showed us
a December 12 fax from Kokoity to the JCC chiefs. It began
with the ritual cursing of Georgia but went on to invite the
JCC, EU, OSCE and UNHCR chiefs to meet informally with him in
Tskhinvali to revitalize both the JCC Working Groups and the

SIPDIS
Authorized Delegations Experts Groups.


3. (C) Popov then showed us the December 19 reply from
Georgian State Minister Antadze. It began with the ritual
cursing of the Ossetians but went on to accept the invitation
to meet with the JCC and to request a direct bilateral
meeting with Kokoity. Popov said Antadze's reply was
problematic: Antadze mentioned only a meeting with the JCC
Co-Chairs, and Popov feared he would walk out if Kokoity
tried to join in. He also noted that Kokoity was unlikely to
grant Antadze a bilateral meeting, as the South Ossetians
would consider Antadze's "level" inappropriate.


4. (C) We replied that Antadze had not mentioned the EU, OSCE
or UNHCR in his acceptance either, but he would clearly be
willing to include them; nor had he made his acceptance
conditional on getting a bilateral meeting with Kokoity. We
urged Popov to take yes for an answer and contact Antadze
directly to work out any protocol problems. Popov said the
issue was between the South Ossetians and Georgians; he had
called the South Ossetians and urged them to work out the
issues directly with Antadze.


5. (C) Popov thought Russian relations with Georgia have
stabilized at their current low level, neither dropping
further nor improving. He said press and politicians'
fulminations about upcoming Georgian military actions were
nonsense, and believed the chances of military confrontation
are now very low. He assured us that the MFA -- including
the Minister -- believed that sanctions against Georgia must
be relaxed. Russia's Ambassador to Georgia is "desperate" to
return, and Popov believed he might be sent back to Tbilisi
early in the new year.


6. (C) Comment: Diplomatic presence is the only sanction
against Georgia over which the MFA has jurisdiction or,
possibly, influence. Publicly, the GOR line remains as hard
as ever. With the press on December 19 and 20, FM Lavrov
accused Georgia of bad faith, hostile actions, and gearing up
to use force. He placed all blame on Georgia for current
cold relations, and claimed that Georgia had left Russia's
offered hand of friendship "hanging in the air."
RUSSELL