RUSSIA: KIRIYENKO REVIEWS TEHRAN VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 012914 DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/IR (WOOSTER) AND EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 TAGS: KNNP PREL ETRD RU IR UN AORC SUBJECT: RUSSIA: KIRIYENKO REVIEWS TEHRAN VISIT REF: A. MOSCOW 10956 ¶B. MOSCOW 6165 ¶C. MOSCOW 4784 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a December 13 meeting with the Ambassador, Rosatom Director Kiriyenko provided his impressions from his recent trip to Tehran. He said Foreign Minister Mottaki had been full of bluster, claiming to be unafraid of sanctions and unconcerned about the United States. Mottaki had pointed out that the USG is threatening sanctions at the same time that it is contacting Iran for help in Iraq. Kiriyenko dismissed Tehran's claims of progress on nuclear enrichment as "comical." In a separate December 13 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Alekseyev expressed optimism that Russia and the U.S. will find common ground on a new UNSCR before Christmas. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity of a December 13 meeting with Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) Director Kiriyenko to ask about Kiriyenko's recent visit to Tehran (other subjects SEPTEL). Kiriyenko underscored that he had not gone there to negotiate any aspects of the nuclear enrichment issue, but purely in his capacity as co-chairman of the bilateral economic cooperation commission. He noted that his Iranian counterpart on the commission is now Foreign Minister Mottaki, who recently replaced the economic minister, but that there had been no "diplomatic filter" in the discussions. Mottaki had been full of bluster, emphasizing that he was not afraid of international sanctions nor of the United States. Mottaki had contended that it was contradictory that the United States threatens Iran with sanctions, but then contacts Iran for assistance with developments in Iraq. ¶3. (C) Kiriyenko said Mottaki also stated that the Iranian Government is unconcerned about events in Lebanon. Tehran believes its influence is rising there, and that it is playing a winning hand. Mottaki also expressed pessimism about the U.S. position in Afghanistan, arguing that NATO forces control only 30 percent of the territory during daylight hours, but nothing after nightfall. The Taliban was essentially back in power. ¶4. (C) Kiriyenko said his agency continues to have intensive contacts with mid-level Iranian officials regarding the schedule for Bushehr (REF A). He said Russia is still ;planning to deliver fuel in March 2007. Kiriyenko commented that he is fully aware of the "serious question" posed by Tehran's noncompliance with IAEA requirements, which Foreign Minister Lavrov is addressing. Still, he said, Russia does not want the reputation of a country that fulfills or does not fulfill its contracts based on political issues. Much will depend on how Iran reacts to a UNSCR, which Kiriyenko expects before Christmas. The Ambassador stressed the urgency of the situation, and the need to give strong, unified signals to Tehran. ¶5. (C) Kiriyenko said his own view is that significant sanctions will not be necessary, but that he doesn't think that Iran will make any sudden moves. He said the Iranian Government is well aware that if it ceases cooperation with the IAEA, Russia will stop all work on Bushehr. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked for Kiriyenko's assessment of how far along the Iranians are technically with their enrichment plans. Kiriyenko was dismissive. He described the series of Iranian statements as a "game," but more political in nature than technical. He suggested that their claims of progress were "comical." Tehran may claim to have succeeded in the requisite cascades, but the reality is that these are unlikely to work: a number of their centrifuges are flawed or broken. He said that claims of cascades of 30,000 and 60,000 are not consistent with reality and that he doubts that Iran would even have the necessary uranium to support such cascades. Kiriyenko said he supposed that, at most, Iran has succeeded in achieving a "few 164-unit cascades." He added that his staff has noticed a virtual collapse in the Iranian nuclear energy agency: many of its mid-level professionals have left. Those who remain, he said, cannot even distinquish between construction frames and pipes. ¶7. (C) Kiriyenko said it was clear that different Iranian agencies speak with different voices and intonations. Vice President Aqazadeh appeared more moderate. Kiriyenko found it revealing that Mottaki, for all his bluster, was nervous about Foreign Minister Lavrov's public statements earlier this week indicating that Russia had a favorable view of the new European draft sanctions resolution. Mottaki asked Kiriyenko three times if Lavrov had been misquoted, and seemed genuinely taken aback that Russia might vote for a sanctions resolution. ¶8. (C) In a separate December 13 meeting, the Ambassador pressed Deputy Foreign Minister Alekseyev (covering Iran in the absence of Foreign Minister Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak) for action in New York on an Iran resolution this week. Alekseyev was upbeat about prospects for the new European draft. Russia had "a few technical concerns," but saw no major problems. The MFA is trying to finish interagency consultations in Moscow, which is not easy given the complexity of sanctions measures. Alekseyev said he was confident, however, that Russia and the U.S. would find common ground and pass a resolution before Christmas. BURNS