RUSSIA: KIRIYENKO REVIEWS TEHRAN VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 012914


DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/IR (WOOSTER) AND EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: KNNP PREL ETRD RU IR UN AORC
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: KIRIYENKO REVIEWS TEHRAN VISIT

REF: A. MOSCOW 10956

B. MOSCOW 6165

C. MOSCOW 4784

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a December 13 meeting with the
Ambassador, Rosatom Director Kiriyenko provided his
impressions from his recent trip to Tehran. He said Foreign
Minister Mottaki had been full of bluster, claiming to be
unafraid of sanctions and unconcerned about the United
States. Mottaki had pointed out that the USG is threatening
sanctions at the same time that it is contacting Iran for
help in Iraq. Kiriyenko dismissed Tehran's claims of
progress on nuclear enrichment as "comical." In a separate
December 13 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Alekseyev
expressed optimism that Russia and the U.S. will find common
ground on a new UNSCR before Christmas. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity of a December 13
meeting with Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom)
Director Kiriyenko to ask about Kiriyenko's recent visit to
Tehran (other subjects SEPTEL). Kiriyenko underscored that
he had not gone there to negotiate any aspects of the nuclear
enrichment issue, but purely in his capacity as co-chairman
of the bilateral economic cooperation commission. He noted
that his Iranian counterpart on the commission is now Foreign
Minister Mottaki, who recently replaced the economic
minister, but that there had been no "diplomatic filter" in
the discussions. Mottaki had been full of bluster,
emphasizing that he was not afraid of international sanctions
nor of the United States. Mottaki had contended that it was
contradictory that the United States threatens Iran with
sanctions, but then contacts Iran for assistance with
developments in Iraq.


3. (C) Kiriyenko said Mottaki also stated that the Iranian
Government is unconcerned about events in Lebanon. Tehran
believes its influence is rising there, and that it is
playing a winning hand. Mottaki also expressed pessimism
about the U.S. position in Afghanistan, arguing that NATO
forces control only 30 percent of the territory during
daylight hours, but nothing after nightfall. The Taliban was
essentially back in power.


4. (C) Kiriyenko said his agency continues to have intensive
contacts with mid-level Iranian officials regarding the
schedule for Bushehr (REF A). He said Russia is still
planning to deliver fuel in March 2007. Kiriyenko commented
that he is fully aware of the "serious question" posed by
Tehran's noncompliance with IAEA requirements, which Foreign
Minister Lavrov is addressing. Still, he said, Russia does
not want the reputation of a country that fulfills or does
not fulfill its contracts based on political issues. Much
will depend on how Iran reacts to a UNSCR, which Kiriyenko
expects before Christmas. The Ambassador stressed the
urgency of the situation, and the need to give strong,
unified signals to Tehran.


5. (C) Kiriyenko said his own view is that significant
sanctions will not be necessary, but that he doesn't think
that Iran will make any sudden moves. He said the Iranian
Government is well aware that if it ceases cooperation with
the IAEA, Russia will stop all work on Bushehr.


6. (C) The Ambassador asked for Kiriyenko's assessment of
how far along the Iranians are technically with their
enrichment plans. Kiriyenko was dismissive. He described
the series of Iranian statements as a "game," but more
political in nature than technical. He suggested that their
claims of progress were "comical." Tehran may claim to have
succeeded in the requisite cascades, but the reality is that
these are unlikely to work: a number of their centrifuges are
flawed or broken. He said that claims of cascades of 30,000
and 60,000 are not consistent with reality and that he doubts
that Iran would even have the necessary uranium to support
such cascades. Kiriyenko said he supposed that, at most,
Iran has succeeded in achieving a "few 164-unit cascades."
He added that his staff has noticed a virtual collapse in the
Iranian nuclear energy agency: many of its mid-level
professionals have left. Those who remain, he said, cannot
even distinquish between construction frames and pipes.


7. (C) Kiriyenko said it was clear that different Iranian
agencies speak with different voices and intonations. Vice
President Aqazadeh appeared more moderate. Kiriyenko found
it revealing that Mottaki, for all his bluster, was nervous
about Foreign Minister Lavrov's public statements earlier
this week indicating that Russia had a favorable view of the
new European draft sanctions resolution. Mottaki asked
Kiriyenko three times if Lavrov had been misquoted, and
seemed genuinely taken aback that Russia might vote for a

sanctions resolution.


8. (C) In a separate December 13 meeting, the Ambassador
pressed Deputy Foreign Minister Alekseyev (covering Iran in
the absence of Foreign Minister Lavrov and Deputy Foreign
Minister Kislyak) for action in New York on an Iran
resolution this week. Alekseyev was upbeat about prospects
for the new European draft. Russia had "a few technical
concerns," but saw no major problems. The MFA is trying to
finish interagency consultations in Moscow, which is not easy
given the complexity of sanctions measures. Alekseyev said
he was confident, however, that Russia and the U.S. would
find common ground and pass a resolution before Christmas.
BURNS