"A JUST RUSSIA": DIFFICULT BEGINNING, UNCERTAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012901

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: "A JUST RUSSIA": DIFFICULT BEGINNING, UNCERTAIN
FUTURE

REF: A. MOSCOW 12168

B. MOSCOW 12498

C. MOSCOW 12708

D. ST. PETERSBURG 00729

E. YEKATERINBURG 00405

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4(b).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Spravedlivaya Rossiya (SR) (&A Just Russia8),often
referred to as the &second8 Kremlin party, has been
officially registered. The party has moved to constitute
itself at the federal and local levels, by combining elements
of its constituent parties --Rodina, the Russian Party of
Life, and the Russian Party of Pensioners-- and by casting
itself as a left-leaning alternative to United Russia (YR).
Presidium Secretary Aleksandr Babakov downplayed to us
reported difficulties in uniting the parties in the regions,
criticized YR's lack of a legislative agenda, but reiterated
that SR would support for President the candidate best able
to continue Putin's policies. The rise of SR is seen here as
"managed democracy," injecting officially-sanctioned
competition into the electoral process, while maintaining
loyalty to Putin. Pollsters record a positive reception to
SR, and analysts predict a credible showing in the March
regional elections. While the party talks about ideology,
most believe that its rivalry with YR is part of a larger
struggle for power and not an argument about ideas. End
summary.

--------------
Step Forward: Party Registration
--------------


2. (U) The Russian Federal Registration Service officially
registered SR as a political party on November 28. SR,s
Presidium Secretary Aleksandr Babakov used the announcement
of the registration to reaffirm the commitment of SR,s three
constituent parties --Rodina, the Russian Party of Life
(RPL),and the Russian Party of Pensioners (RPP) -- to
participate as a united force in the 2007 regional and State
Duma elections.

--------------
Win-Win-Win
--------------


3. (C) According to independent political analyst and RPL
insider Aleksandr Morozov, all three of the founding parties
benefited from the creation of SR. RPL is first among
equals, because its Chairman Sergey Mironov had long proposed
the idea of creating a viable, multi-party system. Per
Morozov, with the departure of Rodina founder Rogozin,
Rodina,s influence was destined to diminish over time.
Morozov thought Babakov was aware of that inevitability, and
seized the proposed merger as a way to salvage Rodina. The
Russian Party of Pensioners (RPP) was in a different
position, Morozov said. The RPP was growing in the regions,
but its strength was also its weakness: it could attract
pensioners, but few others, and as a result was destined to
play a minor role at the federal level. With the merger,
each party was awarded an important leadership position and,
according to Morozov, the synergies created should lead SR to
greater overall success in the upcoming elections.

--------------
Growing Pains: Merging Apparatchiks
--------------


4. (C) Following registration, the SR leadership immediately
began consolidating responsibilities at the federal and
regional levels. Mironov was chosen to head SR. Babakov will
chair the party presidium; and Igor Zotov, former leader of
the Russian Party of Pensioners, was named Secretary of the
Central Council. Of the three, Mironov is the best known.
He is a staunch Putin supporter, who has been at pains since
the merger to stress that SR supports the President, but
opposes YR. A few contacts see Mironov as an effective
public official, known for his ability to reach out to all
levels of society and for his loyalty to his friends. Others
question his political acuity. Kremlin watcher and Director
of the Institute for Applied Politics Olga Kryshtanovskaya
called Mironov an "idiot" in a recent conversation, and said
he lacked leadership potential. Dmitriy Oreshkin, President
of the public relations firm Mercator Group, believed Mironov
lacked talent, but thought his &siloviki8 supporters in the

MOSCOW 00012901 002 OF 003


Kremlin might work around the Mironov to make the party into
a viable alternative to YR. Rodina's Babakov is described as
smart and possessed of a keen business sense. Zotov on the
other hand is known as a technocrat. Babakov and Zotov were
elevated within their respective parties after their
charismatic leaders, Dmitriy Rogozin and Valery Gartung ran
afoul of the Kremlin in spring/summer 2006.


5. (C) SR,s swift registration occurred in the face of
continuing widespread conflict among the three parties at the
regional level, and dissent among some in Rodina at the
national level. In a December 6 meeting, Babakov told
visiting EUR/RUS Director Warlick that there were no
"cardinal differences" among the constituent parties, just
"political ambitions" in the regions that have resulted in
"technical difficulties" but no insurmountable barriers.
Mironov has termed the friction natural and guessed that no
more than 7 to 10 percent of members of the three parties
will leave SR as a result of the merger. Mironov predicted
that by early 2007, SR will have more members on its roles
than the three organizations had prior to their merger.
Babakov agreed, predicting to us that SR would quickly have
one-half million members.


6. (SBU) This may be easier said than done. Recent media
reports tell of scandals in the regions as the local party
branches consolidate, based on the relative strength of RPL,
Rodina and RPP in each region. Examples:

-- at SR,s founding session, some members of the St.
Petersburg Rodina faction, lead by Duma Deputy Yuriy
Savelyev, chose not to join SR;

-- in Tatarstan, inter-party problems have preceded
announcements of the merger, and reportedly have only
intensified since;

-- the media report that two, competing SR regional party
conferences were held in Voronezh over the Dec 2-3 weekend;

-- initial attempts to create a unified regional branch of SR
in Sverdlovsk have proven unsuccessful due to "bad blood"
between local Rodina and RPL leaders (ref e);

-- the Nizhniy Novgorod SR unification conference, scheduled
for December 7, was postponed because the groups reportedly
were unable to reach agreements within their individual
constituencies regarding their respective candidates for
regional leadership.



--------------
SR's Choice for President
--------------


8. (C) Babakov sidestepped the question of whether SR would
field its own presidential candidate or support Putin's
choice. Key to its decision would be its performance in the
2007 Duma elections. On the one hand, Babakov said, there was
no reason, given the President's 70 percent approval rating,
to reject his candidate. On the other hand, the party would
in the end back the candidate who would ensure the
continuation of Putin's policies.

--------------
What Makes &A Just Russia8 Different?
--------------


9. (SBU) In contrast to YR, which SR criticized for lacking
a political ideology beyond supporting Putin, SR combines
three parties that have tried, with varying degrees of
success, to carve out ideological niches and to develop
constituencies. Many of SR,s proposals focus on traditional
"leftwing" issues. Some of those appear to have been lifted
directly from the Communist Party's agenda (ref c). Its
legislative proposals will include a progressive tax to
benefit lower and middle-income wage workers, the
establishment of a fair minimum wage, and a system of checks
that opposition groups in the Duma could use to balance the
power of the YR majority. SR also proposes better use of the
Stabilization Fund, increased pensions, and a campaign
against corruption.


10. (C) Babakov noted that, in contrast, YR has no
legislative agenda. (Virtually all legislative initiatives
originate in the Presidential Administration.) While
supporting the President's emphasis on stability "in the
political and economic sphere," Babakov labeled the current

MOSCOW 00012901 003 OF 003


political monopoly "dangerous." SR would promote
responsibility, not populism. In so doing, he predicted, SR
would bleed support from the Communist Party, although he
recognized that it would take time to wean Communist Party
supporters from the "habit" of voting for Zyuganov.

--------------
Why &Just Russia8 Now?
--------------


11. (C) Several political analysts with whom we spoke see
the creation of SR and Putin's sanction of it as an attempt
to create a "managed democracy" and to challenge YR's
monopoly on power, all while trying to revive the flagging
interest of the electorate. Among our contacts, it was
widely assumed that Mironov and SR are supported by
Presidential Administration Deputy Igor Sechin and the
so-called "siloviki" within the Kremlin, in addition to
ex-FSB officials throughout the regions.


12. (SBU) Recent polling by the All-Russia Public Opinion
Research Firm (VTsIOM) showed political elites, the
intelligentsia, and some regional authorities receptive to
SR. On the other hand, polling by The Public Opinion
Foundation (FOM),an offshoot of VTsIOM, seems to show that
YR continues to command considerable support across social
and economic strata. According to FOM,s research, except
for a dip in popularity following the monetization of
benefits in early 2005, YR's popularity has remained stable.
Extensive media coverage and its relationship to Putin will
only make it more popular, FOM contends.

--------------
&Just Russia's8 Future
--------------


13. (C) SR,s party leadership and analysts agree that the
March 2007 regional elections will be the new party's proving
ground. At a recent press conference, Babakov said that he
thought that SR would have a good chance for success, which
would lay the ground for what he predicted would be a
majority in the December 2007 Duma elections. According to
RPL insider Morozov, SR has a realistic chance of winning 30
- 40 percent of the votes in St. Petersburg and other RPL
strongholds. Sergey Mikheyev, an expert on regional politics
from the Center of Political Technologies (CPT),agreed that
SR has the potential to attract approximately 50 percent of
YR supporters, among whom are:

-- those who voted for YR because of Putin's leadership;
-- those who are disenchanted by YR bureaucracy and
inefficiency;
-- those who support specific issues which YR has failed to
address or has addressed inappropriately;
-- and finally those who joined YR because of its connections
to the Kremlin.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) While SR is attempting to publicly position itself
as a social democratic alternative to the more conservative
United Russia, it is ultimately power and control of the
Kremlin --not ideology-- that is important to its leadership.
In that sweepstakes, United Russia clearly retains the upper
hand, as the large number of prominent politicians who
attended YR's December 2 convention in Yekaterinburg attests.
While President Putin has "blessed" the formation of SR, it
appears that the Kremlin has done little to assist the party
as it attempts to gain a foothold, and it is not clear that
Mironov alone has the ability to do that heavy lifting. He
has not, for example, had the means to impose his will on the
regional leaderships of the three constituent parties as they
squabble over jobs in the newly-constituted party, and SR's
only notable recent addition to its short roster of prominent
party personalities has been figure skater Yevgeniy
Plyushchenko, who will reportedly occupy SR's third slot,
after Mironov and a number two who has not yet been named.


15. (C) Still, some observers see SR's difficulties in the
regions as part of the inevitable birth pangs of a new party,
and they point to what they say is YR's vigorous response at
its December 2 convention as evidence that the reigning
Kremlin party is not taking its newly-minted rival for
granted.
BURNS