Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW12838
2006-12-07 14:16:00
SECRET
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
RUSSIA WANTS "PREDICTABILITY" IN POST-START
how-toVZCZCXRO9076 OO RUEHDBU DE RUEHMO #2838 3411416 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 071416Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5737 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T MOSCOW 012838
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PARM MCAP PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS "PREDICTABILITY" IN POST-START
ARRANGEMENT
REF: STATE 169770
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).
S E C R E T MOSCOW 012838
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PARM MCAP PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS "PREDICTABILITY" IN POST-START
ARRANGEMENT
REF: STATE 169770
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).
1. (S) Russia will insist on predictability in any
arrangement that follows expiration of the START Treaty in
2009, according to Vasiliy Boryak, Chief of the START Office
in the Foreign Ministry's Department for Disarmament and
Security Affairs. First and foremost, Boryak told us
December 7, was Russia's desire to retain a specific list of
limitations in the new accord, with subsequent negotiation of
numerical ceilings on warheads. In this respect, Boryak
noted that Russia's position had not changed significantly
since it presented a set of START review proposals last
summer.
2. (S) Boryak underlined that predictability remained a
fundamental tenet of U.S.-Russia arms control relations; at a
minimum, Moscow needed to be assured of future trend lines on
numerical ceilings, which was not clear in reftel letter to
Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak from U/S Joseph. Boryak also
emphasized our respective obligations under Article 6 of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both Russia and the U.S. would
likely come under increasing pressure to reduce further the
level of nuclear weapons.
3. (S) Boryak said DFM Kislyak would respond formally to U/S
Joseph's letter when they meet December 8. In addition to
insisting on limitations on launch platforms and warheads,
Kislyak will note that:
-- Moscow is not opposed to visits to operational sites but
would insist that the purpose be clearly defined. In this
respect, Boryak foresaw tough negotiations on specific
locations and on defining strategic weapons.
-- Site visits at nuclear test facilities would not be
appropriate.
-- There should be a verification mechanism, though it could
be less burdensome than existing provisions in the START
Treaty.
-- There should be no deployment of nuclear weapons outside
respective national territory.
4. (S) None of these was an insurmountable obstacle, in
Boryak's view. Differences in approach have always
characterized U.S.-Russia arms control relations. Kislyak,
Boryak noted, was confident that both sides would be able to
establish a level of trust necessary to reach agreement.
Boryak added that Kislyak valued his relationship with U/S
Joseph.
BURNS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PARM MCAP PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS "PREDICTABILITY" IN POST-START
ARRANGEMENT
REF: STATE 169770
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).
1. (S) Russia will insist on predictability in any
arrangement that follows expiration of the START Treaty in
2009, according to Vasiliy Boryak, Chief of the START Office
in the Foreign Ministry's Department for Disarmament and
Security Affairs. First and foremost, Boryak told us
December 7, was Russia's desire to retain a specific list of
limitations in the new accord, with subsequent negotiation of
numerical ceilings on warheads. In this respect, Boryak
noted that Russia's position had not changed significantly
since it presented a set of START review proposals last
summer.
2. (S) Boryak underlined that predictability remained a
fundamental tenet of U.S.-Russia arms control relations; at a
minimum, Moscow needed to be assured of future trend lines on
numerical ceilings, which was not clear in reftel letter to
Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak from U/S Joseph. Boryak also
emphasized our respective obligations under Article 6 of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both Russia and the U.S. would
likely come under increasing pressure to reduce further the
level of nuclear weapons.
3. (S) Boryak said DFM Kislyak would respond formally to U/S
Joseph's letter when they meet December 8. In addition to
insisting on limitations on launch platforms and warheads,
Kislyak will note that:
-- Moscow is not opposed to visits to operational sites but
would insist that the purpose be clearly defined. In this
respect, Boryak foresaw tough negotiations on specific
locations and on defining strategic weapons.
-- Site visits at nuclear test facilities would not be
appropriate.
-- There should be a verification mechanism, though it could
be less burdensome than existing provisions in the START
Treaty.
-- There should be no deployment of nuclear weapons outside
respective national territory.
4. (S) None of these was an insurmountable obstacle, in
Boryak's view. Differences in approach have always
characterized U.S.-Russia arms control relations. Kislyak,
Boryak noted, was confident that both sides would be able to
establish a level of trust necessary to reach agreement.
Boryak added that Kislyak valued his relationship with U/S
Joseph.
BURNS