KOSOVO: RUSSIAN POSITION ON UNSC VETO HARDENING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012819 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEV UNMIK SR YI RS SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIAN POSITION ON UNSC VETO HARDENING REF: A. MOSCOW 12549 ¶B. MOSCOW 12351 ¶C. MOSCOW 10438 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In late-November meetings in Moscow, Kosovo Prime Minister Ceku failed to get assurances that Russia would not use its veto when the Security Council takes up the status issue early next year. Russian officials have signaled that they might ultimately deploy a veto to block a UN Security Council resolution that implicitly endorses an independent Kosovo. The MFA told us that Ceku made it clear that Kosovo was intent on independence, but pledged he would continue to act within the Contact Group as long as that framework existed. A veto could be motivated by Moscow's desire to avoid a precedent for recognition of other separatist regions, domestic politics, and Russia's need to demonstrate that its views must be taken into account by the international community. Former PM Gaidar warned the Ambassador that the U.S. and EU should not underestimate Kosovo's corrosiveness in Russia's overall relationship with the West. At this point, it's hard to say how much of Russia's veto talk is bluff and how much is real -- but it's clear that the Russian position has hardened over the past few months. END SUMMARY. . PM CEKU'S VISIT YIELDS NO CONCESSIONS FROM MOSCOW -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In the first official visit to Moscow by Kosovar representatives, Prime Minister Agim Ceku sought but failed to get assurances that the GOR would not use its veto in the UN Security Council when Kosovo's status is taken up early next year. Viktoria Prokhorovo, who assists GOR Special Envoy on Kosovo Botsan-Kharchenko, told us that Deputy Foreign Minister Titov advised Ceku during his late November visit that "it's far too early to start talking about a veto." Instead, Ceku was informed by his Russian interlocutors that the GOR would not make a public or private commitment regarding a veto until after UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari released his proposed Kosovo status package sometime after the January 21 Serbian elections. ¶3. (C) Taking into account Serbian sensitivities, the GOR had billed the Ceku visit as "unofficial" and "low-key," Prokhorovo said. In fact, Serbian Political Counselor Boris Sekulic told us, Moscow consulted closely with Belgrade 
before the visit. Sekulic told us Belgrade was not happy about Ceku's visit, but did not raise objections. In addition to Titov, Ceku met with Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev and Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairman Mikhail Margelov. ¶4. (C) According to Prokhorovo, Ceku made it clear that Kosovo would pursue independence and a seat in the United Nations. However, Ceku also assured the GOR that the Kosovars would continue to act within the Contact Group as long as that framework existed. Ceku told his Russian interlocutors that he wanted UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's report to be made public several days after the January Serbian elections. GOR officials told Ceku that, regardless of the status issue, Moscow expected Kosovar authorities to uphold international standards regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, including the protection of religious sites and the return of Serb refugees to the province. . WHERE IS THE GOR ON A VETO? -------------- ¶5. (C) There are increasing signs that a veto could be in the cards. President Putin's September announcement that the GOR might use its veto if the Kosovo final status package was not in Russia's interests was followed by statements in the G-8 Political Directors gathering in Moscow in November and in discussions between DFM Titov and Assistant Secretary Fried (reftels A and B) that represented a hardening of Russia views. While underlining that the MFA had not yet made any final decisions, the MFA's Prokhorovo speculated that a unilateral declaration of independence by Pristina might act as a trigger for a Russian veto. The MFA continues to push for a Kosovo package that has the approval of both Belgrade and Pristina. The MFA sees Ahtisaari's report as a starting point for negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, not the final act, Prokhorovo said. FM Lavrov reiterated in his OSCE bilateral with Serbian FM Draskovic that Russia did not support any "artificial" time frame for a resolution of the status question. MOSCOW 00012819 002 OF 003 . EXPERT VIEWS ON VETO THREAT -------------- ¶6. (C) Former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, before he fell ill, warned the Ambassador not to underestimate the emotional impact of Serbia on Russian society. During a November 22 meeting, Gaidar underscored his concern that -- based on recent discussions in Washington and New York -- the U.S. was underestimating Russian resolve and the damage Kosovo could still inflict on our bilateral relations. The Ambassador reiterated the case for providing a clear vision of the future for Kosovars, and noted the dangers posed to the region by continued delay. Gaidar responded that whether the U.S. liked it or not, Kosovo would be a precedent, and it was not a precedent that served Russia's interests. He said that pushing for a settlement that did not meet with Belgrade's approval would play into the hands of Russian hard-liners in an election year. Gaidar urged caution, and a continued effort to find a solution that Serbia could live with. ¶7. (C) Other experts we have spoken with are also increasingly concerned that Moscow will use its veto to prevent international recognition of a change in Kosovo's status. Former French Political Director and newly arrived Ambassador Stanislas de Laboulaye told the Ambassador that in his initial soundings on the issue, he detected signs that Russia would try to throw up a roadblock to stop the status process. We have heard similar concerns from British and Swedish diplomats. ¶8. (C) Tatyana Parkhalina, Director of NATO's Center for European Security in Moscow, cautioned that Russia might stumble into the use of its veto because of its concerns about appearing too weak. She argued that Russia was not motivated out of a sense of duty to Serbia. However, Russia was eager to show that it could stand up to the West if need be to protect its interests and that Moscow's views must be taken into account. Since the GOR had already made clear that Belgrade needed to be on board with any final status arrangement for Kosovo, a veto would be seen by the GOR as less odious than allowing a pro-independence UNSCR to go forward over Russian objections. Even abstaining from the vote could be seen as a failure, given Russia's strong public rhetoric in favor of the Serbs. . ORTHODOX CHURCH VIEWS -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite predictions by Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) representatives that the Church and like-minded politicians would seek to raise public awareness about Kosovo, we have yet to see indications of a public campaign. Father Nikolay Balashov, in the ROC's External Relations Division, stated that the interests of the Orthodox community would best be served if the Serbian minority and Orthodox religious sites in Kosovo were protected and if Kosovo retained "some form of ties" to Serbia that reflected the significance that Kosovo holds for the Serbian (and Orthodox) identity. Balashov acknowledged that Kosovo might not carry the same emotional weight with the Russian public that it did in 1999, but those feelings could be revived if the Serbian Orthodox community was under threat again. He reiterated that the ROC supported the position on Kosovo adopted in the Serbian Orthodox Church's November 2005 Holy Synod of Bishops. Balashov acknowledged that there were divisions within the Serbian Church over Kosovo and characterized Bishop Artemije, who had made a private visit to Moscow in September, as someone who espoused more radical views. . SERBIAN EMBASSY -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite GOR hints that it might veto a UNSC resolution on Kosovo if Belgrade was not in agreement, the Serbian Embassy's Sekulic said he doubted Russia would follow through. "Russia will put relations with the West before Serbia," he said. "If they veto, it will not be because they are looking out for the best interests of Serbia. It will be because they want to show the West they can be strong." Kosovo expert Pavel Kandel, of the Russian Academy of Science's Institute of Europe, agreed. Kosovo and Serbia were no longer hot political issues in Russia, as they were in 1999. Though Serbia and Kosovo still resonate among some of the Russian political elite, the average Russian did not care much about the issue these days. Public opinion could be swayed by a Kremlin-sponsored media campaign, but no such campaign had appeared, Kandel said. Sekulic added that although a UNSC resolution on Kosovo's independence would be MOSCOW 00012819 003 OF 003 bad from Belgrade's point of view, a veto would not be much better in the long run. In the event of a veto, Kosovo would unilaterally seek recognition with key international players -- such as the U.S. -- and would eventually be able to cement its legitimacy as an independent state. "Once that process begins, it cannot be stopped," he said. . COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The GOR is clearly dropping hints that it might veto a UNSCR on Kosovo independence in order to influence Ahtisaari's Kosovo package and pressure Contact Group members to consider a longer negotiating process. It is not yet clear whether this is a negotiating tactic or whether the GOR is seriously considering a veto. There is an increasing danger, however, that the GOR could box itself into a corner through it public commitments to Serbia, hints of a veto, and statements linking Kosovo's final status with other frozen conflicts. BURNS