RUSSIA: SOME "DEMOCRATS" UNITE, LARGER DIVISIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012750

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: SOME "DEMOCRATS" UNITE, LARGER DIVISIONS
REMAIN

REF: A. YEKATERINBURG 404


B. MOSCOW 12143

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Poor performances in the October 8 regional elections
notwithstanding, the democratic, western-leaning political
parties and movements --Yabloko, SPS, Other Russia, the
Republican Party of Russia-- show few signs of being willing
to join forces to contest the March 2007 regional elections
and the national elections to the State Duma later that year.
A combination of personalities, inertia, and disarray
continues to impede their efforts. Interference by
authorities at the national and local levels seems to play a
less significant role. According to the parties' own
assessment, also handicapping their efforts is the belief of
many Russians that the Putin government is a liberal one,
which most likely would translate, for those voters
dissatisfied with the status quo, into votes for the
newly-minted, Kremlin-sponsored "opposition" party "Just
Russia." End summary.

SPS and Republican Party Unite; but Yabloko Abstains
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2. (C) Union of Right Forces (SPS) Executive Vice Chairman
Leonid Gozman confirmed his party's merger with Aleksandr
Ryzhkov's Republican Party of Russia (RPR),but downplayed
the significance, noting that "zero plus zero" produced
little political traction. Gozman detailed SPS's marginal
showing in regional elections, never exceeding the two
percent range, and argued that the faint one-percent register
by RPR in the Astrakhan elections reflected the fact that
Ryzhkov had failed to breath life into his political party.
"RPR does not exist," he emphasized, while conceding that the
Central Election Commission's technical objections had
complicated the party's efforts to secure registration.
Echoing comments to us by Yabloko party leaders and leading
"political technologists," and contradicting Ryzhkov's
assessment, Gozman concluded that the inability of RPR to
secure registration reflected the party's weakness, and not
the Kremlin's antagonism.


3. (C) Both Gozman and Yabloko Deputy Sergey Ivanenko told
us that unification talks between the two major democratic
parties were at a standstill. Gozman insisted it was a
question of personalities, not ideology; Ivanenko maintained
it was Yabloko's principled rejection of the radical free
market and economic reform policies embraced by the SPS
leadership in the 90s, whose architects were unrepentant over
the consequences -- social and political -- to this day.
Ivanenko emphasized that survey data confirmed that Chubais
and Gaidar were lightning rods for public disaffection with
"liberal" reforms. Their inclusion on a democratic party
ticket, he argued, would send many of the core liberal base
(as much as 30 percent of the population, Gozman and Ivanenko
separately speculated) into the arms of the newly formed Just
Russia, with its self-conscious and demagogic appeal to
social-democratic policies.

Grudging Admiration for Just Russia Political Positioning
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4. (C) While Gozman and Ivanenko savaged Just Russia
chairman Sergey Mironov's political skills ("idiot," "moron,"
and "politically autistic" were among their epithets),they
credited the newly midwifed party with being well-placed to
pick up the anti-United Russia vote. The democratic parties
were on the defensive, Ivanenko said, because most United
Russia voters believe that the Putin government is a liberal
one; therefore, dissatisfaction with United Russia translated
into votes against both the party of power, but not interest
in its democratic party opponents. (Separately, Ivanenko
quoted a poll, according to which 30 percent of democratic
party supporters wanted a unified "rightist" party, but with
Putin as its head.) Ivanenko speculated that Just Russia was
best positioned to capitalize on voter discontent, but
questioned whether the Kremlin understood the destabilizing
potential of setting up two officially sanctioned parties in
opposition to one another. Rather than providing a vehicle
for otherwise disempowered local elites (as Yabloko had done
in Karelia),Just Russia could cleave the bureaucratic elite
in a manner that ultimately would be destabilizing.

Perm Elections Will Shape SPS Strategy

MOSCOW 00012750 002 OF 003


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5. (C) If SPS makes a convincing showing in the December 3
election in Perm, Gozman explained, the party leadership will
make one more effort to convince Yabloko to join it, but
otherwise will be prepared to contest the elections alone.
Local party leaders were optimistic that SPS, headed by party
leader Nikita Belykh, could secure 10 percent of the vote in
Perm. In a November 27 meeting, Sergey Mikheyev of the
Center for Political Technologies was less certain. He
predicted that SPS would finish in "third or fourth place"
with about 5 percent of the vote. Mikheyev attributed the
SPS's weaker-then-expected showing to Belykh's ties to the
region (he was formerly deputy governor) which,
paradoxically, were causing him to campaign delicately in the
event he would have to return to Perm. Mikheyev scoffed at
SPS's campaign slogan --"it is time to take care of
unfinished business"-- which in Russian recalled the
"perestroika" process of the Gorbachev years. (Also possibly
confounding SPS's hopes was Rodina's "very aggressive"
campaign, Mikheykev said, which could bring it a second-place
or third-place finish. Aiding Rodina's efforts was a talented
team from Moscow.)


6. (C) If the outcome for SPS was substantially lower, Gozman
intimated that some party leaders might advocate folding and
joining the Yabloko ticket on its terms. In either scenario,
Gozman questioned whether the "democrats" would cross the
seven percent threshold for representation in the Duma,
noting that the combined Yabloko-SPS ticket had received 11
percent of the vote in Moscow, where support for the
democrats was generally twice as strong as outside the
capital. Ivanenko echoed Gozman's assessment, underscoring
the near impossibility of reaching the seven percent bar.

Relations with Kremlin
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7. (C) SPS and Yabloko continue to enjoy "correct"
relations with the Kremlin. Ivanenko joked that the Kremlin
wanted a small democratic opposition, while Yabloko wanted a
big opposition. Kremlin backing meant tacit support for
Yabloko's fundraising, with no negative consequences for the
party's sponsors. However, Ivanenko maintained, when the
party grew too big, as in Karelia (ref b),Kremlin tolerance
stopped. Gozman was more equivocal, noting that the Kremlin
would not eliminate SPS, but would not help it either.
Putin's frustration over the inability of the democrats to
unite had led the Russian President to wash his hands of the
parties' leaderships around six months ago, Gozman said.
Both parties have good coverage on NTV, but little exposure
on the two GOR channels that have the most viewers. Neither
leader complained about print media coverage, and both
reconfirmed the free-wheeling nature of the internet.

Other Russia
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8. (C) Other Russia (OR) does not factor into the two
larger democratic parties' political strategy. Ivanenko,
noting that OR cannot claim a single member in the Duma, said
its only value would be in promoting a single democratic
presidential candidate -- a strategy that OR leaders have
rejected, reflecting the divisions within the movement and
the rival presidential aspirations of former Prime Minister
Kasyanov and his erstwhile ally, Garry Kasparov.


9. (C) Kasparov claimed in a recent conversation to be
seeking allies for OR everywhere. The key requirement seemed
to be adamant opposition to the Kremlin and the political
parties it sponsored, and a willingness to put aside personal
differences in the interest of the larger struggle. Yabloko
was not qualified, he said dismissively, both because of
leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's unwillingness to compromise and
the party's alleged cozy relationship with the Presidential
Administration. In his search for allies, Kasparov had met
recently with National Bolshevik leader Eduard Limonov, with
whom he thought limited cooperation would be possible.
Kasparov's frequent trips to the Russian regions had put him
in contact with devout Russian Orthodox and "conservatives,"
who were initially hostile to his message, but who might,
under certain circumstances, make common cause with
western-oriented democratic parties. Kasparov promised to
continue his search for allies. OR's next event would be a
Moscow rally on December 12 for which he predicted a large
turnout.

Comment
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MOSCOW 00012750 003 OF 003




10. (C) With their potential voters either finding what they
want in one of the two Kremlin-sponsored parties or choosing
not to vote at all, it is difficult to see how parties like
Yabloko, SPS, the RPR, or Other Russia can halt their slide
toward irrelevance. Many Russians credit the Putin regime
for creating stability, a highly-prized commodity here after
the turmoil of the Yeltsin years. With incomes rising, they
are loath to cast their votes for the leaders of parties who
at best have been unable to capture their imagination and, at
worst, are so immune to compromise that they are unable to
pool their efforts, even when their parties are on the brink
of extinction.
BURNS