RUSSIA: SOME "DEMOCRATS" UNITE, LARGER DIVISIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012750 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA: SOME "DEMOCRATS" UNITE, LARGER DIVISIONS REMAIN REF: A. YEKATERINBURG 404 ¶B. MOSCOW 12143 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Poor performances in the October 8 regional elections notwithstanding, the democratic, western-leaning political parties and movements --Yabloko, SPS, Other Russia, the Republican Party of Russia-- show few signs of being willing to join forces to contest the March 2007 regional elections and the national elections to the State Duma later that year. A combination of personalities, inertia, and disarray continues to impede their efforts. Interference by authorities at the national and local levels seems to play a less significant role. According to the parties' own assessment, also handicapping their efforts is the belief of many Russians that the Putin government is a liberal one, which most likely would translate, for those voters dissatisfied with the status quo, into votes for the newly-minted, Kremlin-sponsored "opposition" party "Just Russia." End summary. SPS and Republican Party Unite; but Yabloko Abstains -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Union of Right Forces (SPS) Executive Vice Chairman Leonid Gozman confirmed his party's merger with Aleksandr Ryzhkov's Republican Party of Russia (RPR),but downplayed the significance, noting that "zero plus zero" produced little political traction. Gozman detailed SPS's marginal showing in regional elections, never exceeding the two percent range, and argued that the faint one-percent register by RPR in the Astrakhan elections reflected the fact that Ryzhkov had failed to breath life into his political party. "RPR does not exist," he emphasized, while conceding that the Central Election Commission's technical objections had complicated the party's efforts to secure registration. Echoing comments to us by Yabloko party leaders and leading "political technologists," and contradicting Ryzhkov's assessment, Gozman concluded that the inability of RPR to secure registration reflected the party's weakness, and not the Kremlin's antagonism. ¶3. (C) Both Gozman and Yabloko Deputy Sergey Ivanenko told us that unification talks between the two major democratic parties were at a standstill. Gozman insisted it was a question of personalities, not ideology; Ivanenko maintained it was Yabloko's principled rejection of the radical free market and economic reform policies embraced by the SPS leadership in the 90s, whose architects were unrepentant over the consequences -- social and political -- to this day. Ivanenko emphasized that survey data confirmed that Chubais and Gaidar were lightning rods for public disaffection with "liberal" reforms. Their inclusion on a democratic party ticket, he argued, would send many of the core liberal base (as much as 30 percent of the population, Gozman and Ivanenko separately speculated) into the arms of the newly formed Just Russia, with its self-conscious and demagogic appeal to social-democratic policies. Grudging Admiration for Just Russia Political Positioning -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) While Gozman and Ivanenko savaged Just Russia chairman Sergey Mironov's political skills ("idiot," "moron," and "politically autistic" were among their epithets),they credited the newly midwifed party with being well-placed to pick up the anti-United Russia vote. The democratic parties were on the defensive, Ivanenko said, because most United Russia voters believe that the Putin government is a liberal one; therefore, dissatisfaction with United Russia translated into votes against both the party of power, but not interest in its democratic party opponents. (Separately, Ivanenko quoted a poll, according to which 30 percent of democratic party supporters wanted a unified "rightist" party, but with Putin as its head.) Ivanenko speculated that Just Russia was best positioned to capitalize on voter discontent, but questioned whether the Kremlin understood the destabilizing potential of setting up two officially sanctioned parties in opposition to one another. Rather than providing a vehicle for otherwise disempowered local elites (as Yabloko had done in Karelia),Just Russia could cleave the bureaucratic elite in a manner that ultimately would be destabilizing. Perm Elections Will Shape SPS Strategy MOSCOW 00012750 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (C) If SPS makes a convincing showing in the December 3 election in Perm, Gozman explained, the party leadership will make one more effort to convince Yabloko to join it, but otherwise will be prepared to contest the elections alone. Local party leaders were optimistic that SPS, headed by party leader Nikita Belykh, could secure 10 percent of the vote in Perm. In a November 27 meeting, Sergey Mikheyev of the Center for Political Technologies was less certain. He predicted that SPS would finish in "third or fourth place" with about 5 percent of the vote. Mikheyev attributed the SPS's weaker-then-expected showing to Belykh's ties to the region (he was formerly deputy governor) which, paradoxically, were causing him to campaign delicately in the event he would have to return to Perm. Mikheyev scoffed at SPS's campaign slogan --"it is time to take care of unfinished business"-- which in Russian recalled the "perestroika" process of the Gorbachev years. (Also possibly confounding SPS's hopes was Rodina's "very aggressive" campaign, Mikheykev said, which could bring it a second-place or third-place finish. Aiding Rodina's efforts was a talented team from Moscow.) ¶6. (C) If the outcome for SPS was substantially lower, Gozman intimated that some party leaders might advocate folding and joining the Yabloko ticket on its terms. In either scenario, Gozman questioned whether the "democrats" would cross the seven percent threshold for representation in the Duma, noting that the combined Yabloko-SPS ticket had received 11 percent of the vote in Moscow, where support for the democrats was generally twice as strong as outside the capital. Ivanenko echoed Gozman's assessment, underscoring the near impossibility of reaching the seven percent bar. Relations with Kremlin -------------- ¶7. (C) SPS and Yabloko continue to enjoy "correct" relations with the Kremlin. Ivanenko joked that the Kremlin wanted a small democratic opposition, while Yabloko wanted a big opposition. Kremlin backing meant tacit support for Yabloko's fundraising, with no negative consequences for the party's sponsors. However, Ivanenko maintained, when the party grew too big, as in Karelia (ref b),Kremlin tolerance stopped. Gozman was more equivocal, noting that the Kremlin would not eliminate SPS, but would not help it either. Putin's frustration over the inability of the democrats to unite had led the Russian President to wash his hands of the parties' leaderships around six months ago, Gozman said. Both parties have good coverage on NTV, but little exposure on the two GOR channels that have the most viewers. Neither leader complained about print media coverage, and both reconfirmed the free-wheeling nature of the internet. Other Russia -------------- ¶8. (C) Other Russia (OR) does not factor into the two larger democratic parties' political strategy. Ivanenko, noting that OR cannot claim a single member in the Duma, said its only value would be in promoting a single democratic presidential candidate -- a strategy that OR leaders have rejected, reflecting the divisions within the movement and the rival presidential aspirations of former Prime Minister Kasyanov and his erstwhile ally, Garry Kasparov. ¶9. (C) Kasparov claimed in a recent conversation to be seeking allies for OR everywhere. The key requirement seemed to be adamant opposition to the Kremlin and the political parties it sponsored, and a willingness to put aside personal differences in the interest of the larger struggle. Yabloko was not qualified, he said dismissively, both because of leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's unwillingness to compromise and the party's alleged cozy relationship with the Presidential Administration. In his search for allies, Kasparov had met recently with National Bolshevik leader Eduard Limonov, with whom he thought limited cooperation would be possible. Kasparov's frequent trips to the Russian regions had put him in contact with devout Russian Orthodox and "conservatives," who were initially hostile to his message, but who might, under certain circumstances, make common cause with western-oriented democratic parties. Kasparov promised to continue his search for allies. OR's next event would be a Moscow rally on December 12 for which he predicted a large turnout. Comment -------------- MOSCOW 00012750 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) With their potential voters either finding what they want in one of the two Kremlin-sponsored parties or choosing not to vote at all, it is difficult to see how parties like Yabloko, SPS, the RPR, or Other Russia can halt their slide toward irrelevance. Many Russians credit the Putin regime for creating stability, a highly-prized commodity here after the turmoil of the Yeltsin years. With incomes rising, they are loath to cast their votes for the leaders of parties who at best have been unable to capture their imagination and, at worst, are so immune to compromise that they are unable to pool their efforts, even when their parties are on the brink of extinction. BURNS