RUSSIAN YOUTH POLITICS, OR LACK THEREOF: PART 2 OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012717

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN YOUTH POLITICS, OR LACK THEREOF: PART 2 OF
2

REF: 2005 MOSCOW 3617

Classified By: A/PolMin Counselor Colin Cleary: Reason 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. This is the second part of a two-part
message describing Russian political youth groups. Russia's
youth is overwhelmingly apolitical, and youth groups in
general have very little impact on political life in Russia.
The small bit of political life that does exist is restricted
to the margins or co-opted by the Kremlin. The political
youth groups, driven by idealism, can be divided into the
democrats, the communists, and the nationalists/skinheads.
The skinheads are most numerous, but generally unorganized.
The Kremlin fears the emergence of an "Orange" movement, and
systematically moves to diffuse grassroots youth movements
using either carbon-copy groups or harassment and
intimidation. Kremlin fears of a democratic uprising are
unfounded, as the democratically-oriented youth groups are
paralyzed by infighting and the overwhelming apathy of
Russia's youth. END SUMMARY.

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Russian Youth Interests: Sex and Money
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2. (U) According to our contacts among politicians,
journalists, and academics, the overwhelming majority of
Russian youth are simply not interested in politics. This
large non-political group can be subdivided into three parts:
those who simply do not care about politics, those who do
care but think that fighting the system is pointless, and
those who fear the consequences of participating in political
organizations. Yevgeniya Zubchenko, a Novaya Izvestiya
reporter who covers youth politics told us, "Young people
here care about sex and money, they care about finding a good
job. They know there is money now in Russia, and they want a
piece of it."


3. (C) Ilya Yashin, the head of the Yabloko party's youth
movement, cited the difficulty he has both recruiting and
keeping people in his organization because they feel that the
powers-that-be are too strong and too entrenched for any
youth movements to make a difference. This difficulty has
only grown with time. Some who have been involved in
politics have been frightened away by threats from the
security services or their academic institutions (see paras
9-11 below).

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Attack of the Clones
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4. (U) The Kremlin-backed groups, Nashi ("Ours") and Mestnye
("Locals"),have mounted a coordinated effort to co-opt
grassroots political movements among Russia's youth. Most
youth groups use political protests to express themselves, to
win attention from the media, and to attract members. The
Kremlin-backed groups rarely attack grassroots groups
head-on, but instead mimic them while emphasizing their own
loyalty to the president and to Russia. For example,
following a Yabloko protest against the military draft,
Mestnye staged a larger counter-protest. They claimed that
they were also in favor of some military reforms, but in
general, they supported Putin and the Russian army.


5. (U) The Kremlin-backed groups also mimic nationalist
movements. Following the nationalist Russia March on
November 4, Mestnye parroted the better-known Movement
Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and adopted an
anti-immigration attitude. On November 26, it sponsored a
protest by a reported 6,000 youths at Moscow-region farmers
markets and conducted spot checks on market workers' work
permits. Mestnye members turned over to the militia 73
workers who lacked proper documentation. According to
Yashin, these tactics successfully siphon away support from
the grassroots organization by dividing and confusing
potential supporters.


6. (C) Kremlin-backed youth groups are often used to
reinforce Russian foreign policy by staging protests at
foreign embassies. Mestnye has recently been used to conduct
protests at the U.S. and Georgian embassies. Nashi has been
staging a continuous harassment campaign against British
Ambassador Tony Brenton following his appearance at the
"Other Russia" conference in July. The British Embassy told
us that they had appealed to the MFA for increased diplomatic
security following an altercation between an embassy guard
and a member of Nashi at the Ambassador's residence.


7. (U) According to several sources, Nashi and Mestnye both
pay people to participate in their protests. Nashi

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reportedly pays protesters 100-300 rubles, and Mestnye
sometimes pays with McDonald's vouchers. Zubchenko told us
that when she covered one Mestnye protest, most people there
did not know what they were protesting; they were there for
the money.

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Electoral Success and Failure
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8. (U) Not all activity is focused on the streets. Molodaya
Gvardiya has been successful in actually helping young people
become active in politics. During the last year, Molodaya
Gvardiya has held a series of contests called Politzavod
("Political Factory") to find and develop candidates. In
this successful combination of entertainment and politics,
contestants participate in a "Survivor"-type contest where
they organize public events and compete in speech contests
before a voting audience. United Russia offers winners a
position on their legislative party lists. In the October
regional elections, United Russia fulfilled its pledge to
fill 20 percent of its regional party lists with candidates
under age 28 by using the winners of Politzavod, and 31
United Russia candidates between 21 and 28 years of age were
elected. Molodaya Gvardiya leader Andrey Turchak was
nominated by United Russia as a replacement Federation
Council member from the Nenets Autonomous District following
the forced resignation of his predecessor. He was also
recently mentioned as a candidate for membership in United
Russia's Supreme Council.


9. (U) In contrast, opposition youth movement leaders have
been stymied in their electoral bids. Mariya Gaydar ran for
State Duma in the Fall of 2005, Ilya Yashin ran for Moscow
City Duma (winning 17% of the vote),but both were defeated.
They have since resorted to small protests and the occasional
stunt. Gaydar and Yashin were arrested on November 23 for
hanging a large banner from a Moscow bridge that read
"Return the Elections to the People, Bastards!" They were
protesting the recent changes to the electoral law that
removed the minimum voter turnout requirements. Gaydar told
us that this did not mark a change in tactics for DA!, but
was a specific response to a specific government action.

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Government Monitoring and Intimidation
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10. (C) The government has used police and legal means to
harass and intimidate participants in youth movements. Yashin
told us that after two of his colleagues from Yabloko were
arrested last year, an FSB agent approached him and said,
"Your girlfriend will be next, and it will not be pretty for
her in jail." The agent reportedly offered to help Yashin's
girlfriend avoid jail if Yashin would meet with him two times
a month to tell the FSB about what he was planning and what
Yabloko was doing. "So, I met with him. What else could I
do? But I didn't tell him anything that wasn't on our
website, and after a few meetings, he stopped calling."
Yashin said that many people would be scared off by the
possibility of arrest.


11. (C) Yashin also said that many of his members have been
harassed at home and at school. For example, police have
visited students in their dormitories to question them about
their membership and activities, police officers have warned
parents to keep their children out of trouble, and school
officials have threatened members with expulsion or poor
grades if they continued to participate in youth movements.
Gaydar told us that the press secretary of "Other Russia"
(who is a Moldovan),was warned by the FSB that she would not
be able to finish her final year at MGU if she continued her
political activities. When DA! attempted to hold a debate
between DPNI Chairman Belov and Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov
at a Moscow nightclub, the authorities threatened to cut the
club's electricity, and the club canceled the event. (Note:
Since previous DA! debates had not faced problems, it appears
that this action was aimed at DPNI, not DA! End Note).


12. (SBU) According to Pribylovskiy, there are nearly 100
young people in prison for political actions, mainly from the
National Bolshevik Party, who are serving terms of five or
six years for participating in protests that involved the
storming of government ministries.

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Comment
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13. (C) Youth movements have stagnated or declined in
strength and influence since we last reported on this topic

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(reftel). Russian youth are politically apathetic (the
military draft is the sole issue that seems able to mobilize
them) because they believe that the issues do not affect them
or that they cannot affect the issues. Those groups that
attract our attention because they are daring or outspoken
are the exception. The few genuinely democratic youth groups
are being hastened to irrelevancy by a well-funded and
organized government effort intent on avoiding the orange-
and rose-colored revolutions of its neighbors. The
nationalist groups, should they grow in strength, would
likely also face a campaign of intimidation and harassment.
BURNS