Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW12708
2006-11-30 12:44:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

COMMUNIST PARTY: NOT DEAD YET

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM RS 
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VZCZCXRO2571
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2708/01 3341244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301244Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5545
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3603
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 1793
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2046
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012708 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY: NOT DEAD YET

MOSCOW 00012708 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012708 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM RS SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY: NOT DEAD YET MOSCOW 00012708 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Most observers describe the Communist Party (KPRF) as a party on life-support sustained by nostalgic pensioners. The cliche has it that as party stalwart's die off, so too will the KPRF. This assessment, however, ignores a relatively constant level of support, despite the demographics, and the attraction that some feel for a well-defined political party structure. The KPRF accommodates not only the "Soviet" socialist traditionalists, but also a new generation of intellectuals who wish, literally, to overthrow Russia's current system which they believe only helps the select few. KPRF's message, however, is unlikely to reach beyond these two small constituencies. End summary. -------------- VOTER SUPPORT DECREASING -------------- ¶2. (U) From the fall of the Soviet Union until the 2003 Duma elections, the KPRF increased its percentage of the vote with every successive Duma election. The KPRF was perennially in second place. The bulk of its support came from the "red belt", a swathe of conservative, agrarian regions that consistently supported KPRF candidates against all comers. ¶3. (U) As participants at a September roundtable held by the "November 4 Club" noted, KPRF's opponents stoked fears of the re-creation of the Soviet Union and the concomitant loss of freedoms that Russians had come to take for granted to significantly erode that support in the 2003 State Duma election. The resulting Duma has 47 KPRF party members (compared to 110 deputies in the 1999 Duma),which represents about ten percent of the legislative body. ¶4. (U) Voter support for the KPRF has eroded regionally, as well. In the most recent regional elections, held October 8, the KPRF won 10-18 percent of the vote in all but one of the nine regions holding elections (now a distant second or third place finish),just enough to overcome the 7 percent threshold for regional representation. This was not the case in Tuva where the party received 5 percent of the vote. -------------- WHERE ARE KPRF VOTERS GOING? -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Since KPRF voters are generally understood to be pensioners who support the KPRF out of a sense of nostalgia or force of habit, many commentators attribute the drop in KPRF voter rolls to death. In an October 24 meeting, KPRF &#x
000A;Information Technology Center's Ilya Ponomarev offered a more nuanced explanation. While KPRF voter rolls are being reduced by death and disability, the inherent "conservatism of the peasant class" may have prompted others to change their allegiance to United Russia, the party that now represents the status quo and stability. ¶6. (SBU) Indem political analyst Yuriy Korgunyuk agreed with Ponomarev. Russians want a "chief" to take care of them and will vote for the person with the connections to Moscow and the money. Today, he concluded, that person belongs to United Russia. ¶7. (SBU) In recent years, many regional politicians have followed the voter to United Russia. Even one of the KPRF's staunchest erstwhile supporters, ultra-nationalist Aleksandr Prokhanov, has declared the party a spent force and switched his allegiance to President Putin, whom he credits with the renaissance of the Russian empire. Putin, Prokhanov told us, has given Russia stability. -------------- BUT POLLS REMAIN CONSISTENT -------------- ¶8. (U) Opinion polls, however, show that since 2003 the KPRF has maintained a fairly steady level of support, with no other party yet able to challenge its grip on second place. Levada Center polls taken monthly over the last three years show the KPRF typically garnering 15-22% of support among likely voters. The most recent poll, taken in October 2006 shows support at 22%. ¶9. (SBU) Ponomarev reported a dip in KPRF support among 35 to 60 year olds, but claimed that support increases among those under 35. Ponomarev described these young supporters as "Trotskyites": young intelligentsia, who believe that the Soviet Union represented state capitalism and that communism MOSCOW 00012708 002.2 OF 003 is the ideal with which to shape society. ¶10. (SBU) In a November 20 meeting, Vasiliy Koltashov, member of the Central Committee of the Youth Communist League, reported disillusionment with KPRF Central Committee Head Gennadiy Zyuganov's hold on power because of his ties to the Kremlin, which sanctions the criticisms that Zyuganov makes. Koltashov spoke of his disagreement with the KPRF's tame views. He promised that he would create a new party (the "Left Party") which would oversee the nationalization of industry, do away with residence permits, and ensure housing for all. He also told us of impending labor unrest in Tyumen over low wages and poor working conditions. Koltashov admitted that he did not know when these things would come to pass, but was firm in his belief that young Russians would not remain passive. ¶11. (SBU) Ponomarev also claimed that the KPRF was gaining strength in the regions, particularly in the cities, because it represents real opposition. He argued that this was true even in regions such as Krasnoyarsk, a major part of the Soviet Gulag system. -------------- EXPLANATION FOR THE DISCREPANCY -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The discrepancy between Ponomarev's description and the opinion polls and the actual election results was explained by allegations of fraud. KPRF Duma Deputy Sergei Reshulskiy detailed to us the many forms in which fraud could occur, including instructing workers and others dependent on administrative resources how to vote, helping "voters" fill out their ballots, and falsifying the results after the fact. -------------- THE FUTURE -------------- ¶13. (U) Despite the allegations, Ponomarev argued that fraud can only succeed at the margins. Citing the Samara mayoral elections, where the Party of Life candidate unexpectedly won, he proposed that if Russians sensed a real possibility for change, they would vote in sufficiently large numbers to overcome attempts to falsify the results. ¶14. (SBU) In a separate meeting, Duma Deputy Reshulskiy was less optimistic, pointing out that with no access to the media it would be impossible for such a candidate to become known to the electorate. In combination with the recently enacted electoral legislation that prohibits negative campaigning, removes minimum voter turnout requirements, and expands the reasons for which a candidate may be removed from the ballot, Reshulskiy doubted that real change could occur. He told us that he would content himself with using his Duma position to speak out against the wrongs of the Putin administration. ¶15. (SBU) Despite attempts to build the KPRF base and sharpen its message, Ponomarev believes that, barring an arrangement with the Kremlin, it is a distinct possibility that the KPRF will lose all representation in the Duma in the next election. ¶16. (SBU) In a recent press briefing, Zyuganov expressed the hope that the KPRF would win 20 percent of the State Duma seats next year and announced his intention to stand for president in 2008. Ponomarev, however, told PolOff that Zyuganov is due to step down next summer, although it is unclear who will replace him. He contended that for many politicians, getting to the top of the KPRF party structure represents a livelihood rather than the chance to work for social change and that, therefore, there would be no dearth of candidates. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (SBU) While trumpeting democratic ideals (free speech and press and transparent business climate) and socialist goals (housing and health care for all and use of the Stabilization Fund for the people),the KPRF message is not resonating with voters, despite reputed dissatisfaction with the Government, if not Putin per se. With the establishment of A Just Russia, a purported Kremlin creation that parrots much of the KPRF's platform, KPRF's future is still dimmer. Although it will likely retain Duma representation, it will probably not MOSCOW 00012708 003.2 OF 003 have a meaningful voice for the foreseeable future. BURNS

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