RUSSIA KEEPS UP THE PACE IN MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012628

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS SY LE IZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA KEEPS UP THE PACE IN MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY

REF: A. MOSCOW 12035


B. CAIRO 6867

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Following the assassination of Lebanese
Minister Gemayel, Russia has become increasingly concerned
about political violence in Lebanon, but is unwilling to
press Damascus on its role. The MFA preferred to offer
legalistic arguments about whether there was compelling proof
of Syrian involvement in political violence. Defending
Russia's engagement with Syria, MFA Middle East and North
Africa Director Vershinin argued that Bashar al-Asad was
isolated and faced radical pressures at home which were
exacerbated by his international isolation. The MFA welcomed
efforts to stimulate more comprehensive talks on Middle East
peace, but judged the Arab League's proposal for a conference
by year's end as unrealistic. Vershinin argued that the U.S.
should take a less rigid view of the three conditions for
recognition of a Palestinian unity government. The MFA
acknowledged the increased pace of engagement with Gulf
states, which was driven by shared energy interests. End
Summary.
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MIDDLE EAST VISITORS FLOCKING TO MOSCOW
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2. (C) In a November 22 meeting, Russian MFA Middle East
and North Africa Director Sergey Vershinin reviewed the
situation in Lebanon following the assassination of Minister
Pierre Gemayel, discussed Syria's role in the region,
reviewed prospects for restarting Middle East peace talks,
and deplored the ongoing violence in Iraq. He briefly
touched on visits by a number of Middle Eastern officials
over the past month. (Note: Since Israeli PM Olmert's
mid-October visit (ref A),Egyptian President Mubarak has met
with President Putin in Moscow (November 1-3) and there have
been Moscow visits by Qatari FM Hamad bin Jasim (October 18),
UAE Foreign Minister Abdallah bin Zayid (Oct. 30) and
Bahraini FM Khalid bin Ahmad al-Khalifa (November 9). End
Note).
.
LEBANON: (NOT) TAKING IT TO THE STREETS
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3. (C) Vershinin underlined that Moscow viewed Lebanon as
passing through a dangerous and decisive point following the
assassination of Minister Gemayel. He reiterated the MFA's
statement earlier that day condemning violence in Lebanon and
noted that political murders and interconfessional violence
were entering an even more deadly phase. Taking a backhanded
swipe at the Cedar Revolution, Vershinin stressed that Russia
had always supported a national political dialogue that
followed regular legal norms and that did not depend on
street action, no matter who was calling for change. He
claimed that inter-Lebanese dialogue had been making progress
on contentious issues such as demilitarization of Hizbollah
and other militias and the status of Shebaa Farms until it
was interrupted by Israeli military action this summer.


4. (C) Pressed to explain Syria's role in Lebanese
politics, Vershinin asserted that Moscow supported the
establishment of "fully normal" diplomatic relations between
Beirut and Damascus to create a state-to-state relationship.
He argued that Lebanese politicians who "recklessly" claimed
that Syria was behind the bulk of the violence in Lebanon did
not have compelling proof for their accusations and only made
relations worse. Arguing that there was no hard evidence of
official Syrian involvement in the Gemayel assassination or,
for that matter, in many other killings in Lebanon, he argued
that political killings must be neutrally investigated and
judged by the facts, not emotions.
.
SYRIA'S REGIONAL ROLE
--------------


5. (C) Acknowledging Moscow's good relations with Damascus,
Vershinin argued that Russia pursued a step-by-step
engagement with Syria in pursuit of shared interests. He
welcomed agreement between Syria and Iraq to restore
diplomatic relations, arguing that Iraq needed to have good
relations with all its neighbors, especially Syria, in order
to stem the cross-border flow of militants into Iraq. In his
view, President Bashar al-Asad faced a difficult internal
situation given pressures for economic reforms. This was
coupled with serious problems with many of Syria's neighbors,
which only increased Syria's isolation and bolstered radical
forces. Israel seemed to be uninterested in pursuing any
sort of dialogue with Syria. He acknowledged strong U.S.
concerns about Syria's destabilizing role in Lebanon, Iraq
and in Gaza and the West Bank, but argued that renewed
efforts to engage with Damascus might produce better results.

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
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6. (C) Vershinin's view was that a general settlement of
Middle Eastern disputes was needed rather than piecemeal
bilateral settlements, but that current discussions about a
Middle East conference needed to be refined. He labeled an
Arab League proposal for a conference by year's end as
unrealistic -- such an undertaking required a strategic
approach and careful preparation and should not be pushed as
a tactical ploy. He said that existing conference proposals
did not make clear whether the organizers saw a conference as
the beginning or the end of the peace process; if it was to
be the former, what kind of process would it launch, he asked
rhetorically, and how did this fit in with the Quartet's
efforts. Participation was crucial as well, he argued,
pointing out that the failure to invite Syria or Iran to the
July 26 Rome International Conference on Lebanon limited the
usefulness of the meeting and should not serve as a model for
future regional discussions.
.
PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT AND QUARTET DEMANDS
--------------


7. (C) Vershinin reiterated Russian support for Abu Mazen's
efforts to form a Government of National Unity (GNU).
Stating that the situation changed on a daily basis, he said
the Palestinians were trying to reach a compromise on
ministerial portfolios which would meet Quartet and (by
implication) U.S. concerns. Characterizing the U.S. approach
to a GNU as "all or nothing," he urged that Washington be
more flexible in evaluating whether a new government met the
requirements to restore international funding. Acknowledging
U.S. warnings about moving the goal posts on recognition,
renunciation of violence and acceptance of prior agreements,
he stressed that Moscow had followed a different approach to
Hamas, which, he emphasized, had been the democratic choice
of the Palestinian people. Russia believed the best way to
change Hamas was to engage with it.
.
IRAQ/THE GULF STATES
--------------


9. (C) Vershinin deplored sectarian violence in Iraq and
argued that the situation was growing out-of-control with
violence now spreading. He reiterated Russia's call for an
inclusive national dialogue that produced consensus, pointing
out that Moscow had been advocating this position for the
past three years. In his view, the death sentence handed
down in the Saddam Hussein trial was an internal matter for
the Iraqis, but he argued that it was a distraction that had
resolved none of the serious problems Iraq faced.


10. (C) Acknowledging the steady flow of visitors from the
Gulf, Vershinin said that over the last several years Russia
had worked hard to build up relations in the region. While
political and security issues -- particularly Iraq's future
and Iran's emergence -- were a subject of discussion, he
stressed that a shared interest in energy matters and
investment drove these ties. Vershinin noted that Putin's
planned trip to the region (reftel B) had not yet been
completely nailed down. (NOTE: An Egyptian Embassy contact
confirmed there had been discussions about a Putin trip to
Egypt in January, but no date had been set yet.)
.
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Russian efforts to remain relevant to Middle East
discussions have strengthened over the past several months as
Moscow finds positive reinforcement for its role from among
its Arab interlocutors. Putin's confidence as a global
figure, Russia's continued efforts to portray itself as a
great power whose equities need to be taken into account, and
Moscow's energy-driven diplomacy intersect in the Middle East
in ways that suggest Russian interests will only deepen.
BURNS