RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH BELARUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012600 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BO RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH BELARUS REF: MINSK 1184 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell. Reasons: 1. 4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Another Putin-Lukashenko meeting has come and gone with few evident results. It occurred against a widespread perception here that Putin would like to rein in Lukashenko as part of Russia's growing assertiveness. Unresolved problems, most notably those related to energy, plague the bilateral relationship, while after nearly a decade of posturing, a "Union State" remains only a distant possibility. Lukashenko's populism resonates among Russia's disenfranchised rural dwellers which, some believe, creates low-grade anxiety in the Kremlin, where senior officials do not hide Putin's dislike of the Belarusian President. Gazprom's new, more market-oriented approach to Belarus is seen here as an inevitable, if painful phase in the bilateral economic relationship. End Summary. Putin-Lukashenko: Tug of War -------------- ¶2. (C) The popular Moscow daily newspaper Kommersant characterized the November 10 three hour Lukashenko-Putin meeting as a "waste of time." Reportedly on the agenda were Belarus re-exports of Russian oil to Europe and gas price increases. Putin has publicly threatened to terminate current oil delivery arrangements, which allow Belarus to import crude oil without paying duties, refine the crude for export to third countries and then pocket the resulting export duties. On gas, Russia wants significant increases over current prices for 2007 while demanding an interest in Beltransgaz, the Belarusian gas transport system. The sides continue to wrangle over an appraisal of Beltransgaz's market value. Belarus watchers told us that the discussions were inconclusive. Russia's Cold Feet, Belarus' Cold Winter? -------------- ¶3. (C) Carnegie Moscow Center's Nikolay Petrov argued that the new dynamic between Belarus and Russia, in which Moscow had put more pressure on Minsk, was fueled by changes within -- not outside -- Russia. Russia's growing wealth had caused it to become more assertive. At the same time, in his view, the color revolutions had made Russia feel vulnerable and spawned Moscow's efforts to exert more influence over its neighbors. Gazprom's new approach -- raising gas prices for former Soviet states to market rates -- was a clear reflection of this, as was Russia's pressure on oil export duties. Petrov thought that for Lukashenko, this change of heart on energy subsidies on Russia's part was unacceptable. Aleksandr Fadeyev of the CIS Institute claimed that Lukashenko continued to believe that Putin could simply order Gazprom to set a gas price at a certain level. With ten percent of its national outlays spent on gas, the GOB considered further price increases as an attempt to drive Belarus to bankruptcy. The experts we spoke to believed that Belarus' attempts to find another energy supplier -- Iran, Venezuela -- would be unavailing, but, as in the past, it would somehow manage to strike a deal with Russia. How to Deal with Luka? -------------- ¶4. (C) MFA Deputy Director Victor Sorokin told us after the November 10 meeting that there were two ways to deal with a regime like Lukashenko's: 1) isolation in an effort to impose European standards; 2) or a dialogue designed to edge Belarus closer to those same standards. He argued that the first approach, which is preferred by the EU and the U.S., would produce no results, while Russia's patient engagement will eventually bring change. (Comment: Sorokin had little else to share about the meeting, which reflects in part the MFA's marginal role in setting Belarus policy.) ¶5. (C) Other interlocutors disagreed about the possibilities for change. Andrey Ryabov of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) warned against a simplified view of Lukashenko. "He is not a marionette which Russia can easily control. He is a seasoned politician who knows how to manipulate the media and the public." Aleksandr Fadeyev of the CIS Institute seconded Ryabov, offering as evidence a September gathering of Russian regional journalists in Minsk at Lukashenko's invitation. The journalists, he said, were entertained by Lukashenko for more than four hours, showered with gifts, and returned "smitten" with Lukashenko. The journalists came from Russian regions where some continued to believe that Lukashenko personified a social "paternalism" practiced by an ideal leader, a conserver of Soviet values. Irked by the visibly widening MOSCOW 00012600 002 OF 002 gap between the rich and the poor in Russia, the journalists wrote for readers, Fadeyev said, who viewed Belarus with nostalgia as a place where everyone might be poor but were all equally poor. For them, dreams of a Union State were part of the nostalgia for a more just political structure. Carnegie's Petrov agreed that the Kremlin had good reason to fear the populist Lukashenko, who would be in power long after Putin left office, and who could at some point play a role in Russian politics. Weak Opposition -------------- ¶6. (C) While most observers viewed Lukashenko as a continuing irritant for Putin, they did not think Russia had any alternatives in Minsk. Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia in Global Affairs, pointed out two problems with the existing Belarusian opposition: 1) they were weak and not united and 2) they were too identified with the West. This left Russia with no option but to stick with Lukashenko. Lukyanov stressed that the West, too eager for any sign of a democratic movement, clung to weak opposition figures such as Milinkevich and Kozulin when they had no meaningful power base. Lukyanov thought that the EU's biggest mistake in trying to influence what happened in its neighborhood was to close the door on further EU expansion. Any talk of future entry to EU, however unlikely, might have worked as a strong incentive for Lukashenko. Union State: Going Nowhere? -------------- ¶7. (C) Most of the expert community in Moscow saw progress on the long-planned Union State as halting. Both sides paid lip service to the goal, but Lukashenko would not accept Belarus becoming just another Russian region and Putin was not prepared to consider Belarus Russia's equal. Observers alleged that there was a clear divide in Russia between city dwellers, who scoff at the concept of a union, and some in the provinces who supported it. In any event, many Russians considered Belarus "somehow" part of Russia. Konstantin Eggert of BBC Moscow saw an opportunity for Putin to create a legacy for himself by pursuing the Union State idea. He repeated speculation that Putin could re-create a Soviet Union-like structure, and perhaps find himself a new job in the process as head of the new organization when his presidential term expires in 2008. Whatever Comes Next, No Conflict with Belarus, Please -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) While Russia might push Belarus hard on energy issue, the observers we spoke to argued that there were limits to such pressure and that Minsk was aware of this. Aleksey Vlasov of Moscow State University (MGU) held that conflicts with Belarus were not beneficial to Russia. Belarus was a small, isolated, underdeveloped country which, for its survival, depended on its "transit" function between Russia and the West. It could not be ignored and abused by Russia, he said, or there would be negative consequences for Russia. While a handful of Belarusian "dissidents" in Moscow, headed by Valeriy Pavlov of the Dionis Club, dream of overthrowing Lukashenko, we could not find any expert who thought they had much sway with the Kremlin. While Moscow kept a watchful eye on them, it did not seem to influence their activities. Nor would anyone speak to the possibility that someone in Lukashenko's ruling circle could be turned. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Moscow is clearly trying to redefine the relationship by exerting growing pressure on Minsk. Beyond the core issue of energy, there are many levels of political dissonance between the two, spurred in part by Putin's intense personal dislike of Lukashenko, which senior Kremlin officials do not disguise in their conversations with us. At the same time, Moscow is aware that there are limits to what it can get from Belarus and is cognizant as well that, from its perspective, there are no appealing alternatives to Lukashenko's rule. BURNS