A/S FRIED CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIAN DFM KARASIN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 012528 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR PBTS ETRD GG MD UP RS SUBJECT: A/S FRIED CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIAN DFM KARASIN, NOVEMBER 15 REF: MOSCOW 11941 Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin focused on Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova in a two hour discussion November 15. Karasin dismissed Georgian conciliatory steps as cosmetic; Fried said they are real and Russia should respond by ending sanctions. Karasin decried Georgian "militarization;" Fried assured Karasin that the U.S. will not support any use of force to resolve separatist conflicts in Georgia. Karasin recognized that the conflicts are taking place "on Georgian territory" and guaranteed Russia will be "responsible" with regard to South Ossetian and Abkhaz demands for recognition. Fried laid out U.S. proposals for confidence-building measures in the two conflicts. Karasin was not enthusiastic but promised to look at them. Karasin claimed Georgia is not fulfilling the mandate of UNSCR 1716 to withdraw armed forces from the Kodori Gorge. Fried answered that our approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia is to rule out the use of force, increase internationalization and promote contacts between the parties. ¶2. (C) On Ukraine, Karasin expressed satisfaction that political tensions have defused and Ukraine's leaders are engaging on real issues, including in relations with Russia. He expected a summit in the coming months. Fried said the U.S., too, is prepared to work with the Ukrainian government. On Moldova, Karasin said Russia is trying to promote direct Moldovan-Transnistrian contact to move toward settlement and stressed the need for a transit protocol. DAS David Kramer blamed Transnistrian negotiator Litskai for refusing direct contact at Odessa, and said there is a potential solution for the transit protocol issue. End Summary. ¶3. (C) EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried, Ambassador and EUR DAS David Kramer met with DFM Grigoriy Karasin for two hours November 15. Karasin was accompanied by 4th CIS Department Deputy Director Tarabrin and North America Department Deputy Director Vinokurov. The meeting was characterized by sharp give and take on substance, while maintaining a friendly atmosphere. Georgian-Russian Relations -------------- ¶4. (C) Karasin stated that the crisis in Georgian-Russian relations continues. The Georgian leadership is not taking steps to alleviate Russian concerns. Despite an agreement by FMs Lavrov and Bezhuashvili not to raise emotions, Bezhuashvili's subsequent speech in Paris claimed that Russia is preparing for war against Georgia. ¶5. (C) Fried answered that he is sorry to hear that Georgia must take further steps before Russia will take any steps to improve the situation. Georgia has already taken significant steps. It reacted responsibly to the October 25 rocket attack in Kodori. President Saakashvili sacked DefMin Okruashvili, whom the Russians repeatedly told us they found objectionable. Saakashvili's November 14 speech to the European Parliament was responsible and conciliatory, and the Georgian response to Gazprom's attempt to double the price of gas was restrained. Russia has seen these steps, which are both in action and rhetoric. It will not do to ignore them and demand more. Russia must make efforts, too. ¶6. (C) Fried returned to this issue several times during the conversation, pressing Russia hard to ease its sanctions against Georgia. Karasin tried to deflect the issue to frozen conflicts, but Fried maintained that Georgia-Russia relations cannot be separated from these conflicts. Russia needs to build confidence by easing sanctions. Georgia sees that Russia supports South Ossetia and Abkhazia while severing economic and transportation links with Georgia. Under those circumstances it is hard to convince Georgia to reach out to its separatist provinces. If the Georgians believe Russia is trying to destroy their economy, they are less apt to listen to the U.S. when it counsels restraint and moderation. Georgia has taken steps and needs to see that those steps meet a response. Under no circumstances will the U.S. support Georgian military action to resolve the conflicts, but the increased tensions from Russia's economic measures leave both Georgia and Russia vulnerable to provocations. ¶7. (C) Karasin responded that he cannot satisfy Fried on this issue because the Georgians have not satisfied Russia. They MOSCOW 00012528 002 OF 005 have taken some cosmetic steps that will not lead to relaxation of the measures Russia has taken against Georgia. Karasin regretted the anti-Georgian mood that had caused Russians of Georgian ethnicity to suffer, but such excesses have stopped. Georgia must understand Russia's position and think through its policies with regard to Russia. Karasin also warned against the U.S. positioning itself as a "mediator" between Russia and Georgia. Charges of Militarization -------------- ¶8. (C) Karasin charged that Georgia is acquiring offensive weapons and training special units for commando operations against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia has "facts" showing U.S., NATO and "post-Soviet" participation in this effort. That could increase Georgian "appetite" for a military solution to the conflicts on Georgian territory. He repeated that these conflicts are on "Georgian territory," and Fried assured him that he understood Karasin's emphasis. ¶9. (C) Fried said reform and improvement of the Georgian army were a necessity under any circumstances. Putin himself had demanded in 2001 that Georgia gain the capability to police and control its territory against movements of insurgents and terrorists. The U.S. has helped increase Georgia's capabilities to do that with light infantry. U.S. military experts have assured Fried that there is no evidence that Georgia is preparing a military offensive. We will be happy to check out any Russian evidence. Karasin cited a Georgian 36D6 air defense radar that peacekeepers had discovered in the South Ossetia conflict zone. Separatist Conflicts: Use of Force -------------- ¶10. (C) Karasin said that armed conflict would close the door to any solution, because reestablishing trust would be problematic. Fried said the U.S. has made its position absolutely clear to Georgia: there are no circumstances under which we would support Georgia initiating military operations to settle by force the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Karasin asked whether the U.S. still maintains this attitude. "Certainly," Fried replied. He said he sees no circumstances under which that attitude will change. ¶11. (C) Fried said that the October 25 rocket attack in Upper Kodori showed that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are potentially explosive. Actors not under Georgian or Russian (or even Abkhaz) control, such as deposed warlord Kvitsiani, can provoke crises. We should not wait for the next crisis, but should act now to build confidence. Though political settlements will take time, CBMs will prepare the groundwork and are a necessary first step. Karasin said Russia has always maintained that, before any discussion of status, Georgia must build trust in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, convincing them that they can develop constructive relations. But, he maintained, Georgia is doing nothing along those lines. Separatist Conflicts: Referendum and Recognition -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Karasin criticized U.S. and EU statements of intent not to recognize the referendum in South Ossetia as a "stupid policy." The referendum made clear the course that the population will support, and it is offensive to the Ossetians to declare that their opinion does not matter. He asked for Fried's comment on the referendum. ¶13. (C) Fried answered that the Russian MFA had called the referendum in South Ossetia "the envy" of democratic institutions. Fried said the U.S. does not envy anything about the South Ossetian political order -- he noted that Kokoity's income derives in part from counterfeiting U.S. currency -- and does not believe Russia seriously does, either. Rather, Russia's open support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia is subject to misinterpretation by the separatists, who might think it means they can start hostilities. Russia, whose citizens make up a large part of the leadership of the South Ossetian army and security services, has a responsibility to see this does not happen. ¶14. (C) In addition to his recognition that the separatist conflicts are taking place "on Georgian territory," Karasin repeated his October 21 assurance to Fried (Reftel) that, despite public sympathy with South Ossetia's appeal to Russia to recognize its independence, Russia will act responsibly. "I can guarantee that," he affirmed. Fried thanked Karasin for that guarantee. Later Karasin said that Abkhazia, like South Ossetia, has appealed to Russia's Duma for recognition. MOSCOW 00012528 003 OF 005 He repeated that Russia will act responsibly, but said that Georgia's anti-Russian line makes it harder to persuade deputies to deny the appeal. South Ossetia -- CBMs -------------- ¶15. (C) Fried ran through U.S. ideas on CBMs for South Ossetia, noting that he wanted to share them before these could come up at the OSCE ministerial in Brussels. Fried said the list is not exhaustive and that we would welcome Russian contributions. He stressed extending OSCE monitoring to all of South Ossetia; setting up joint checkpoints and monitoring at Didi Gupta and/or Roki Tunnel; accelerating OSCE economic rehabilitation plans; and working to establish a free trade corridor to link North Ossetia and South Ossetia to Georgia's Black Sea ports. He drew Karasin's attention to the absence of demands to change negotiating formats. He asked for Karasin's views. ¶16. (C) Karasin thanked Fried for sharing the U.S. ideas in advance. After questioning whether Georgian actions in South Ossetia -- installing an air defense radar and sponsoring an alternative election -- showed a willingness to build confidence, Karasin said Russia wants to continue the economic rehabilitation process set out in the Brussels Donors Conference in May. He called for facilitating direct contacts between the South Ossetian and Georgian leaders. Fried said we support both points. DAS Matt Bryza will be in Tbilisi November 17, and will look for ways to facilitate a meeting of South Ossetian and Georgian leaders. Fried returned to the package of CBMs to be unveiled at Brussels and asked Karasin's opinion. Karasin said, "I don't want to disappoint you with my answer." His said CBMs should not only be technical, but should support an atmosphere of confidence among people. Fried answered that statements are important -- Putin has recently made the constructive statement that South Ossetia and Abkhazia need to builds a common state with Georgia -- but CBMs should not be simply rhetorical, either. They should include actions such as the ones we have outlined. Abkhazia -------------- ¶17. (C) Karasin claimed Georgia is not fulfilling the mandate of UNSCR 1716 to withdraw all armed formations from Kodori. There are still 500 Georgian troops of both Interior and Defense Ministries, plus heavy weapons, armor and sophisticated weapons systems. Russia wants regular joint PKF-UNOMIG monitoring of the Kodori Gorge. The current situation in Kodori, including the presence of the "Government-in-Exile," does not suit Russia. Karasin called on the U.S. to press Tbilisi to observe 1716. He said Russia is working with the Abkhaz on the idea of police advisors in Gali. He asked about the status of "FM" Shamba's visa to visit the UN. ¶18. (C) Fried answered that the U.S. approach on Abkhazia is to stress no use of force, increase the international presence on the ground, and promote Georgian-Abkhaz contacts. We have no opposition in principle to a Shamba visit, which a better UNSCR would have secured. We support monitoring of Kodori. Our ideas for CBMs in Abkhazia include promoting economic contacts (under UN leadership),de-isolating Abkhazia and expanding its economic ties to Europe, increasing international presence such as an international police force, sending a FSG/SRSG fact-finding mission to Gali, returning to the previous Abkhaz agreement to allow Georgian language teaching in Gali, seeking a Georgian pledge not to use force, and surveying IDP returnees to Gali. We will also recommend that Georgia rename the administrators it has sent to Upper Kodori, dropping the "Government-in-Exile" title. ¶19. (C) Fried stressed that we are not interested in changing negotiating formats in Abkhazia at this time but in getting things done. Secretary Rice's instructions are to work with Russia creatively on CBMs and come back to her if we need help. Karasin (finally) said Russia is willing to work on building confidence and will look at the U.S. proposals. The greatest obstacle, however, is that the Abkhaz have no confidence that Georgia is willing to consider Abkhaz interests and engage in talks on an equal basis, with respect and without preconditions. No one has made an effort to prove that Georgia is willing to do so. One appropriate step in getting the Abkhaz to engage was the removal of endorsement of the Boden paper from UNSCRs, as this prejudged the outcome of status negotiations and led to a dead end. ¶20. (C) Fried said the U.S. is suggesting the measures he MOSCOW 00012528 004 OF 005 outlined without precondition. We support Georgia's territorial integrity within its existing borders, "and so do you." But it is not the U.S. position that the Abkhaz must pledge allegiance to Georgia before discussing anything else. Fried noted that in Cyprus confidence has improved between the communities even though the status question remains unresolved. Fried took Karasin's point that the Abkhaz believe the Georgians do not respect them, but working with Georgians such as UN PermRep Alasania can remedy that. Georgia Human Rights -------------- ¶21. (C) Fried signaled that there would probably be a written response to the letter Karasin sent to Under Secretary Burns on November 13. Fried said there is an answer for every point in the letter, whose arguments he characterized as weak. He would not insist on going into detail in this meeting, but had the overall comment that if Russia is concerned for the welfare of the Georgian people as the letter claims, it should not be trying to impoverish them with economic sanctions. Ukraine -------------- ¶22. (C) Karasin briefed on his recent trip to Kyiv, where he found the political atmosphere less tense. Leaders are engaging on real issues. To be sure, there is friction, but no side is monochromatically black or white. All agree on the need to work together to resolve problems. Karasin had a productive conversation with FM Tarasyuk. The "sensationalism" has been removed from many issues such as border questions, the Black Sea Fleet and working out joint approaches to new challenges and terrorism. In his meeting with Yushchenko, Karasin was reassured that Ukraine does not look at the Great Famine (Holodomor) as genocide against Ukrainians. The Russian-Ukrainian bilateral commission's groups are working in phases -- Lavrov-Tarasyuk on international affairs, Yanukovich-Fradkov on the economy, as well as the security and human dimension groups. The work will lead to a summit. ¶23. (C) Fried said the U.S. approach is simple: Yanukovich was democratically elected and we will work with him. He will be in Washington in early December, hosted by Vice President Cheney. We are relaxed about such issues as NATO membership and welcome the improvement in Russian-Ukrainian relations. We are more focused on Ukrainian WTO accession. Fried was on his way to Kyiv, where he will meet with Yushchenko, Yanukovich and opposition leader Tymoshenko. Yanukovich appears to be thinking of Ukraine's place in the world for the first time. Like us, Poland also seems prepared to work with the Ukrainian leadership. Karasin attempted a question as to whether Poland now thinks of itself as Ukraine's elder brother; Fried replied that Ukraine has already many types of elder brother. Moldova -------------- ¶24. (C) Karasin said Russia is "activating" its relations with Moldova and broadening them beyond the Transnistria conflict. On Transnistria, Russia's main thrust is promoting contact between Moldova and Transnistria. Some elements from the 2003 Kozak memo can be used to give a push toward resolution. Karasin was impressed by Voronin's flexibility. Meanwhile, Transnistrians are looking for the way forward. Russia hopes Ukraine will begin to play a more active role in the conflict. Karasin endorsed the 5 plus 2 negotiating format. ¶25. (C) Fried said the U.S. supports direct contacts. Moldovan territorial integrity remains our starting point. Fried said we were surprised by the cancellation of train no. 47 and asked why it should stop in Tiraspol and not Chisinau. Kramer added that the Moldovans and Transnistrians could have talked earlier in the month at Odessa, but Litskai refused. Russian negotiator Nesterushkin did not give sufficient encouragement to direct contact. Karasin said that a transit protocol for the Transnistrians would be an important next step. Kramer said Voronin had told him that Chisinau was willing to turn a March Moldovan declaration on the issue into a protocol; the language of the declaration was acceptable to Transnistria but because of the lack of trust Tiraspol has for Chisinau, it needed to be signed by others in the 5 2. This should allow negotiations to resume. Kramer said the Transnistrians at present feel no pressure to move towards a settlement; he hoped Russia can convince them to work with the Moldovans. MOSCOW 00012528 005 OF 005 Karasin Trip to Washington -------------- ¶26. (C) Fried proposed December 15 or 19 for Karasin's long-promised trip to Washington. Karasin said he would get back on dates, but proposed taking a number of directors with him, including MFA 3rd CIS Department Director Peshkov to participate in Karasin's talk with Assistant Secretary Boucher about Central Asia. ¶27. (U) A/S Fried and DAS Kramer have cleared this message. BURNS