RUSSIAN REACTION TO EVENTS IN GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012441 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR PBTS UNSC OSCE GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN REACTION TO EVENTS IN GEORGIA Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM j. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) MFA 4th CIS Department Director Andrey Kelin told us November 13 that Georgia shows no willingness to meet Russia's "simple" demands for normalizing relations. He downplayed the effects of the sacking of former DefMin Okruashvili. He fretted that an "alternative election" in South Ossetia was a Georgian tactic to cloud the peace process, though he signaled some flexibility on the "authorized delegations" format. He decried what he claimed was Georgian refusal to implement UNSCR 1716, and alleged that half the Georgian forces in Kodori are wearing MOD uniforms. He said Russia is "not against" a dialogue between President Saakashvili and South Ossetian leader Kokoity. He delivered a letter from DFM Karasin to Under Secretary Burns (faxed to EUR/RUS) criticizing Georgian human rights practices, including allegations of torture and crackdowns on dissent. Security Council Secretary Ivanov strengthened Kelin's points to Ambassador November 13. End Summary. Georgians Bear No Gifts... -------------- ¶2. (C) In a November 13 meeting, Kelin provided a gloomy assessment of prospects with Georgia. FM Bezhuashvili came to Moscow November 1 "empty-handed," repeating old positions. FM Lavrov formulated Russia's "simple" demands for improved relations: Georgia must stop militarization, stop preparing for offensive action against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stop its anti-Russian rhetoric and start "conversation" with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These are in line with EU requests, he said. But Bezhuashvili said nothing of these in his 90 minutes with Lavrov, and new DFM Manjgaladze was unable to formulate a Georgian position in his meeting with DFM Denisov the following day. Manjgaladze proposed that Georgia and Russia draw a "roadmap" to better relations. This was absurd, Kelin said. "Imagine the U.S. making a road map with Cuba." ... But May Be Sending "Faint Signals" -------------- ¶3. (C) Asked whether the transfer of Irakli Okruashvili away from the Defense Ministry addressed some of Russia's concerns, Kelin said that he personally saw some attempts by Georgia to send positive signals. Georgia last week resumed issuing visas to Russian military personnel tasked with withdrawing from military bases. The GOG has delayed parliamentary hearings on withdrawing from the CIS. In Geneva, Georgia sent signals that it is moving away from its objection to Russian WTO accession. Okruashvili's transfer, though timely, resolves little. MinInt Merabishvili and Okruashvili's deputies are still in place, and they think like Okruashvili. Only Deputy MOD Mamuka Kudava was reasonable, and he was replaced November 4. ¶4. (C) Kelin said he thought some more "steps" might make possible a Putin-Saakashvili meeting at the CIS Summit in Minsk November 28, but not if the Georgians stay with their current positions. A Georgian parliamentary declaration debated on November 11 was blatantly anti-Russian, accusing Russia of xenophobia and the oppression of Georgians. Kelin added that Russia had taken some "idiotic" steps with regard to schools, but denied they were xenophobic. Kelin said deportations are waning, with Georgians representing a fraction of the nationalities expelled by the authorities. ¶5. (C) In a separate November 13 conversation with Ambassador (other subjects Septel),Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov struck most of the same notes. Ivanov acknowledged that Okruashvili's departure was a significant step and a significant signal, and said he thought there might now be an opening for a Putin-Saakashvili conversation in Minsk. But he made clear that the GOR, and Putin personally, had no inclination right now to ease economic pressure on Georgia. No Light on Frozen Conflicts... -------------- ¶6. (C) Asked whether the lack of violence during the November 12 South Ossetia referendum and elections lessened Russian concerns about provocations and violence, Kelin answered that Georgia may have repeated its Kodori experience (e.g., installed an alternative government that claims to speak for the people). If that is the case, tensions will continue and the South Ossetians will not negotiate. ¶7. (C) Kelin described his view of the Kodori situation, which he described as "nearly blown." The MOSCOW 00012441 002 OF 002 Government-in-Exile "might continue to exist until the snow." After that, Georgians in Kodori cannot renew fuel supplies. As it stands, he said, 1000 ethnic Svans are guarded by 500 military personnel labeled police. Georgia seems to be making no move to implement UNSCR 1716. PolMinCouns said it is our understanding that police are permitted in Kodori under relevant agreements. Kelin said that Bezhuashvili had claimed the Georgians were not in violation of 1716. In fact, he said, SRSG Arnault is demanding that Georgia withdraw its heavy equipment, vehicles and mines in order to comply with the UNSCR. He denied that the heavy equipment Arnault referred to belonged to deposed warlord Kvitsiani. He asserted that UN observers concluded the equipment belonged to Georgian troops. "Kvitsiani never had helicopters," he said. Kelin claimed that half the Georgian forces were in MinInt uniforms, but the other half wore MOD clothes. We said we had not seem this reported and would convey the allegation to Washington. ¶8. (C) Asked about renewing the peace processes, including a Saakashvili-Kokoity meeting, Kelin said restarting the process for Abkhazia would be difficult, as the Abkhaz demand the withdrawal of all Georgian forces and the "government-in-exile" before agreeing to a meeting of the Coordinating Council. There is, however, discussion of a Georgian-Abkhaz commission for the Upper Kodori and planning is underway for a second PKF-UNOMIG monitoring mission. ¶9. (C) Kelin continued that there is no prospect for reconvening the Joint Control Commission for Abkhazia. The OSCE proposed dialogue of the "authorized delegations," and "we might think about that," but the sticking point is status. Talk initially needs to focus on demilitarization and confidence-building measures, and then go on to status. Kelin clarified that even the working groups charged with harmonizing the Georgian and Ossetian peace plans should focus on the first two phases, and leave harmonization of the status proposals for later. In addition, the authorized delegations are too senior to take on the initial talks. The groundwork must be laid at the working level in the JCC. ... And No Dialogue... -------------- ¶10. (C) Asked about a direct Georgian-South Ossetian dialogue, Kelin joked that the Georgians raise such a possibility in Washington and Brussels, but never invite Kokoity directly. But Russia is "not against it" if Saakashvili and Kokoity can agree. Asked whether Kokoity might take such a step by himself, or whether he needed to be urged to do so, Kelin said it depends on the Georgian reaction to the referendum. If Georgian rhetoric puts Kokoity in "an awkward position," he will refuse. ...But Further Accusations -------------- ¶11. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting Kelin conveyed a four-page letter from DFM Karasin to Under Secretary Burns (faxed to EUR/RUS) asserting serious human rights abuses and backsliding on democracy in Georgia. The letter alleges arrests of opposition politicians, pressure on free media, unfair electoral manipulation, collapse of the judicial system and growth in crime, torture and unexplained deaths in prisons, and discrimination against ethnic minorities. The letter concludes that in view of America's increased attention to human rights in the "post-Soviet space" as well as to Georgian-Russian relations and the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts, Georgia's human rights violations will no doubt draw the attention of the U.S., which will convey the "necessary recommendations" to Tbilisi. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Kelin shares a view universally espoused by GOR interlocutors: that it is up to Georgia, not Russia, to take steps toward normalized relations. Only then will Russia consider relaxing sanctions. We would re-emphasize two elements of the Russian view of normalization. First, Russia views the prospect of removing its sticks as the only carrot it will offer. Second, Russia views normalization as assent that frozen conflicts remain frozen: Russia's clear aim is to restore the status quo of the last fourteen years, not to resolve the conflicts as a reward for Georgian concessions. BURNS