C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012441

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PBTS UNSC OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN REACTION TO EVENTS IN GEORGIA


Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM j. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) MFA 4th CIS Department Director Andrey Kelin told us
November 13 that Georgia shows no willingness to meet
Russia's "simple" demands for normalizing relations. He
downplayed the effects of the sacking of former DefMin
Okruashvili. He fretted that an "alternative election" in
South Ossetia was a Georgian tactic to cloud the peace
process, though he signaled some flexibility on the
"authorized delegations" format. He decried what he claimed
was Georgian refusal to implement UNSCR 1716, and alleged
that half the Georgian forces in Kodori are wearing MOD
uniforms. He said Russia is "not against" a dialogue between
President Saakashvili and South Ossetian leader Kokoity. He
delivered a letter from DFM Karasin to Under Secretary Burns
(faxed to EUR/RUS) criticizing Georgian human rights
practices, including allegations of torture and crackdowns on
dissent. Security Council Secretary Ivanov strengthened
Kelin's points to Ambassador November 13. End Summary.

Georgians Bear No Gifts...
--------------


2. (C) In a November 13 meeting, Kelin provided a gloomy
assessment of prospects with Georgia. FM Bezhuashvili came
to Moscow November 1 "empty-handed," repeating old positions.
FM Lavrov formulated Russia's "simple" demands for improved
relations: Georgia must stop militarization, stop preparing
for offensive action against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stop
its anti-Russian rhetoric and start "conversation" with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These are in line with EU
requests, he said. But Bezhuashvili said nothing of these in
his 90 minutes with Lavrov, and new DFM Manjgaladze was
unable to formulate a Georgian position in his meeting with
DFM Denisov the following day. Manjgaladze proposed that
Georgia and Russia draw a "roadmap" to better relations.
This was absurd, Kelin said. "Imagine the U.S. making a road
map

with Cuba."

... But May Be Sending "Faint Signals"
--------------


3. (C) Asked whether the transfer of Irakli Okruashvili away
from the Defense Ministry addressed some of Russia's
concerns, Kelin said that he personally saw some attempts by
Georgia to send positive signals. Georgia last week resumed
issuing visas to Russian military personnel tasked with
withdrawing from military bases. The GOG has delayed
parliamentary hearings on withdrawing from the CIS. In
Geneva, Georgia sent signals that it is moving away from its
objection to Russian WTO accession. Okruashvili's transfer,
though timely, resolves little. MinInt Merabishvili and
Okruashvili's deputies are still in place, and they think
like Okruashvili. Only Deputy MOD Mamuka Kudava was
reasonable, and he was replaced November 4.


4. (C) Kelin said he thought some more "steps" might make
possible a Putin-Saakashvili meeting at the CIS Summit in
Minsk November 28, but not if the Georgians stay with their
current positions. A Georgian parliamentary declaration
debated on November 11 was blatantly anti-Russian, accusing
Russia of xenophobia and the oppression of Georgians. Kelin
added that Russia had taken some "idiotic" steps with regard
to schools, but denied they were xenophobic. Kelin said
deportations are waning, with Georgians representing a
fraction of the nationalities expelled by the authorities.


5. (C) In a separate November 13 conversation with Ambassador
(other subjects Septel), Security Council Secretary Igor
Ivanov struck most of the same notes. Ivanov acknowledged
that Okruashvili's departure was a significant step and a
significant signal, and said he thought there might now be an
opening for a Putin-Saakashvili conversation in Minsk. But
he made clear that the GOR, and Putin personally, had no
inclination right now to ease economic pressure on Georgia.

No Light on Frozen Conflicts...
--------------


6. (C) Asked whether the lack of violence during the November
12 South Ossetia referendum and elections lessened Russian
concerns about provocations and violence, Kelin answered that
Georgia may have repeated its Kodori experience (e.g.,
installed an alternative government that claims to speak for
the people). If that is the case, tensions will continue and
the South Ossetians will not negotiate.


7. (C) Kelin described his view of the Kodori situation,
which he described as "nearly blown." The

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Government-in-Exile "might continue to exist until the snow."
After that, Georgians in Kodori cannot renew fuel supplies.
As it stands, he said, 1000 ethnic Svans are guarded by 500
military personnel labeled police. Georgia seems to be
making no move to implement UNSCR 1716. PolMinCouns said it
is our understanding that police are permitted in Kodori
under relevant agreements. Kelin said that Bezhuashvili had
claimed the Georgians were not in violation of 1716. In
fact, he said, SRSG Arnault is demanding that Georgia
withdraw its heavy equipment, vehicles and mines in order to
comply with the UNSCR. He denied that the heavy equipment
Arnault referred to belonged to deposed warlord Kvitsiani.
He asserted that UN observers concluded the equipment
belonged to Georgian troops. "Kvitsiani never had
helicopters," he said. Kelin claimed that half the Georgian
forces were in MinInt uniforms, but the other half wore MOD
clothes. We said we had not seem this reported and would
convey the allegation to Washington.


8. (C) Asked about renewing the peace processes, including a
Saakashvili-Kokoity meeting, Kelin said restarting the
process for Abkhazia would be difficult, as the Abkhaz demand
the withdrawal of all Georgian forces and the
"government-in-exile" before agreeing to a meeting of the
Coordinating Council. There is, however, discussion of a
Georgian-Abkhaz commission for the Upper Kodori and planning
is underway for a second PKF-UNOMIG monitoring mission.


9. (C) Kelin continued that there is no prospect for
reconvening the Joint Control Commission for Abkhazia. The
OSCE proposed dialogue of the "authorized delegations," and
"we might think about that," but the sticking point is
status. Talk initially needs to focus on demilitarization
and confidence-building measures, and then go on to status.
Kelin clarified that even the working groups charged with
harmonizing the Georgian and Ossetian peace plans should
focus on the first two phases, and leave harmonization of the
status proposals for later. In addition, the authorized
delegations are too senior to take on the initial talks. The
groundwork must be laid at the working level in the JCC.

... And No Dialogue...
--------------


10. (C) Asked about a direct Georgian-South Ossetian
dialogue, Kelin joked that the Georgians raise such a
possibility in Washington and Brussels, but never invite
Kokoity directly. But Russia is "not against it" if
Saakashvili and Kokoity can agree. Asked whether Kokoity
might take such a step by himself, or whether he needed to be
urged to do so, Kelin said it depends on the Georgian
reaction to the referendum. If Georgian rhetoric puts
Kokoity in "an awkward position," he will refuse.

...But Further Accusations
--------------


11. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting Kelin conveyed a
four-page letter from DFM Karasin to Under Secretary Burns
(faxed to EUR/RUS) asserting serious human rights abuses and
backsliding on democracy in Georgia. The letter alleges
arrests of opposition politicians, pressure on free media,
unfair electoral manipulation, collapse of the judicial
system and growth in crime, torture and unexplained deaths in
prisons, and discrimination against ethnic minorities. The
letter concludes that in view of America's increased
attention to human rights in the "post-Soviet space" as well
as to Georgian-Russian relations and the South Ossetia and
Abkhazia conflicts, Georgia's human rights violations will no
doubt draw the attention of the U.S., which will convey the
"necessary recommendations" to Tbilisi.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Kelin shares a view universally espoused by GOR
interlocutors: that it is up to Georgia, not Russia, to take
steps toward normalized relations. Only then will Russia
consider relaxing sanctions. We would re-emphasize two
elements of the Russian view of normalization. First, Russia
views the prospect of removing its sticks as the only carrot
it will offer. Second, Russia views normalization as assent
that frozen conflicts remain frozen: Russia's clear aim is
to restore the status quo of the last fourteen years, not to
resolve the conflicts as a reward for Georgian concessions.
BURNS