RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: BILATERAL RELATIONS UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012402 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2026 TAGS: PREL KNDP ECON ETRD RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: BILATERAL RELATIONS UPDATE Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a November 8 meeting with the Ambassador, DFM Kislyak expressed concern over the potential impact of US congressional elections on WTO and bilateral nuclear cooperation. He argued again that US sanctions against Sukhoi were symbolic of the failings in bilateral relations -- deeply offending Putin, who would likely raise the topic with the President at APEC. Kislyak flagged a possible visit to Washington in early December to consult with U/S Joseph in advance of the next round of the Strategic Security Dialogue. He praised the inauguration of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, pushed for immunity in the Kuznetsov case, welcomed an Embassy Baghdad briefing on the Yousifiyah power plant, and urged closure on the Putin-Bush meeting time in Hanoi-- noting that DFM Denisov would represent the GOR at the APEC ministerial prior to FM Lavrov's November 18th arrival. Kislyak agreed it was time to revisit commitments to the International Science and Technology Center, and welcomed planning for the 200th anniversary celebration. Iran portion of conversation reported septel. End Summary ¶2. (C) US-Russian Relations Post-Elections: Kislyak expressed concern that US-Russian relations would be "held hostage" to congressional elections, with ratification of key elements of the presidential checklist -- WTO and "123" -- subject to a more critical reception. Kislyak interpreted the language of the Iran Non-Proliferation Act amendments as a bellwether of congressional activism. The Ambassador responded that WTO would be a signal accomplishment, but agreed that it would face tough scrutiny. While a "123" agreement would provide Congress with a 90 day period to react, but no formal requirement to vote, the Ambassador stressed that Russian cooperation on North Korea and Iran would remain important factors in congressional deliberations. The Ambassador reminded Kislyak that prior to the mid-term elections, congressional skepticism towards Russia was acute: a strong case would need to be made on the merits of US-Russian cooperation. ¶3. (C) Sukhoi: Launching into a lecture on the failure of the US to be a predictable partner in foreign affairs (citing shifting US budgetary support for CW destruction and CTR), Kislyak revisited GOR unhappiness over the US decision to impose sanctions against Sukhoi. The company that had done the most to advocate long-term cooperation with the United States, he argued, had been singled out for punishment. Kislyak argued that an apology was in order, taking particular offense at the Federal Register language that labeled Russian firms overseen by Putin as proliferators. Noting that he had made the same points with U/S Joseph, Kislyak rejected US explanations that the Federal Register language mirrored the legislation, and repeated that it was unacceptable that an official US document labeled Russian parastatals as proliferators. The Sukhoi sanctions were symbolic of what was wrong in the relationship and constituted a personal offense to Putin, who would raise the issue with the President in Hanoi. The Ambassador responded that Kislyak's conversation with U/S Joseph had been a positive first step in reviewing the Sukhoi issue. The focus now needed to be on careful consultations on the facts and moving forward. ¶4. (C) Possible Kislyak Visit Early December: Kislyak noted that he might add a Washington leg to an early December trip to Central America in order to consult with U/S Joseph prior to the next round of the Strategic Security Dialogue scheduled for Moscow before year's end. The Ambassador encouraged the visit, reminding Kislyak that the 15th anniversary of the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement would give momentum to the Bratislava checklist, but also provide an opportunity to assess how best to move forward. He underscored that a Washington visit would not obviate the need for a follow-on session of the Strategic Security Dialogue in Moscow. ¶5. (C) Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Kislyak praised the inaugural session of the Global Initiative in Morocco, underscoring his appreciation for the work of U/S Joseph's team. With the next session in Turkey to be followed by a larger event in Astana, Kislyak noted that it did not take much GOR persuasion to win over President Nazarbayev to the merits of hosting the high-profile gathering. Some doubts were quietly expressed to the GOR by Turkey and Kazakhstan over the fact that the summits were exclusively in Muslim countries. Kislyak said he refuted the notion of a faith-based selection process. ¶6. (C) Kuznetsov Immunity: Kislyak reiterated Lavrov's written request to the Secretary for a "political and MOSCOW 00012402 002 OF 002 extrajudicial" determination of the case, arguing that regardless of the SYG's decision to waive immunity, the US made its own determination of immunity through the visa process. The Ambassador noted that a written response to Lavrov's letter was forthcoming, but did not provide any grounds for optimism that the US would change its position. ¶7. (C) Yousifiyah Power Plant: The Ambassador informed Kislyak that Embassy Baghdad had extended an offer to brief the Russian mission on the state of play at the facility, which was still the site of numerous and severe security incidents, and was awaiting a response. Kislyak said that he would send instructions for the Russian mission to set up the meeting, adding that it was not in the interest of either the US or Russia for the facility to be further damaged. ¶8. (C) APEC/Putin-President Bilateral: Kislyak pushed for closure on the timing of the presidential bilateral in Hanoi, noting that Putin accords "great importance" to his meeting with the President, which meant that the rest of his schedule was in limbo. He clarified that First DFM Denisov would precede Lavrov to Hanoi and would represent the GOR at the ministerial. Lavrov arrives on the 18th and is available to meet the Secretary on the 18th or 19th, with his preference the 18th. ¶9. (C) International Science and Technology Center (ISTC): The Ambassador flagged the upcoming visit of ISN DAS Semmel as an opportune time to address the status of the ISTC, noting declining US budgetary support for the center. Kislyak said that he had raised this issue with Rosatom Kiriyenko, who had asked for more time to come up to speed on the issue. The GOR valued the ISTC for the transparent rules and world standards that it propagated. Kislyak agreed in principle that the ISTC needed to adapt to new realities and conditions. ¶10. (SBU) 200th Anniversary: Expressing appreciation for Putin's letter endorsing the official commemoration of 200 years of diplomatic relations in 2007, the Ambassador said the Embassy would work closely with the MFA on the range of US-supported events that were under consideration. Kislyak said the MFA was committed to the project, and valued the public diplomacy dimension that it added to US-Russian relations. BURNS