RUSSIAN MFA ON TALKS WITH GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012347

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON TALKS WITH GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 12257

Classified By: PolMinCouns Alice Wells. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) The Russian MFA was disappointed that Georgian FM
Bezhuashvili brought no deliverables with him to his November
1-2 talks in Moscow. The Russians are hearing rumors of a
major cabinet reshuffle in Tbilisi. Proposed talks between
President Saakashvili and South Ossetian leader Kokoity are
stymied by disagreement on venue. The Russian negotiator
suspects Saakashvili proposed these talks as part of a plan
to create a "South Ossetian Government in Exile" -- which
would provoke a Russian response. End Summary.

"Disappointment"
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2. (C) Russian MFA negotiator for South Ossetia Amb. Yuriy
Popov told us November 7 that the MFA was "disappointed" by
talks with Georgian FM Bezhuashvili (reftel). The Russians
had expected some "steps" from the Georgians that might
provide the basis for relaxing sanctions Russia has imposed
on Georgia. Before the visit, the Georgian MFA had asked the
Russian Charge in Tbilisi what steps might be effective with
the Russians. The Charge had replied that it was up to the
Georgians to come up with steps. In the event, Bezhuashvili
had no deliverables, and, Popov said, the MFA believed there
was no common ground. We briefed Popov on our understanding
of the talks, including Bezhuashvili's assurance that Georgia
planned no military actions in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, and
his request for assurances that Russia would not recognize
either of the separatist entities.


3. (C) Popov said he had met with Georgian Minister for
Conflict Resolution Antadze after the latter's one-on-one
meeting with DFM Denisov November 2. He said Antadze, who
had said nothing during Bezhuashvili's meeting with Lavrov,
seemed "insecure" about his position, amid rumors of a
cabinet reshuffle. (Later, Popov mentioned that media
reports hint that DefMin Okruashvili might be out in a
reshuffle. Popov hoped this was the case, but doubted
Okruashvili could be jettisoned without a fight. Popov noted
that we are rapidly approaching the New Year, which
Okruashvili promised to greet in Tskhinvali.)

South Ossetia/Abkhaz Talks: All a Trick?
--------------


4. (C) Popov discussed with Antadze the possibility of a
Saakashvili-Kokoity meeting. Initially, Saakashvili had
proposed a meeting at the Georgian ski resort of Bakuriani.
Kokoity refused on grounds that about 1000 Ossetians had been
expelled from that region during the 1992 war. Kokoity
proposed Sochi (with Putin presiding); the Georgians rejected
a Russian venue. The OSCE proposed a western European
meeting -- Brussels or Vienna -- and Popov said de Gucht's
special representative Chevalier told him that both the
Georgians and Ossetians rejected this. Popov said there were
now thoughts of a tripartite meeting among Saakashvili,
Kokoity and Bagapsh -- but there was no progress on finding a
venue acceptable to all.


5. (C) Popov said he suspected a plot by Saakashvili in
proposing to meet with Kokoity. November 12 would see not
one referendum/election but two: one held by the Tskhinvali
authorities, the other an "alternative," pro-Georgian
referendum and election. Saakashvili could use an
unproductive meeting with Kokoity (or a failure to hold a
meeting) as an excuse for recognizing the "alternative"
government. Popov believed this would lead to confrontations
in South Ossetia. He warned that this would give impulse to
"hotheads" in Russia to push for recognition of the
Tskhinvali authorities.

SIPDIS

Comment
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6. (C) Finding the venue for a Saakashvili-Kokoity (or
Saakashvili-Kokoity-Bagapsh) meeting is dependent only on the
political will to hold such a meeting. Popov seemed to be
interested in our suggestion of Baku or Yerevan, but his body
language implied both that his superiors insist on a
Putin-led meeting in Russia -- and that Popov recognizes this
as a non-starter.


7. (C) Creating a new "Ossetian Government in Exile" would,
as Popov implied, set the Russians off -- much as the
Georgian deployment of the "Abkhazian Government in Exile" to
Kodori did. Such a move would further set back hopes for

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normalization between Georgia and Russia.
BURNS