GEORGIA-RUSSIA: FM BEZHUASHVILI GETS RUSSIA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012257

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA-RUSSIA: FM BEZHUASHVILI GETS RUSSIA'S
MESSAGE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Georgian FM Bezhuashvili told Ambassador November 2
that he "got the message" passed to him bluntly November 1 by
FM Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov: that
the Russians believe Georgia will begin military action in
Abkhazia or South Ossetia; that Russia will confront Georgia
militarily if that happens; and that the Russians don't care
if this means taking on the rest of the international
community. Bezhuashvili assured the Russians that Georgia
has no plans for military action. He passed a blunt message
of his own: that recognition of separatist entities would
have grave consequences. He sought assurances that the
Russians are not planning to activate the conflicts as
pressure against Georgia. Ivanov replied that Russia will
not. It will not recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia, nor is
it interested in "regime change." The Russians made clear
they will not relax sanctions and that they will campaign to
stop military sales to Georgia -- their way of reducing
Georgian capacity to wage war.


2. (C) Bezhuashvili thought his talks began a valuable
dialogue to "create space" now that Russia's emotions are
calming down. But Ivanov made clear to him that engagement
is still problematic: Putin is personally making all
decisions related to Georgia, and Putin remains angry and
humiliated. End Summary.

Talks -- Tough Talks
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador met Georgian Foreign Minister Gela
Bezhuashvili (at the FM's request) for 1 1/2 hours on
November 2. Ambassador led off with a readout of the
Secretary's talks with Putin on Georgia. Ambassador

SIPDIS
understood from a November 1 conversation with FM Lavrov that
the message to Bezhuashvili would be similar to what Putin
told the Secretary: Russia is not looking to do more to harm
Georgia, but the Georgians have to understand that Russia
would respond with force to a Georgian attack on Abkhazia or
South Ossetia.


4. (C) Bezhuashvili said he had come with limited
expectations. The good news from his talks is that he and
the Russians have agreed on a public line: that the dialogue
continues. But, he said, the dialogue is tough.

War Means War
--------------


5. (C) After a "standard" large-format meeting with Lavrov
November 1, Bezhuashvili got down to brass tacks with Ivanov
in a one-on-one meeting later that evening. Ivanov made
clear several times -- and Bezhuashvili kept returning to it
as the central point -- that Russia believes Georgia is
planning to start violence. If that happens, Russia will
respond with direct force. If that means confronting the
whole international community, so be it. Russia will not
care what damage it does to its relations with the U.S. or
Europe; a Georgian initiation of hostilities will mean direct
Russian military response. Bezhuashvili said Georgia has no
plans to start fighting. Ivanov said Russia does not trust
Georgia and needs assurances at the highest level.
Bezhuashvili asked whether his assurances were not high-level
enough, and Ivanov answered, "No." Ambassador commented to
Bezhuashvili that this tracked with what we understand: the
Russians are not fooling.


6. (C) Bezhuashvili told his interlocutors that Georgia, too,
needs assurances. It sees Russian rhetoric and sanctions as
preparing public opinion for war. Georgia needs a guarantee
that the Russians will not activate the conflicts to pressure
Georgia. Ivanov said Russia will not. He said Russia does
not seek either to annex or recognize Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. He denied Russia has any plans for "regime change."
He said Russia understands Saakashvili has public support,
and added that Russia no longer has the capacity to engage in
such adventures. Ivanov agreed that sanctions will not
isolate Georgia. Ivanov said the only way to re-build trust
is to tone down the rhetoric (with which Bezhuashvili readily
agreed) and sign bilateral agreements with the Abkhaz and
South Ossetians on the non-use of force. Bezhuashvili
replied that the non-use of force is already enshrined in the
1994 Moscow Agreement. Taking non-use of force out of the
context of overall peace settlements is useless for Georgia.
Georgia will soon present packages of proposals on both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia that include non-use of force in
the context of an overall solution.

MOSCOW 00012257 002 OF 003




7. (C) Ambassador asked whether Bezhuashvili's interlocutors
had focused on the Kodori Gorge. Bezhuashvili said no;
Kodori had just been an excuse for Russia to apply pressure.
It came up briefly with Lavrov, who asserted that, to comply
with UNSCR 1716, Georgia had to withdraw its troops from
Kodori. Bezhuashvili said there are no military personnel in
Kodori, and 1716 makes no mention of police, which will not
be withdrawn. Lavrov dropped the issue.

Sanctions as Arms Control
--------------


8. (C) Bezhuashvili said his interlocutors made clear that,
though not interested in imposing further sanctions, current
economic sanctions will remain. Russia will also attempt to
stop military sales to Georgia. Both measures are aimed at
reducing Georgia's capacity to increase its military
strength, Bezhuashvili said -- the former by "starving" its
budget and the latter by stunting its army. Bezhuashvili
told Ambassador that Georgia needs a better military in part
to gain a better diplomatic negotiating position. He agreed
when Ambassador stressed that all advantage will be lost if
the military is actually used directly.


9. (C) Bezhuashvili said he had told the Russians Georgia
will not deviate from its goal to reunite the country. He
said the Russians understood. They believe it can and must
be done through negotiations. Bezhuashvili said this is
possible if Russia does not interfere and becomes an honest
broker. He recounted what Putin said when Saakashvili used
the same phrase in their last meeting: "Why should we?"


10. (C) Ambassador asked whether the Russians had focused on
Georgia's NATO aspirations. Bezhuashvili said no. The main
reason for Russian aggressiveness, he believed, is Putin's
personal feeling of humiliation. Ivanov had made clear:
nobody but Putin can make decisions on Georgia. For this
reason, no senior Russian will engage with the Georgians.
Ivanov was only meeting with Bezhuashvili because they had a
personal relationship. Nor were the Russians eager to see
Bezhuashvili return to help "shape" the atmosphere before the
November 28 CIS summit in Minsk. He discussed a visit by
Parliament Speaker Burjanadze as an alternative, but got no
clear response beyond Ivanov's flat assertion that she would
not get a meeting with Putin.

Going on From Here
--------------


11. (C) Bezhuashvili agreed with Ambassador that the Russians
seem to be calming down after the strong emotions of October.
Lavrov had assured him there would be no disruption of gas
or electricity this winter. Ambassador noted that
Bezhuashvili's calm statement at the BSEC ministerial
(Septel) is a model for making Georgia's points while keeping
the situation calm. On WTO, Georgia may gain more
concessions by engaging in multilateral discussions with
Russia rather than blocking those discussions. Bezhuashvili
agreed, and said that was the strategy he had ordered to his
representative at the Geneva talks. The Russians had not
raised WTO in either of his meetings in Moscow.


12. (C) Bezhuashvili summed up his impressions by saying
Georgia has "crossed the point of no return" with Russia. It
cannot get agreement from Russia on strategy. It is
therefore important to be extremely careful about tactics to
avoid "dancing the wrong tango" with Russia, especially over
the next 3-6 months. Ambassador noted the unanimity of
Russian views: even the most liberal Russian politicians are
angry about Georgia and agree that if there is any bloodshed,
Russia must step in and win.


13. (C) That being the case, Bezhuashvili continued, he will
return to Tbilisi and develop strategies on how best to deal
with the Russians and how best to enlist Georgia's European
and American partners. He believed Georgia should seek areas
to engage and cooperate between the Russian and Georgian
militaries (including the PKFs). Economic opportunities will
have to wait. Rhetoric will have to be toned all the way
down, with appropriate criticism of Russian policies in
private and in relevant multilateral fora. Bezhuashvili said
he will try to activate GUAM to gain multilateral leverage.
He has been in Baku and will soon visit Chisinau and Kyiv.
He will also visit France, Finland (again),Norway, and Sofia
for a "New Group of Friends" meeting. He praised the recent
European Parliament resolution on Georgia ("I couldn't have
written it better myself),and looked forward to
Saakashvili's address before that body.


14. (C) With regard to Georgia's partners, Bezhuashvili hoped

MOSCOW 00012257 003 OF 003


they can make Russia understand the dangers of recognizing
Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Just as an outbreak of bloodshed
could produce an irrational and counterproductive response
from Russia, so too could Russian recognition of the
separatists produce such a response from Georgia.
Bezhuashvili said he had stressed this to the Russians as
many times as the Russians had stressed to him the
consequences of fighting; he hoped the West would reiterate
the point.

Comment
--------------


15. (C) The resumed dialogue is part of a perceptible
lowering of the emotional tone. The Georgian Embassy told us
there is a "visible decrease" in harassment of ethnic
Georgians in Russia. That is a narrow foundation to build
wider trust, but it is all that is available for the moment.
Bezhuashvili made clear that he understands that the
situation in Moscow is very different from Tbilisi's
perception. When he returns to Tbilisi, he said he will try
to make Saakashvili and his inner circle realize that. He
implied that this will not be an easy task. He did not
mention DefMin Okruashvili's assertion that Russia is scared
of war, but that is clearly on his mind. From the
perspective of Moscow, a lot depends on how well Bezhuashvili
can get his points across when he gets home. Saber-rattling
and fiery rhetoric play into Russia's strengths and Georgia's
weaknesses.
BURNS