TRANSNISTRIA: WHY IS VALERIY NESTERUSHKIN SMILING?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD MD RS
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: WHY IS VALERIY NESTERUSHKIN SMILING?

Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) Russian diplomacy has become more active with Moldova
since Putin and Voronin met August 8. The rise of Yanukovich
in Ukraine has helped Russia exert leverage over Moldova,
helping to roll back the agreement between Moldova and
Ukraine on customs that so irritated the Transnistrians.
Russian leverage is also undermining internationalized
negotiations that include the U.S. and EU. New dialogue
between Russia and Moldova has so far produced no concrete
results on either economic issues or the Transnistria
conflict. End Summary.

The Cheshire Cat
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2. (C) Russian MFA Transnistria negotiator Nesterushkin
looked more than ever like a cat licking cream when we saw
him October 24. He exuded schadenfreude over the failure of
the October 17-18 Odessa round to produce an agreement even
to meet again in the 5 plus 2 format (the format that
includes the EU and U.S.). He denied that useful progress
could come out of such a large "roomful of people." And he
lauded TN negotiator Litskai for declaring in Odessa that the
U.S. had no business discussing Transnistria's railroad
protocols, since the U.S. had no rail connections with
Transnistria.


3. (C) Nesterushkin has been traveling often to Chisinau and
Tiraspol recently -- we chanced to meet his wife October 25;
she told us he goes to Chisinau and Tiraspol "every week
nowadays." But he flatly refused to tell us what his purpose
was, whom he had met, or what results he has achieved. We
know Nesterushkin was there with DFM Karasin in early
October; he went by himself for the week of October 16 and
again on October 26 with Deputy Security Council Secretary
Zubakov, who reputedly has large financial interests in
Transnistria and exerts great influence on Russian policy
towards Moldova.


4. (C) The closest Nesterushkin got to revealing what he is
up to was in expressing the opinion that a final agreement
would have "elements of the Kozak paper, as well as other
papers such as the Belgian plans." Moldovan Political
Counselor Ion Ciornii confirmed to us October 26 that Russia
has been using its new leverage from the September 17
Transnistria referendum to foist on Moldova proposals from
the Kozak memorandum that Moldova definitively rejected years
ago -- though mention of the Memorandum itself might
disappear.

The Yanukovich Factor
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5. (C) Ciornii said Ukrainian PM Yanukovich is providing
Russia with leverage to undermine the Customs Agreement
between Moldova and Ukraine via the "Transit Protocol"
Transnistria is seeking. Yanukovich's leverage is the main
railway bridge over the Dniester between Moldova and Ukraine,
which in August "suddenly" needed repair that is still
"incomplete," though it was scheduled to be finished by
October 1. (The OSCE reports that in fact the repairs are
complete and that "test" trains have crossed.) The Russians
have piled on by insisting that if, as of November 1, all
train service does not pass through Transnistria, Russia will
simply cancel the Moscow-Chisinau train.

Better to Jaw, Jaw
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6. (C) Ciornii (protect) said neither Russians nor Moldovans
are willing to talk about the results of new dialogue that
began after Moldovan President Voronin's talk with Putin
August 8. The sides have talked at various levels in
addition to the Russian visits mentioned above. DPM
Grecianii arrived in Moscow October 25 for a CIS exhibition,
and was expected to meet with Minister of Education and
Science Fursenko, her co-Chair on the Russian-Moldovan
Economic Commission. Ciornii expected a formal meeting of
the Commission in November. Grecianii also had talks with
Russia's chief sanitary officer, Onnishenko, who imposed the
ban on wine.


7. (C) Ciornii said the dialogue so far seems to be for its
own sake -- Russia's demonstration that Moldova's approach,
less confrontational than Georgia's, is more effective.
However, he said, there are no concrete results -- no
progress on wine bans, no progress on the Transit Protocol
(which Moldova rejects largely because it would require

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Moldova to send all its rail cargoes through Transnistria --
and pay transit fees to the Transnistrians),and no progress
in the Transnistria negotiations.

Comment
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8. (C) All this gives Nesterushkin reason to smile. Russia
has used Yanukovich to gain greater leverage over Moldova.
The internationalized negotiating format cannot meet and may
be breaking down. And Voronin's hat-in-hand approach to
Putin in August, together with Russia's desire to set an
example for Georgia, may have led to instructions to raise
the profile of Russian diplomacy on Moldova in general and of
Nesterushkin in particular -- one of the things that makes
Nesterushkin smile widest of all.
BURNS