MOSCOW EXPERTS ON DPRK NUCLEAR TEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011698

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DEPT FOR EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP UNSC KN RS
SUBJECT: MOSCOW EXPERTS ON DPRK NUCLEAR TEST


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary. Despite the GOR's strongly negative
reaction to the reported nuclear test and its cooperation on
UNSC 1718, Moscow's Korea watchers were for the large part
critical of U.S. policies, arguing that the impasse over the
DPRK program could have been avoided had the U.S. acted
differently. The test surprisingly does not seem to have
changed public opinion or experts' views on North Korea.
Many continue to view North Korea as a poor and isolated
regime that seeks increased international attention through
direct negotiations with the U.S. Most thought the U.S. and
China were better placed to resolve the nuclear issue, while
Russia has very little to offer. End summary.
.
Public Biases, Institutional Interests
--------------


2. (C) While the nuclear test was front-page news here as
elsewhere, public attention quickly returned to Russia's
ongoing dispute with Georgia. The Director of the Institute
of Contemporary International Studies Yevgeniy Bazhanov
maintained that Russians do not think about North Korea in a
sustained way, and public opinion had little effect on Korea
policy. An opinion poll published after the test revealed
that forty-six percent of the respondents thought the U.S.
had created the North Korean problem and were happy to let
the U.S. worry about it. Few saw even a nuclear-armed North
as a threat to Russia. A series of conversations over the
last several days with Moscow's Korea specialists suggests
that expert reaction falls into three broad categories:

-- those who hold the U.S. alone responsible for the current
impasse,

-- selective critics of the USG approach, who emphasize the
need for continued negotiations,

-- a few experts who generally support USG efforts to contain
North Korea by imposing stronger sanctions.
.
The Blame America Crowd
--------------


3. (C) Finding scholars who are quick to blame U.S. actions
for "forcing" North Korea to test is not difficult among Asia
experts at the older think tanks, who are often reflexively
anti-American. However, these scholars often reflect the
views of at least some in the Kremlin and MFA who shape
policy. Mikhail Titarenko, Director of the Institute of Far
Eastern Studies, who is a sinologist by training, sees the
Russia-China alliance as a necessary counterbalance to U.S.
influence in the region. He argued that the U.S. must simply
make peace with the fact that "North Korea exists and is not
going anywhere." Titarenko also criticized U.S. fulfillment
of the Agreed Framework. He argued, along with Aleksandr
Zhebin of the Far Eastern Studies Institute and Aleksandr
Vorontsov of the Institute of Oriental Studies, that the U.S.
had not engaged in good faith negotiations during the
Six-Party Talks, and had been deceptive about its intentions.

.
Time to Ask Tough Questions
--------------


4. (C) Gennadiy Chufrin, Deputy Director of the Institute
of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
acknowledged that the situation on the Peninsula was serious
and that the international community must act to change it.
Chufrin argued that if the international community cannot
halt North Korea's drive to acquire a nuclear arsenal, the
already tattered NPT regime will collapse. However, like
those analysts who question U.S. motives, Chufrin suggested
that as a first step, the U.S. needed to define what it
wants: regime change, North Korea back in the NPT, or
resumed Six Party Talks. Chufrin thought the strongly held
perception that U.S. policy favored regime change created
fatal disharmony among its partners in the Six Party Talks.
.
What is To Be Done?
--------------


5. (C) When pressed on how the international community
should respond to the tests, many of the experts we spoke to
at the two regional institutes were convinced that sanctions
did not work, and argued that Russia's support for sanctions
through UNSCR 1718 was little more than a gesture of
solidarity with the international community. Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) scholar
Aleksandr Bogaturov predicted that further sanctions would

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have no effect on the DPRK. He described the clause on
luxury items as "humorous." Interlocutors here seemed to
place more faith in what they characterized as gradual but
steady efforts by South Korea to encourage the North to adopt
a more market-based economy ("developing a taste for money,"
as one specialist put it). That process would be painfully
slow, but held out better prospects for success than what
they characterized as continued U.S. "provocations."
Yevgeniy Bazhanov, who is often viewed as pro-Western, saw
"hypocrisy" and a "double standard" in the USG's willingness
to condemn North Korea's human rights record while
overlooking failures by U.S. partners like Saudi Arabia.
Washington's willingness to countenance the nuclearization of
Pakistan, India, and Israel while imposing sanctions on North
Korea made many here question U.S. sincerity, said Bazhanov.
.
Russia Lacks Leverage
--------------


6. (C) While there was little consensus on what measures
might be effective, the experts we spoke to at the Institute
of Oriental Studies and the Institute of Far Eastern Studies
believed that on a political and diplomatic level, Russia had
little real potential on its own to turn the situation
around. On the other hand, they noted that China had failed
to influence the DPRK's behavior despite its own perceived
leverage. Most thought that left the U.S. as the most
important player. Experts here believed it unlikely at this
stage that the North would agree to take any steps backward,
but it might, under certain circumstances, be persuaded to
freeze further development. Winning that concession,
however, would require unmeditated U.S. overtures to the
DPRK. All highlighted the difficulties of verification of a
freeze, which would be possible only if all members of the
Six Party Talks cooperated. The experts thought, however,
that if the U.S. goal remained regime change, the DPRK would
continue efforts to acquire an arsenal; something that no
country in the region wanted.
.
Fed Up with North Korea
--------------


7. (C) A handful of Moscow experts expressed frustration at
the lack of more coordinated measures against North Korea and
saw DPRK nuclear weapons capability as a threat to Russian
interests. IMEMO's Georgiy Kunadze suggested that the P-5
should cooperate not only on political declarations, but on
developing and using every other lever -- political, economic
and military -- to address the DPRK threat. IMEMO's Vasiliy
Mikheyev believed that, if anything, the DPRK's test had
brought the Chinese and U.S. positions closer together. He
noted China's reinforced border at Dandong and the cessation
of cross-border money transfers. Mikheyev and MGIMO's
Aleksandr Lukin went so far as to support a trilateral
military exercise -- Russia, China, and the U.S.-- as a
demonstration of resolve. They agreed -- although they
acknowledged that Russia would not sign on -- that the DPRK
test site should be destroyed in the event of another test.
.
Comment: Head in the Sand?
--------------


8. (C) Once the initial shock had subsided, Moscow expert
circles quickly resumed their standard lines on the DPRK.
Most experts do not view North Korea's nuclear ambitions as a
direct threat to Russian interests. Dissatisfaction with the
USG's approach to the DPRK is widespread here among the
academic community. Even foreign policy "moderates" in
Moscow subscribed to the belief that it was U.S. behavior
that is responsible for the current impasse. Most informed
observers believed that Russia should and would implement the
UNSCR, but saw little utility in the measures it prescribes.
In their view, the U.S. holds all of the cards, but it is a
weak hand in their view, and the possibilities of success are
slim. Few expected Moscow to do much more than lend
rhetorical support to efforts to restrain Pyongyang.
BURNS