RUSSIA-ABKHAZIA: SEEKING A DEAL AT THE UNSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011372 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR UNSC GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA-ABKHAZIA: SEEKING A DEAL AT THE UNSC Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) DFM Karasin convoked Ambassador October 10. He hoped for "a more constructive and flexible" U.S. approach to the Russian draft UNSCR on UNOMIG mandate renewal and said the Europeans are willing to be flexible. If the resolution included a "blunt message" to Tbilisi on its Kodori operation, other basic elements of UNSCR could remain. Ambassador replied that the U.S. will not be flexible on condemning the Kodori operation, but would accept highlighting violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. We have delivered a blunt message to Tbilisi privately; the international forum should complement that message, not repeat it. A visa for Abkhaz "Foreign Minster" Shamba could potentially be part of a package. Both the U.S. and Russia need to be blunt with the Abkhaz on the unacceptability of the use of force. Karasin said this approach is "smart," but continued to push for condemnation of the Kodori operation; Ambassador reiterated this is unacceptable. Ambassador pressed Karasin on harassment of Georgians. Karasin said "rough edges" will be smoothed out, but limitations will remain on relations with Georgia. End Summary. UNSC State of Play -- Russian View -------------- ¶2. (C) DFM Grigoriy Karasin convoked the Ambassador October ¶10. He said the U.S. is blocking progress on a UNSCR renewing UNOMIG's mandate. Russian negotiators say there are hints that the Europeans are willing to be flexible, and there has been some movement forward. The Russian bottom line is that the UNSCR must contain: -- a "qualification" of Georgia's action in the Kodori Gorge; -- condemnation of violations of the Moscow ceasefire agreement (1994); -- restatement of the obligation not to put armed forces in the Kodori Gorge; -- assurance that joint UNOMIG-PKF patrols in Kodori will be regular. With those elements, other major elements of UNSCR 1666 can remain. Karasin passed the Ambassador a non-paper (faxed to EUR-RUS) and draft resolution. ¶3. (C) Karasin continued that the U.S. is being tough in proposing alternatives unacceptable to Russia. U.S. language on status "breaks the spirit" of UNSCR 1666. U.S. language does not include expressions on the role of the CIS PLF, and hints that it should leave. Without a more cooperative U.S. attitude, Karasin said, he did not see how we could agree on a resolution to renew UNOMIG's mandate for another six months. He asked the Ambassador to convey Russia's concern to Washington. No U.S. Flexibility on Kodori -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador agreed that the negotiations are difficult. Russia should not expect the U.S. to show flexibility on condemning the Kodori operation per se. However, there is a willingness on our side to highlight violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. Russia should bear the distinction in mind. Karasin responded that "if we fail to send Tbilisi a clear signal, we will be de facto promoting its militaristic stance." ¶5. (C) Ambassador replied that we are very clear with the Georgians on the use of force. Our Ambassador in Tbilisi delivered a blunt demarche on this to President Saakashvili October 9. The Georgian leadership is in no doubt of the U.S. position. With regard to the UNSCR, however, there will be no flexibility. Karasin said he appreciated the U.S. bluntness to the Georgians, but the message must come from the U.S., Russia and the Europeans together. Ambassador replied that our private bilateral channel to the Georgians is the appropriate one for the message. The message from New York should be different but complement it. It could potentially be coupled with a visa issuance for Abkhaz "Foreign Minister" Shamba to visit New York to meet with UNSC members in the Aria forum. This would inter alia allow the U.S. to reinforce the message to the Abkhaz of the unacceptability of the use of force. That is part of the package -- another element is a blunt Russian message to the Abkhaz not to use force, a message we assume the Russians are sending. Karasin said the package approach is "smart." Still, he hoped for U.S. flexibility on the resolution, which could help calm the situation. MOSCOW 00011372 002 OF 002 Harassment of Georgians -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador mentioned mounting concern in Washington on Russian actions against individual Georgians in Russia. The actions promote a negative image for Russia. Ambassador was glad to learn that the Russians have stopped combing school records for information on Georgian parents. However, deportations (totaling 300 on October 10) and intensified document checks continue, and Georgian-linked businesses and restaurants continue to close. ¶7. (C) Karasin replied that "sometimes, decisions in Russia are strong, not elegant, but gradually we put away the extremes." He hoped there would be no more screaming from schools and universities. "But certain elements of limitation on our relations with Georgia will continue -- without the rougher forms, perhaps, but they will continue" as a message to Saakashvili. Karasin pushed again on the UNSCR, saying it would promote a better atmosphere for normalizing relations with Georgia. Ambassador hoped that some of these pieces will come together for a workable resolution. He reiterated that Russia needs to work, too, by pressing the Abkhaz not to use force. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Karasin, confident that the Europeans are ready to abandon the U.S. position, was trying to see where the limits of a deal might lie. Russia very much wants a resolution that will show Georgia that its major allies, especially the U.S., are angry with it and have reached the limit of their support. The Russians have fixed upon condemnation of the Kodori operation as the vehicle. The Ambassador gave Karasin no comfort on this, but the Russians are likely to keep trying before accepting a fallback of condemning ceasefire violations. ¶9. (C) Karasin took the point that the Shamba visa is in play as part of the package. We should try to get a decision as early as possible -- by COB October 10 would be important -- as a catalyst for moving negotiations on the resolution. BURNS