RUSSIA-GEORGIA: NO LET-UP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011315

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD UNSC GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: NO LET-UP

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (S) Russian officials continue to reject relaxation of
economic sanctions. About 150 Georgians have been deported.
Police document checks have intensified. Georgians here on
work permits are seeking other citizenship. However,
official actions in Moscow hit ethnic Georgian Russian
citizens hardest. Ambassador has been pressing Russian
officials on harassment of Georgians in Russia. DFM Karasin
agreed October 9 this has gone too far and promised "greater
restraint." First DFM Denisov repeated the same line in a
separate conversation. Presidential Human Rights Advisor
Pamfilova said October 9 that she is pushing the Kremlin to
stop "silly and repressive measures." The Georgian
Ambassador alleged Russia is pressing the Abkhaz to attack in
Kodori. He asked for the U.S. position on Georgian defense
of Kodori by a flanking attack through Gali. Given DefMin
Ivanov's markers on the Russian response to a military
"provocation," the result could be widespread conflict. The
U.S. must be clear with the Russians, Georgians and Abkhaz to
head off such actions. End Summary.

Russia Still Mad
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2. (C) Russian officials continue to express anger at Georgia
and to declare their intent to maintain economic sanctions.
DefMin Ivanov has been most outspoken, warning publicly
October 8 of a Russian military response should Georgia
resort to "armed provocations" against Russian citizens in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He said that Georgia represents
a reincarnation of Cold War "client" or "proxy" states. He
said it is up to Georgia to decide whether to join NATO, but
made clear that Russia has no intention to "pay for this
desire of the Georgian leadership" by sacrificing its own
interests. He minimized current economic sanctions against
Georgia, saying that if Russia wanted to impose a real
blockade, it would use the model of the U.S. "blockade" of
Cuba.


3. (C) Although Ivanov warned against a "witch hunt" against
common Georgian citizens living in Russia, it is clear that
police document checks have been intensified, including in
places where Georgians are more likely to be found. About
150 Georgians have been deported, the Georgian Ambassador
told us October 7 -- 100 of them with no papers, and 50 with
papers that may have been acquired through corruption. Most
controversial is the practice of combing school records to
find the addresses of children with Georgian surnames, to
check whether their parents are legally in Russia. One
school administrator confirmed that the police had done so,
despite police denials. Both Kremlin human rights chief
Pamfilova and the NGO Memorial have publicly condemned the
practice, and Pamfilova made the same points to the
Ambassador in an October 9 conversation.


4. (S) Ambassador's other conversations over the weekend
(NODIS Septels) confirmed the hard line of senior Russian
officials, and their intention to continue economic sanctions
to ensure Georgia receives "not one kopek" from Russia.
Ambassador separately pressed DFM Denisov and DFM Karasin
October 9 on Russian harassment of Georgians living in
Russia. Karasin agreed that the campaign has "gone too far,"
and said, "you will see greater restraint" from now on.
Karasin reminded Ambassador that Abkhaz "Foreign Minister"
Shamba is still waiting for permission to travel to New York
to speak with UNSC members in the Aria forum (see comment
below, para 8).


5. (C) Georgian Ambassador Chubinishvili told us October 7
that the weight of Russia's actions in Moscow hits hardest at
Russian citizens of Georgian ethnicity. When we mentioned
that we had confirmed that some of Moscow's most famous
Georgian restaurants are closed -- Tiflis, Genatsvale and
Pirosmani (where President Clinton dined) -- Chubinishvili
said the owners of these restaurants are Russian citizens --
"and very loyal to Russia, too." Chubinishvili cited several
cases he knew of Russian citizens of Georgian ethnicity or
born in Georgia who were denied papers such as automobile
registrations, allegedly because of a policy against
performing such services for ethnic Georgians. Nonetheless,
he said, Georgians in Russia are protectively seeking Russian
citizenship.

The Potential for Conflict
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6. (S) Chubinishvili was more concerned about the potential

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for military action. He claimed to have first-hand
information from a recent meeting of senior GOR officials at
which the MFA was severely criticized for its moderation
towards Georgia. (DFM Denisov indirectly confirmed this to
the Ambassador, saying that "Sergey (Lavrov) is in a very
tough position right now.") At the meeting, management of
the Abkhazia and South Ossetia issues was taken away from the
MFA and given to the Russian Security Council.


7. (S) Chubinishvili also claimed that a friend with good
contacts in the Abkhaz leadership quotes the Abkhaz as saying
that the Russians are pushing them to attack the Upper Kodori
Gorge later in the Autumn (once snows close the passes,
Kodori is isolated from the rest of Georgia by road; weather
often prevents helicopter access for weeks at a time as
well). Chubinishvili worried that an attack on Kodori might
coincide with an attack in South Ossetia as well. The Abkhaz
are unhappy, Chubinishvili said, because they know the
Georgians have good defenses in the Gorge, whose terrain
makes it easy to defend. Whether the Abkhaz succeed or not,
they will lose many troops. In addition, he said, the Abkhaz
know that the Georgians might try to defend Kodori by
launching a flanking attack to re-take Gali and lower Kodori.
We recalled that the U.S. has been absolutely clear with
Georgia about the unacceptability of a Georgian offensive
against Abkhazia. Chubinishvili replied that it is
impossible to defend Kodori without the threat of such an
attack, and requested that the USG make its position on this
known to the Georgian Government as soon as possible.

Comment
--------------


8. (S) We need to caveat Chubinishvili's information, but the
scenario he paints is realistic and worrisome. The Russians
will be ready for a Georgian attack in Gali, and this would
provide justification for a wider military campaign against
Georgia. DefMin Ivanov's public and private comments make
that clear. The ever more shrill press coverage and public
statements (despite dissent from some sober voices) could
provide public support for military action. The U.S. needs
to continue to be clear with both Russia and Georgia -- and
the Abkhaz -- to avert fighting, preferably with the strong
backing of our European allies.

-- With Russia, we need to stress that:

- -- The West considers Russia to have full control over
Abkhaz forces, and to have full control as well over the
presence of North Caucasus volunteers in Abkhazia; any such
presence violates the 1994 Moscow Accords.

- -- The 1994 Accords make clear that Georgian civil
authorities are to administer Upper Kodori, and as a result
of the July police operation, Georgian civil authorities are
doing just that. Any Abkhaz attempt to reverse the current
situation without the intervention of the CIS PKF against the
Abkhaz would result in a serious reconsideration by Western
powers of their position on the legitimacy of the CIS PKF --
especially if there is no UNSCR renewing UNOMIG's mandate.

-- With Georgia, we need to make clear that the West will not
countenance a Georgian attack, for whatever reason, on
territory currently held by separatists. We understand the
need to defend Kodori, but we also understand the temptation
by some to manufacture an Abkhaz attack on Kodori in order to
justify a Georgian attack on Gali, and Georgia will be on its
own if it crosses the Enguri.

-- Abkhaz "Foreign Minister" Shamba should, in our view, be
granted a visa immediately to visit New York, where U.S.
officials can make clear that an Abkhaz attack on Kodori,
using any justification, will have severe consequences for
Abkhaz efforts at dialogue with western countries (including
future visas for Abkhaz),for assistance programs within
Abkhazia, and for western pressure on all Abkhaz trading
partners.

BURNS