THE OCTOBER 8 REGIONAL ELECTIONS AS A PROVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 011279 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL SOCI RS SUBJECT: THE OCTOBER 8 REGIONAL ELECTIONS AS A PROVING GROUND FOR 2007 REF: A. VLADIVOSTOK 130 ¶B. YEKATERINBURG 359 ¶C. YEKATERINBURG 360 ¶D. MOSCOW 11137 ¶E. MOSCOW 11172 Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The October 8 elections are being viewed by commentators here as a rehearsal for the 2007 State Duma elections (which some see as a rehearsal for the 2008 presidential contest). Viewed from that vantage point, the contests, in nine regions and republics of Russia, should offer the Kremlin an opportunity to assess the future of a managed, two-party system; gauge the mood of the electorate; and determine what works, what does not, in producing the desired electoral outcome. This election in some of the regions will serve as the debut for the Russian Party of Life (RPL),the second Kremlin-fostered party, after United Russia, to throw its hat into the ring. How RPL fares on October 8 will likely determine what part it will play in the Presidential Administration's plans for the 2007 contest. End summary. -------------- A New Kremlin Party Appears -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 8, as many as 14 million voters in nine regions will go to the polls in what many commentators here view as a dress rehearsal for the 2007 State Duma elections. Differentiating these elections from contests that took place in March this year is the presence in some of the regions of two "Kremlin" parties: United Russia (YR) and the Russian Party of Life (RPL). The appearance of RPL --which is in the middle of a merger with the Russian Party of Pensioners (RPP) and Rodina-- has reportedly caused confusion, and engendered resistance in some of the regions. Local elites, who had become accustomed to supporting one, state-sponsored party, this time around have been confronted with the unaccustomed task of backing two contenders, and attempting to divine which of them, based on their reading of the Kremlin tea leaves, is the more deserving. -------------- Nine Regions, Different Rules -------------- ¶3. (C) Elections will take place October 8 in the Republics of Karelia, Tuva, and Chuvashiya; the regions of Primorye, Astrakhan, Lipetsk, Novgorod, Sverdlovsk; and the Jewish Autonomous Region. Different laws regulate the conduct of the elections in each place. The minimal voting age is either 20 or 21 years, the minimal voter turnout required ranges from 20 to 33 percent, and voters in four of the regions (Karelia, Tuva, Primorye, the Jewish Autonomous Region) will retain the option of voting against all of the candidates or parties running. The threshold which any party must cross to representation in its legislature is 7 percent in every region. -------------- Election as Litmus Test -------------- ¶4. (C) In addition to the Kremlin's experiment with managed, two-party democracy, this election will likely be used by those with their eye on 2007 to gauge: -- the effect of an infusion of administrative resources on election results; -- the mood of the electorate, to the extent that is possible when the election playing field is less than level; -- the ability of the regions to produce the desired results at the polls; -- which mechanisms work, which do not, with an increasingly sophisticated, and perhaps jaded, voter. -------------- Very Managed Democracy -------------- ¶5. (C) The elections this Sunday will occur against the background of the same factors that have made previous contests less than democratic: MOSCOW 00011279 002 OF 003 -- the media deck is stacked in favor of the sponsored parties: YR and in some cases RPL; -- compliant electoral commissions and courts have in some cases prevented the participation of parties, like Yabloko in Karelia, and many individual candidates. In some cases, candidates have been intimidated and have "voluntarily" withdrawn; -- in rural areas and areas with a large employer, voters may be told whom to vote for; -- administrative resources have flowed to the Kremlin's favorite parties and candidates. ¶6. (C) Still, the elections results will very generally reflect the will of the voters. -------------- Rocky Start for Party of Life -------------- ¶7. (C) Observers here trace the creation of a second, centrally-sponsored party broadly to: -- rivalries within the Kremlin; -- an attempt to channel the electorate's dissatisfaction with the status quo, and hence with YR, into a safe alternative party; -- an effort by President Putin to divide and conquer, or at least control, Kremlin factions. ¶7. (C) The Kremlin's enthusiasm for managed democracy has not been universally embraced in the regions. In Lipetsk (ref e),YR and RPL appear to be competing for votes, although party representatives allege that their parties complement one another. Sverdlovsk region (refs b and c) and Moscow appear to be at loggerheads over the RPL, whose ticket is led by Yevgeniy Roizman, a maverick who is anathema to the city and regional administrations. In Chuvashiya (ref d),Moscow prevailed to have one party, Rodina, registered as the standard bearer for the RPL-RPP-Rodina alliance, but in doing so engendered much resentment among Cheboksary RPL members. In Primorye (ref a),the three "allied" parties --Rodina, RPL, RPP-- are all separately on the ballot and the controversial mayor of Vladivostok has formed his own bloc to contest the elections. ¶8. (C) In addition to local resentment of Moscow's decision to establish a second party over the heads of the regions, there is undoubtedly unhappiness with the complexities created by another official contender on the ballot. It is easier to use administrative resources and control of the media to advance the fortunes of one party than two, and the emergence of the RPL no doubt creates angst among local leaders uncertain of what it signifies about the power balance in the Kremlin and what that ultimately means for future center - region relationships. ¶9. (C) Further complicating the task of producing the "right" election results is YR's diminishing popularity in some regions (refs a,b,c). (Primorye has apparently been tasked to win 45 percent of the vote, while Sverdlovsk region and Chuvashiya are each on the hook for 50 percent.) -------------- The Voters -------------- ¶10. (C) Observers throughout the regions generally expect voter turnout this time around to drop slightly, with the electorate arranged in four broad categories: -- "sophisticated" voters who, according to some commentators are tired of being manipulated and will not vote; -- employees of Russia's vast public sector, who will generally vote for one of the two Kremlin-sponsored parties; -- pensioners, some of whom will remain loyal to the Communist Party. The remainder will vote for the party of Putin, YR; -- the heterogeneous "others," generally urban voters whose choices on October 8 will span the spectrum. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Most Moscow commentators have focused on what the formation of a second government party says about Kremlin infighting and the ability of Moscow to write a script that will be acted convincingly in the regions. If that script MOSCOW 00011279 003 OF 003 proves convincing to the voters and the local elites, it will likely be used as the rough draft for the 2007 contest. BURNS