C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 011241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DUSHANBE PLEASE PASS TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG PTER SNAR RS
SUBJECT: YOUR MOSCOW VISIT FOR CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA
CONSULTATIONS

REF: A. MOSCOW 5415


B. MOSCOW 11079

Classified By: Amb. William J. Burns. For Reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) We welcome your visit to Moscow as a chance to
engage the GOR face-to-face on sensitive regional issues and
begin to chip away at Moscow's misconceptions about U.S.
intentions in the region. It is a commonplace assumption
that Moscow's policies in Central and South Asia are fueled
by a perception that U.S. gains must come at the expense of
Russian interests. Competition -- for political influence,
economic dominance and control of resources -- often drives
Moscow's foreign policy thinking. Russia can do much to slow
down or hinder U.S. efforts in the region. The hardest part
of your talks will be the difficult but necessary process of
beginning a conversation with Moscow about regional
cooperative strategies that encourage stability and economic
prosperity benefiting all, including Russia.
.
THE GOR TEAM
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2. (C) Your two primary interlocutors -- DFM Grigoriy
Karasin and DFM Aleksandr Alekseyev -- are both consummate
diplomats; they are highly professional, candid, and know
their briefs. Karasin, who served as the MFA's spokesman in
the early nineties and came to his position in 2005 after
serving as Ambassador to the UK, is responsible for Russia's
bilateral relations with CIS countries. Karasin has been
point man at the MFA since Russia redoubled its efforts to
assert its interests in Eurasia, particularly in Central
Asia, following the color revolutions. While you will find
Karasin a lively interlocutor, he is likely to be preoccupied
by the ongoing crisis in Georgian-Russian relations, which
has been exacerbated by the recent spy scandal. In contrast
to Karasin's broader experience, Alekseyev is a South Asia
expert who served as Russia's Ambassador to Pakistan in the
mid-nineties and to the OSCE until two years ago. He also
serves as Russia'

s representative to the Six Party Talks.
Alekseyev has been tapped for an ambassadorship in Europe,
but this is not yet official. Presidential Counterterrorism
Envoy Anatoliy Safonov is a former DFM who had also served in
the security services; he has been an energetic proponent of
counterterrorism cooperation in the Foreign Ministry. Drug
Tsar Viktor Cherkesov (who we hope you will be able to meet)

SIPDIS
is also a member of the so-called "siloviki," an informal
group of senior intelligence and law enforcement officials
who are close to the Kremlin. He was named by Putin to his
post in 1995 to reinvigorate a lagging drug enforcement
effort.
.
CENTRAL ASIA
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3. (C) While the color revolutions were a blow to Russian
prestige, Moscow has focused on rebuilding ties to Central
Asian elites and has managed to achieve some tactical
success. Russia feels confident it has a good hand, and will
seek to build on its existing advantages -- proximity and
institutional/personal ties that date back to the Soviet
period -- to preserve Russia's unique influence in the
region. Moscow often seeks to reinforce existing elite
attitudes in Central Asia that view an emerging civil society
and resultant pressures for human rights and political
empowerment as an existential threat. You are likely to hear
from Karasin that Russia seeks stability in the region, but
our perceptions differ widely over what stability would look
like. Russia sees it as a static phenomenon and fears that
U.S. efforts to promote democratization will lead to turmoil
on Russia's borders and the accession to power of Islamist
governments.
.
ENERGY
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4. (C) Any discussion about energy will soon run up against
firm Russian perceptions that developing the region's energy
resources is a zero-sum game. Countering this mentality will
be a hard slog but a good start would be to convince the
Russians to move forward on a clear win-win -- Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (CPC) expansion (ref B). The Russians
have complicated the expansion decision by linking it to the
construction of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis (BA) Bosphorus
bypass. Russian participation in BA would be substantial
with GazpromNeft, Rosneft, TNK-BP (all oil companies) and
Transneft (the state-owned oil pipeline operator) all
expected to take part. According to Chevron (one of the main
shareholders in CPC and a major Kazakh oil shipper), they
would participate in a BA pipeline but only if CPC expansion

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gets done because, without expansion, BA is not economic.
Further, while in Athens recently, Putin apparently tasked
Transneft to make the BA pipeline happen, thus setting the
stage for a broader CPC/BA deal that would significantly
increase Kazakh oil volumes reaching the Mediterranean and on
to world markets. Russia also has growing concerns about
competition with Beijing, reflected in disquiet about China's
recent gas development and pipeline deal with Turkmenistan.
.
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
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5. (C) While Russia has been less than transparent about
the workings of the specialized regional organizations it
uses to bolster its influence in Central Asia -- recall last
year's call by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for a
timetable for U.S. withdrawal from Central Asian military
bases -- Karasin is likely to stress to you that the groups
are not directed against U.S. interests. Moscow, however,
faces a difficult time trying to win regional buy-in for
these organizations which have so far accomplished little
beyond politically symbolic gatherings of the region's
leaders. Russia's partners in the Collective Security Treaty
Organization seem to view the group as little more than a
vehicle to keep Moscow placated, and there is little to
suggest that the SCO will evolve into something that can
guarantee security solely on Moscow's terms. At the same
time, Russia has been intensely suspicious about U.S. efforts
to encourage regional links, exemplified by its opposition to
the May regional counternarcotics and security conference
held in Dushanbe. Your meeting is an opportunity to
underline that our goal in supporting integrated regional
approaches is not to squeeze Moscow out but to bring more
partners in to work on transnational problems.
.
COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERNARCOTICS
--------------


6. (C) Our bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism issues
is handled through the Counterterrorism Working Group headed
by Under Secretary Burns and DFM Kislyak. Presidential Envoy
Safonov has played an active role in the CTWG and has
provided continuity on the Russian side. The CTWG, which met
last month in Washington, is focused on spurring
working-level contacts by focusing on specific tasks in an
Action Plan. On specific threats, Karasin will likely
reiterate long-standing Russian concerns about cross-border
incursions of reconstituted Taliban elements into Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan. He may also flag worries that Hizb ut-Tahrir
is making inroads in Central Asia and may be intermingling
with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Beyond urging
greater efforts to suppress the Taliban resurgence in
Afghanistan, Karasin's policy prescription will be to urge
U.S. cooperation in forming "security belts" that will
protect the Central Asian states from disorder in
Afghanistan. On narcotics trafficking, your interlocutors
will stress the need for more strenuous efforts to combat
flows from Afghanistan -- which have exacerbated drug abuse
problems in Russia itself -- while also highlighting the
connection between terrorists and illicit narcotics
trafficking. If you meet with Cherkesov, he's likely to tout
Russia's cooperation with Central Asian states in Operation
Kanal -- but this semi-annual event under CSTO auspices seems
much more a law enforcement concept than an actual unified
operation.
.
AFGHANISTAN
--------------


7. (C) Karasin and Alekseyev will both underline Moscow's
growing concerns about the upsurge in Taliban/al-Qaida
activity that began this spring. While Russia has never been
particularly supportive of President Karzai, he is still
viewed as better choice than any of the alternatives. That
does not mean that you will not hear strong criticism of
Karzai -- for sidelining Russia's clients while not
effectively reining in Pashtun warlords. Moscow does have a
positive agenda in Afghanistan, highlighted by Russia's
agreement in July to reconcile outstanding debt and its
reiteration of a commitment to forgive 100 percent of debt in
the Paris Club, which could be finalized later this month in
a meeting of the Finance Ministers. Alekseyev told us in
late June that Moscow continues to look for investment
opportunities in Afghanistan, with resolution of the debt
issue as removing a significant obstacle to further economic
cooperation.
.
PAKISTAN AND INDIA
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8. (C) Moscow's relations with Islamabad have never been
particularly good, but we have detected an interest in
improving relations with Pakistan. Alekseyev, as Moscow's
man in Islamabad in the nineties, has noted that lingering
stereotypes on both sides will make that difficult.
Regardless of good intentions, Russia continues to fear that
Pakistan is not doing enough to suppress the Taliban and will
likely cite Musharraf's North Waziristan peace agreement to
question Islamabad's commitment to the fight. On India,
Alekseyev will most likely focus on prospects for the
adoption of the nuclear agreement, given Russian interest in
Tarapur and a renewed push by the nuclear industry here to
build more atomic power plants overseas. In general, links
with India remain strong, but Russia now seems to be
struggling to reposition its ties to take account of India's
rising political status and growing economic capacity. As
government-to-government economic ties dwindle and India
turns to others for defense technology, Moscow will likely
seek to strengthen energy, scientific and technological ties
and promote India's enhanced role in the UN.
BURNS