UNITED RUSSIA SEEKS MAJORITY IN OCTOBER 8

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 011137 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR RS SUBJECT: UNITED RUSSIA SEEKS MAJORITY IN OCTOBER 8 CHUVASHIYA ELECTIONS Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) A September 28 - 29 visit to Chuvashiya in the run-up to the October 8 State Council elections found: -- five of the Republic's twenty-two parties on the ballot, with a sixth --the Party of Pensioners-- denied registration, and joining the Party of Life in supporting Rodina's quest to cross the 7 percent threshold; -- United Russia well ahead of its competitors, with party members predicting it will capture more than 50 percent of the votes, and others alleging that only fraud will make that possible; -- evidence of pressure placed on "Patriots of Russia" candidates to withdraw from races and allegations of a Watergate-like campaign headquarters break-in; -- the media deck stacked in favor of United Russia; -- the Republic apparently awash in money from the Stabilization Fund for building roads, reforming education, improving healthcare, and making natural gas available to all Chuvashiya residents; -- and awash with emissaries from Moscow reminding voters that it is United Russia that has made those improvements possible. End summary. -------------- Framework for the Elections -------------- ¶2. (U) The Republic of Chuvashiya will stage elections to its State Council on October 8. With this election, the size of the Council will be reduced from 73 to 44 members and, for the first time in Chuvashiya, twenty-two seats will be filled by candidates running on party lists, and twenty-two deputies will be chosen from single-mandate lists. Because the date of Chuvashiya's election was fixed before the adoption, in summer 2006, of amendments to the Federal law on "The Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in the Elections," Chuvashiya's voters will still be able to check the "against all" box on October 8. The Chuvashiya Republic's electoral law was adopted only on June 14, 2006, which gave parties and candidates intending to participate in the elections scant time to adjust to changes in the electoral process. Important features of the Republic's electoral law: -- minimum voting age: 21 years -- voter participation: a minimum of 20 percent of all registered voters for the election to be valid -- observers from registered NGOs permitted -- percentage of votes necessary for party to be represented in the Council: 7 -- "closed" party lists, i.e., voters cannot indicate their preferences for candidates on party lists -------------- Parties on the Sidelines -------------- ¶3. (C) Five of Chuvashiya's registered 22 parties will participate in the election. The registration petition of a sixth party, the Russian Party of Pensioners (RPP),was rejected by the Republic's Central Electoral Commission (CEC). The CEC found that RPP's preparation of its financial documents and contributions to its election fund had violated the law. According to the CEC the RPP had 1.4 million rubles more in its accounts than indicated on documents submitted to the CEC. In addition the CEC found that the RPP had accepted a contribution of 1.5 million rubles from the fund "Narodnoe dostoyanie" when the law permits a maximum contribution from any one organization of no more than 1.05 million rubles. The RPP contended that in its documents it had mistakenly indicated contributions from two organizations when it had in fact received its total contribution from three funds. It initially announced that it would appeal the CEC's decision, but did not do so. Poloff was told that driving the RPP's decision to stand down was a decision made over its head in Moscow by leaders of the incipient Russian Party of Life-Rodina-RPP alliance to have Rodina be the standard bearer in the October 8 Chuvashiya election. MOSCOW 00011137 002 OF 005 ¶4. (C) The decision of the Russian Party of Life's (RPL) Moscow leadership to sit out the Chuvashiya contest appears to have been very unpopular in Cheboksary. RPL's Chuvashiya Deputy Chairman Mikhail Gorbatin ruefully told Poloff that the order from Moscow had come at the eleventh hour, and did not allow some of the potential RPL candidates to be folded into Rodina's list. Gorbatin invited Poloff to ask him whom he would vote for October 8. "I will cross them all out," he said bitterly. Also not participating is the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR). The APR has strong support in Chuvashiya's regions, but decided at its eighth extraordinary conference not to field candidates, as there was a need for "political consolidation" behind United Russia and its leading candidate, Chuvashiya's President Nikolai Fedorov. -------------- Patriots of Russia Under Pressure -------------- ¶5. (C) The CEC's treatment of party-affiliated individual candidacies seemed generally evenhanded, with the exception of the party Patriots of Russia (PR). As expected, all twenty-two of the Kremlin's United Russia candidates were registered. The Communist Party (KPRF) elected to field 19 candidates and all were registered, while the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) lost one of its 21 candidates to the CEC. In contrast, the CEC declined to register six of the PR's 21 nominees. In a September 29 conversation, PR Chairman Vladislav Soldatov alleged to Embassy that his party was under relentless pressure because of its unwillingness to defer to United Russia. The authorities had intimidated several PR candidates. Among them: -- Vadim Bulankin, who was found by the CEC to have understated his income by 30635 rubles, and has withdrawn; -- Aleksandr Samakin who, although registered by the CEC, has withdrawn because of threats; -- Roman Kalyaev, who was told he would lose his job at Chuvashautodor (a republic-owned road construction firm) if he remained in the race; -- (FNU) Golgov, who was told he would lose his job as the Director of Svyaztekhnika, and withdrew without protest. ¶6. (C) Soldatov averred that appealing CEC decisions to deny registration was a fruitless endeavor. The judge of the court to which such decisions are appealed, he said, is Rais Gafyrov who for his services in past elections had been given an apartment with a European-quality renovation and a salary of 90 thousand rubles per year. ¶7. (C) In a September 28 meeting, CEC Chairwoman Lyudmila Linik insisted that there had been no problems with the electoral process. She traced the failure of a large number of individual-mandate candidates to register to miscellaneous violations of the electoral law. In addition, she acknowledged, a large number of candidates had withdrawn before completing the registration process. (Of the 179 candidates who announced their intention to register, 119 were registered.) (Linik is widely believed here to have been awarded a very nice home on the fringes of the city for her work in arranging the results of the last presidential elections.) ¶8. (C) Also under pressure, according to other sources in Cheboksary, are PR candidates Aleksandr Kudryashov, the Director of Chuvasenrakhmal. Kudryashov allegedly had been offered a large sum of money to withdraw, and young people in his campaign were regularly stopped by the local police. The pressure on PR candidate Yuriy Nikiforov seems to be increasing, as polls show him neck-and-neck with the head of the administration of Vurnarskiy region (FNU) Kuzmin. Finally, on September 23 PR candidate Vladimir Sudakov, the General Director of the newspaper Chuvashiya Komsomolskaya Pravda, in responding to reports that his campaign workers were being harassed, wounded a by-stander with a rubber bullet. Soldatov alleged that Sudakov was provoked by "thugs hired by the local (Chuvashiya) administration." Police are investigating the incident. Interestingly, the incident was the only reporting about opposition campaign efforts published in the local media during Poloff's visit to Cheboksary. ¶9. (C) Soldatov further alleged that PR campaign headquarters had been ransacked during the week of September 18. A group of armed men had entered the premises, located in a Cheboksary suburb, at night, tied up the watchman, opened the safe, and removed key PR documents. When Soldatov arrived, MOSCOW 00011137 003 OF 005 he discovered his headquarters swarming with higher-ranking police officers, who questioned him. Soldatov alleged that the protocol he was made to sign could be used as a pretext hold him for questioning and, possibly, detain him at any point during the campaign. He insisted the break-in was "political" in nature; noting that none of electronic equipment had been stolen. Soldatov's account of events was broadly confirmed by local Kommersant correspondent Oleg Eruslanov. ¶10. (C) Soldatov also alleged that the Chuvashiya Administration was "stacking" the twenty-two regional electoral commissions. In his version, participants from the more pliable parties --the KPRF, LDPR, Rodina-- had agreed to allow United Russia to staff the regional commissions. The quid pro quo, said Soldatov, was a guarantee from the Chuvashiya administration that the KPRF would win 15 - 17 percent of the vote (as opposed to the 10 percent generally expected),and that the LDPR would cross the 7 percent barrier to representation in the State Council. Eruslanov and local Regnum journalist Valentina Andreyeva could not confirm Soldatov's allegations, but agreed they tracked broadly with trends in Chuvashiya. -------------- Access to Media: A Problem -------------- ¶11. (C) The campaign in Chuvashiya officially began 28 days before the October 8 elections. Per regulation, each of the registered political parties was allotted one hour of airtime on each of the regional channels during that period. Each single-mandate candidate was given 15 minutes of airtime. Candidates, especially from PR, agreed that the required broadcast media access was available, but argued that access of opposition parties was confined to weekday mornings or afternoons, when much of the voting population did not watch television. A list of broadcast slots posted in the CEC suggested there might be some basis for that allegation. It showed that PR airtime on Radio Rossii for the dates September 13, 22, 25; October 3, 6 as scheduled between 1000 and 1030. A second list of PR airtime on Cheboksary Television for the dates September 14, 21, 26; October 2, 5 allotted the party slots in the 1600 - 1630 timeframe. Regnum correspondent Valentina Andreyeva alleged that media exposure was less important to candidates in this election. In fact, she said, many candidates see the local television networks as compromised, and prefer not to be associated with them. Eruslanov suggested that candidates avoid television because "they have nothing to say." An official at the CEC noted that those candidates garnering less than 2 percent of the vote have to reimburse the cost of their airtime, and suggested that could be a deterrent for some. ¶12. (C) It was impossible, during Poloff's brief visit to Cheboksary to evaluate the treatment of parties and candidates by the print media. A survey of some the newspapers --"Sovetskaya Chuvashiya," "Cheboksarie Novosti," and "Molodezhnyj Kur'er"-- indicated that the comings and goings of Russia's and Chuvashiya's officialdom received most of the coverage, although "Kur'er" did feature postage stamp-sized ads for KPRF (with a portrait of Che Guevara) and LDPR on its third page. Party posters were on display around the city but, again, PR propaganda seemed to be largely absent. A survey of the city's central avenue, Karl Marx Street, found many posters for United Russia; fewer for LDPR and the KPRF; and none for Rodina and PR. -------------- Aid from Moscow -------------- ¶13. (C) Although the KPRF had traditionally been strong in Chuvashiya, it has lost its luster, and observers peg its current support to pensioners. KPRF Central Committee Chairman Gennadiy Zyuganov has made an effort to reverse that trend this time around with a September 26-27 visit to Cheboksary and Chuvashiya's regions. (Zyuganov was widely criticized by Chuvashiya communists for spending only several hours in Cheboksary three years ago during the Duma election campaign.) At a press conference, Zyuganov predicted that the KPRF would win one-third of the votes, and publicly aired the possibility of electoral fraud on October 8. LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy will have made two trips to Chuvashiya before election day. With much of LDPR's local popularity tied to his flamboyant personality, frequent visits are key to the party's efforts to cross the 7 percent threshold. Within the last two weeks, United Russia has sent the Duma's International Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev, MOSCOW 00011137 004 OF 005 Deputy Director of the Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, and Chairman of the Duma's Regional Affairs Committee Viktor Grishin to Cheboksary. -------------- Ambitious Goal for United Russia -------------- ¶14. (C) It was widely believed by Cheboksary interlocutors of all stripes that United Russia (YR) had been set the goal --by Moscow-- of capturing at least 50 percent of the votes on October 8. In a September 29 conversation, YR Chuvashiya Deputy Chairman (and Chairman of Cheboksary's Executive Committee) Vladimir Midukov agreed. Midukov's prediction was seconded by Russian Party of Life (RPL) Deputy Chairman Mikhail Gorbatin. Some disinterested observers, while acknowledging that YR and its administrative resources offered it an unassailable advantage even in a free and fair election, believed that winning 50 percent of the votes would be impossible without electoral fraud. Other observers believed that outright fraud would be avoided, but that the republic's rural voters would be "told" whom to vote for, as would employees of key factories. Other observers added that the absence of RPP, the Union of Right Forces, and Yabloko from the ballot meant less competition for centrist voters, and more votes in the YR bank on election day. Also cited were the long coattails of President Putin, who remains genuinely popular in Chuvashiya. (Opinions about Chuvashiya President Fedorov are decidedly more mixed.) The consensus among observers was that, in a fair election YR would garner 20 - 25 percent of the vote, KPRF: 10 - 12 percent, LDPR: 10 percent, PR: 7 - 10, and Rodina: less than 7 percent. (According to the news agency Regnum, in the 2003 Duma elections YR received 38 percent of the votes, the KPRF - 17 percent, the LDPR - 8 percent, the Agrarian Party - 7 percent, and Rodina - 5 percent.) ¶15. (C) In addition to the sheer statistical difficulties, further complicating YR's attempt to win 50 percent of the popular vote will be rivalries within the party. According to observers, this rivalry manifests itself in two ways: -- a number of local political personalities, when not chosen to represent YR in the election, chose to run anyway. Their participation complicates the efforts of YR to organize unified support in each of the 22 electoral districts. Some believe that at least some of those candidates do not intend to be spoilers for YR, but have thrown their hats into the ring in order to be "bought off" by the party or to win name recognition for a possible future election run; -- other observers allege a serious rivalry between two groups in the Chuvashiya administration. One group is allegedly headed by the current Head of Chuvashiya's Presidential Administration and, it is rumored, the most likely successor to President Fedorov, Enver Ablyakimov. The second group is chaired by the Chuvashiya's Minister of Sport, Mikhail Krasnov and Krasnov's brother, who is also in the administration. In their struggle for supremacy, each group has fielded its own candidates in some of the single-mandate contests. If an agreement is not reached before the elections, the YR's expectations may have to be curtailed. ¶16. (C) In Cheboksary, the October 8 elections are widely viewed as a dress rehearsal for the 2007 Duma elections. As part of YR's campaign, the voters are frequently reminded of what the Republic administration has done for them. Among the accomplishments touted are: -- the completion of a network providing natural gas connections to all dwellings in Chuvashiya; -- the consolidation and reform of the school system, with fewer, better-funded, computer-equipped schools and a network of 200 buses to get the students to them; -- an on-going program to provide potable water to all; -- an effort to be completed in 2008, to pave all of the Republic's roads; -- a new network of ambulances and a state-of-the-art ambulance dispatch network; -- the halving of public sector payroll indebtedness; -- a reportedly successful experiment in "electronic government"; -- a 15 percent payraise for public employees in 2006, and a promised 11 percent increase in 2007. It is expected that continuing infusions from the Stabilization Fund will further buoy UR's election prospects. MOSCOW 00011137 005 OF 005 ¶17. (C) Implicitly supplementing those programs is a consensus that life is getting better, at least in Cheboksary. where about 400 thousand of the Republic's 1 million, 300 thousand residents live. The same, according to those in Cheboksary, cannot be said for the Republic's regions, where development is reportedly more spotty. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶18. (C) Cheboksary and its environs are bristling with new apartment buildings, the city recently opened a new dock for Volga River tourist traffic, there are more than enough cars to fill the roads that have yet to be paved, and encounters with residents during Poloff's two-day stay suggest that a sense of progress and economic well-being should translate, at least in the capital, into a majority of votes for the status quo. Still, YR appears to be under some pressure, perhaps from Moscow, to make that majority absolute, which is likely the source of some of the misbehavior described here. BURNS