RUSSIAN SANCTIONS ON GEORGIA TO STAY FOR NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011107

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR ETRD GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SANCTIONS ON GEORGIA TO STAY FOR NOW

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Following President Putin's October 1 comments that
Georgia's arrest of Russian officers was an act of "state
terrorism," new measures targeting Georgia are being enacted.
As of October 3, flights between Georgia and Russia have
been halted for "recertification." Ferry service between
Sochi and Batumi has been suspended. Russian railways will
no longer attach passenger cars to the Moscow-Baku train for
direct transfer to the Baku-Tbilisi train; the railways will
also stop procuring from Georgia parts and service for
locomotives. The Minister of Communications announced the
suspension of mail service, including postal money orders. A
draft law before the Duma would give the GOR the power to
restrict or ban bank transfers to individual countries (read:
Georgia. The language of discussion in Moscow portrays the
employment of Georgians legally resident in Russia as a sort
of Russian economic assistance to Georgia, rather than a
contribution by Georgians to the Russian economy). Press
reports indicate Russia is deporting a few Georgian illegal
immigrants, and that the Russian police are stepping up
action against Georgian organized criminals in Russia.


2. (C) The release of the Russian officers has not lessened
Russia's determination to impose these measures. MFA 4th CIS
Department Deputy Director Tarabrin told us October 3 that
the arrests were not the only cause for the sanctions.
Rather, the measures resulted from Georgia's "language of
ultimata and accusations, and the entire line of the Georgian
leadership over the past months." Tarabrin stressed that the
measures were supposed to be temporary and that "if there is
an improvement in relations, the measures will be canceled."
He also stressed that the draft Duma law was still at the
stage of "intention, not actualization." The rhetoric of
Russian officials, usually restrained (in contrast to that of
Russian parliamentarians and commentators) has taken on a
sharp edge. In addition to Putin's October 1 comments on the
return of "Beria's policies" to Georgia, Russian Ambassador
to the UK Fedotov, speaking to an international conference
September 29, compared recent Georgian actions on Abkhazia to
those Stalin took before invading Finland. Stalin and Beria
were, of course, Georgians.


3. (C) Duma CIS Committee Chair Andrey Kokoshin confirmed to
DAS David Kramer October 3 that the Duma would amend the law
on financial transactions to allow the GOR to stop bank
transfers. Russian public opinion wants strong action
against Georgia. Kokoshin said Russia believes Georgian
President Saakashvili has angered local elites who will now
attack him; even the ethnic Georgian parts of Georgia were
now unstable. Kokoshin also vented against the U.S., both
for Georgia's NATO aspirations (specifically a Senate bill to
fast-track Georgia's accession) and arms transfers to
Georgia, which he proposed be stopped by moratorium.


4. (C) DFM Karasin told the Ambassador October 3 that "you
should not underestimate how angry people are here." Russia,
he said, is seeking to draw a line with the Georgian
government in response not only to recent arrests but also to
a whole range of perceived provocations. Ambassador pushed
back, pointing out that heavy-handed Russian actions
following the release of those arrested was only going to
bolster Georgian popular support for Saakashvili and deepen
hostility toward Russia. Karasin was unmoved. "This is the
least we can do," he added.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) The Russian measures appear to us to have several
specific aims:

-- First, Russia wants to convince Georgians that their
leaders are worsening their living conditions.

-- Second, the Russian political elite believes Georgia was
encouraged to arrest the officers by NATO's offer of
Intensified Dialogue. The Russian actions and sharp rhetoric
stress this to NATO, express Russia's unhappiness at NATO's
perceived role and hope to convince European allies of the
futility of going further down the path of Georgian accession.

-- Third, most Russians suspect that the U.S. incited or at
least gave pre-approval to the Georgian arrests. The
measures aim to demonstrate to the U.S. that Russia sees the
U.S.-Russian relationship vis--vis Georgia as a zero-sum
competition for influence in the Caucasus; a game in which
Russia has the greater commitment and holds the stronger
cards.


6. (C) Given the last two points, it is essential that we
urge our European allies to join us vigorously in engaging

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with Russia to normalize Russian-Georgian relations. They
need to play a strong role in urging an end to measures
imposed against Georgia since last year on imports, borders,
and now transportation and communications. Along those
lines, Ambassador pressed his German, British and EU
counterparts in separate conversations October 3 to weigh in
with the GOR -- noting Putin's planned trip to Germany next
week and to Finland for the informal EU Summit later in
October.
BURNS