CPC AND SHTOKMAN: SOME RESIGNATION, SPRINKLED WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 011079 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS WARLICK, HOLMAN, AND GUHA DEPT FOR EB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GARVERICK DOE FOR HARBERT/EKIMOFF/PISCITELLI DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER NSC FOR GRAHAM, MCKIBBEN, MCCORMICK, AND COEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2036 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS SUBJECT: CPC AND SHTOKMAN: SOME RESIGNATION, SPRINKLED WITH HOPE REF: MOSCOW 10777 Classified By: Amb. William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On September 28, Ambassador met with Chevron's VP for Business Development Jay Pryor and the company's Russia chief, Ian MacDonald. On Shtokman, Chevron believes it has little chance of affecting the outcome of the now-politicized deal, but noted that market realities (missing the Atlantic Basin LNG window) and any good news on WTO may be the catalyst allowing Gazprom to announce consortium members by year's end. Chevron seems resigned to the Kremlin-inspired linkage between the Burgas-Alexandroupolis (BA) bypass pipeline and CPC expansion but maintains that now the bypass discussion is driving expansion and not the other way around. In Athens, Pryor said that Putin tasked Transneft with finding a way to get BA built, thus putting the pipeline company on the hot seat and, perhaps, provides the incentive to get CPC done. Nevertheless, the final go-ahead on expansion will not require a BA deal alone but will undoubtedly hinge on upcoming discussions between Putin and Nazarbayev. END SUMMARY. . Shtokman: High Politics and Rhetoric Meet Market Realities -------------- --- . ¶2. (C) Pryor said that Chevron recognizes the Shtokman decision is not for Gazprom to make and is now resigned to the fact that encouraging WTO passage and maintaining contact with Gazprom is all they can do at this point. If it were Gazprom's decision to make, Chevron believes it stands a very good chance of getting in as senior Gazprom officials have confided to Chevron that its offer is the best of the five, Pryor said. Presidential energy advisor Igor Yusufov confirmed this to Pryor in a recent meeting and added that the Kremlin's aim was to use the various delays and confusing cues to do little more than squeeze the best offer from the companies. To reinforce this view, MacDonald said that Putin shopped Chevron's offer to Total during his recent trip to France, hoping Total would up the ante. For this reason, MacDonald and Pryor are not concerned about Putin's efforts. ¶3. (C) Pryor noted that the Kremlin is playing a dangerous game delaying Shtokman because it could well miss the market window for Atlantic Basin LNG. This would consign Russian exports from Shtokman to be piped to Europe and thus would move Russia off of Shtokman's original purpose -- to diversify exports away from Europe. Putin's statement in France about possibly diverting Shtokman volumes by pipeline to Europe would have the same negative effect, although MacDonald pointed out that there is no inconsistency between the volumes Putin mentioned and longstanding plans to consider shipments of gas from Shtokman to Europe by pipeline in subsequent phases of the field's development after the first phase firmly targets LNG to North America. Pryor noted that Japan's offered prices for LNG have risen 20 percent in the last two weeks -- the sort of market force that will pull Middle Eastern and Asian LNG to Asian markets, starving the U.S. west coast and thus driving Atlantic LNG to the U.S. East and Gulf coasts, leaving little market for Russia during the current window. ¶4. (C) As for Shtokman's linkage to WTO, Pryor added that Chevron's sense is that Gazprom itself (and many senior GOR officials) really want Shtokman decided this year. At the same time, it is clear beyond doubt now that Russia needs massive new supplies like Shtokman to come online to meet its myriad gas commitments. Looking forward, Pryor added that part of Chevron's offer to Gazprom involves assets in the U.S. and he said that Gazprom is "amazingly scared" about U.S. corporate governance requirements. The Ambassador replied that this is understandable, but that it is precisely this sort of integration that can have a disciplining effect on Gazprom and Russia over time, hopefully making Shtokman both the first and the hardest such deal to cut and the future somewhat easier. . Life and Taxes? CPC's Future -------------- . ¶5. (C) Moving to CPC expansion, Pryor and MacDonald both MOSCOW 00011079 002 OF 003 claimed that the government and all but one western partner (unspoken, but it is ExxonMobil) have agreed on the economic terms for expansion. On the twin issue of agreeing with the GOR on corporate governance -- something that has long plagued negotiations -- Chevron believes the GOR is about to present a scheme that will be acceptable to the other shareholders. This twin deal would complete the technical package necessary for CPC expansion. Chevron believes the next milestone could be Putin's upcoming meeting with Nazarbayev in Uralsk where inter alia they will cut a deal on Karachaganak gas sales. In addition to adding to political momentum for CPC expansion, Chevron expects Nazarbayev to soon pressure the last western partner holding out on the economic terms for CPC expansion to give in since the sticking points are economically immaterial given the scope of the project. ¶6. (C) Chevron is less sanguine about the tax case against it (reftel),but still hopeful on that front as well. The Ambassador noted that he had raised the case with Finance Minister Kudrin this week and that Kudrin said he understood and would look into the situation. One of Kudrin's aides downplayed the likelihood that the tax case would ever go as far as converting to a criminal case. The Ambassador opined that Kudrin is effective at ensuring that tax prosecutors double-check with those (like his ministry) that offer some checks and balances to this sort of untethered law enforcement activity. . Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bypass: CPR for CPC? -------------- . ¶7. (C) Pryor said that meetings in Athens between President Putin and the president of Greece and Prime Minister of Bulgaria appear to have gone well and that the Burgas-Alexandroupolis (BA) pipeline concept is moving along well. The force of events has essentially driven Chevron to accept that CPC expansion is now inextricably linked to BA pipeline's success, rather than Chevron's longstanding position that causality should be the other way around. Pryor noted that Transneft's President Vainshtok appears to have been given the order by Putin to "make BA work" and is now a man in a hurry (Note: On September 27 another Chevron source very close to BA negotiations verified this in no uncertain terms. End Note). MacDonald noted that Bulgaria's EU accession timeline is also motivating the Russians to move fast before the roles of Russian companies there comes under official EU scrutiny. ¶8. (C) But Chevron still holds key cards in this poker game. MacDonald observed that Russian officials now realize fully that BA cannot be realized without Caspian oil, and that, in turn, means oil through CPC, and in the Russians' mind that means Chevron. Partly in recognition of this, Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria have nominally carved out an early position for Chevron, albeit largely in absentia. According to MacDonald and Pryor, the Russians want 17 percent each for Rosneft, Gazpromneft, and TNK-BP for a total of 51 percent Russian equity. Greece and Bulgaria seem content at this stage with 16 percent each, leaving Chevron with 17 percent, or parity with each of Russia's shippers. Pryor and MacDonald agreed with the Ambassador that this is not a bad starting point for negotiations over equity control. (Note: Shawn McCormick of TNK-BP -- please protect -- told us on September 29 that sources very close to the negotiations say the equity split would be 51 percent Gazprom/Rosneft, 25 percent TNK-BP/Chevron, and 24 percent Greek/Bulgarian companies, with Transneft assigned to coordinate the arrangement. This conflicting account seems to indicate the contours of the deal are not decided yet. End Note) ¶9. (C) This need for CPC to make BA work could resolve some related issues -- MacDonald said that Chevron believes that should a Bosphorus bypass go forward, the tax case will "vanish." Pryor suggested that the USG need not do anything at this point, but clearly as negotiations continue, USG efforts at the right moment to promote the pipeline with relevant governments -- including Turkey -- would be most effective. BA will clearly need political heavyweights to assist in achieving something akin to an international treaty. Regarding Turkey, Pryor said Chevron is still strongly engaged on a Samsun-Ceyhan option, and MacDonald MOSCOW 00011079 003 OF 003 added that Chevron still is considering the tempting merits of pursuing both bypasses. . COMMENT -------------- . ¶10. (C) Putin's shopping of Chevron's offer on Shtokman certainly points to the Kremlin's desire to maximize rents from the project. That said, there is little doubt that the Kremlin has taken ownership of the Shtokman decision and hopes to leverage this into concessions from the U.S. and others on WTO and other issues. Regarding CPC and BA, confusing signals about equity ownership means the economic viability of the project is unknown at this point and probably warrants caution on our part. When and if Chevron climbs on board, then we can offer our political support. In the meantime we should watch how the governments (Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, the EU, and Turkey) proceed and how the three Russian shippers (GazpromNeft, Rosneft, and TNK-BP) and the other actors (Chevron and Transneft, for example) hash out their interests. BURNS