"NOT WAR, BUT CLOSE:" RUSSIAN REACTION TO GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 010986 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR NATO GG RS SUBJECT: "NOT WAR, BUT CLOSE:" RUSSIAN REACTION TO GEORGIA ARRESTS OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: DFM Karasin told Ambassador September 28 the arrest of Russian officers in Georgia "could have been a casus belli." Russian reaction "will be more reasonable." Russia "has the impression that it cannot rely on its American partners." Karasin asked for U.S. help in freeing the officers. He made clear that expulsion to Russia would be acceptable. He passed a non-paper on the Russian position. Karasin was tough -- but the opinion of Russia's political classes is tougher still. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador met Karasin September 28 to discuss the September 27 arrest of Russian military intelligence officers in Georgia. Karasin handed Ambassador a non-paper (translation, para. 11). He said a chain of events showed Georgia has an "orientation to force." The situation is "not war, but close to war." The arrest of Russian officers was a "qualitatively new escalation." It called forth a "whole bouquet of tough and unpleasant thoughts." The officers were there to help withdraw Russia's military bases -- in fulfillment of Russia's commitments. ¶3. (C) The arrest, Karasin said, was part of a chain of events: the September 21 decision on Intensified Dialogue (ID) for Georgia; the Kodori Gorge operation with its aftermath of "political circus;" and intensified attacks on Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Later he added the GUAM initiative on frozen conflicts as one of Georgia's "provocative actions." ¶4. (C) Karasin regretted that Georgia had received encouragement: the push for ID, the applause for Pres. Saakashvili's UNGA speech, and the generally anti-Russian tone of Georgian policy. This encouragement has created the impression in Russia that it cannot rely on its partners, and in particular on the U.S. The explosion of tensions in South Ossetia was unnecessary. It is a zone of Russia's vital interests; America must understand the dangers. ¶5. (C) Karasin said Russia insists on immediate freedom for its soldiers and for an end to the blockade around the Group of Russian Forces in the Trans-Caucasus (GRVZ). Tomorrow, Russia will evacuate the families of embassy employees. It will recall its ambassador. Washington, he concluded, must understand the gravity of the situation. ¶6. (C) Ambassador promised to convey Karasin's seriousness to Washington. Neither the U.S., nor Russia, nor Georgia needed an increase in tensions. We appreciate Russia's fulfillment of its obligations to withdraw its bases. Despite Russian perceptions, the U.S. message to Georgia has been consistent: we are prepared to move down the road toward Georgian NATO membership, but Georgia must show restraint on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ambassador asked what outcome would work for everyone in the present crisis. ¶7. (C) Karasin responded that Russia is still considering its course of action. Karasin did not want to close any option. Its priority is the release of its people. This "could have been a casus belli," he said, "but our response will be more reasonable." However, he stressed, "Our reserve of patience is near an end." It was important to return the situation to "a more reasonable basis." When a situation evolves on its own, he said, there can be a dangerous chain reaction. There were a million Georgians in Russia. This gave the problem great magnitude. Russia would have to think about how to proceed. "We hope our partners will help," he said, "by being tough and precise with Georgia." He said Ambassador Ushakov would be seeking a senior appointment to make these points in Washington, and hoped he would be received. He added that if Saakashvili "returns to normal negotiations on Abkhazia," ending the "political circus" in Kodori, which "smells of adventurism," Russia will try to convince the Abkhaz "there is a chance." ¶8. (C) Ambassador reiterated he would convey Karasin's sense of seriousness. He asked whether the Russian Embassy had access to the detainees. Karasin said yes; they were in satisfactory conditions. At a later date -- after their release -- Russia would be prepared to discuss the claims against them. He reiterated that it was important that these people be freed. "They can stay or leave the country," as long as they get out of jail. ¶9. (C) Karasin's comments, tough as they were, are restrained in comparison to the public statements of political figures and the analyses of our institutional contacts. Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russia would seek an emergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss the detention. All commentators note the proximity to the NATO decision on MOSCOW 00010986 002 OF 003 ID, and call the arrests a deliberate provocation, not a serious counter-espionage operation. A number stated that the U.S. must have approved, or at least did not veto the arrests, and some point to the arrests as part of Saakashvili's "narrow agenda to undermine Russia" -- presumably as a catspaw for American ambitions. Federation Council Chair Mironov bluntly said the arrests "could lead to war." Fyodor Lukyanov, Chief Editor of Russia in Global Politics, told us that the detentions would unite radical elements in Russian politics. He said the only positive element he could see so far was that Russian elites were calling for sanctions rather than military action. Lukyanov thought that the incident would demonstrate to NATO what Georgia's membership would entail NATO disputes with Russia. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The Russian non-paper below is a cry of anger and outrage -- but without concrete decisions on the Russian reaction, because Russia has no good options in this case. We strongly recommend pressing Georgia to expel the Russian officers and make public its evidence for the accusations. The sooner that is done, the sooner the crisis can be defused, and it would also help dampen some of the more inflammatory rhetoric. Some of that rhetoric is genuine outrage; some an attempt to recoup after the decision on ID. Russia's message to NATO members is clear: giving Article V guarantees to Georgia allows Georgia to embroil NATO in a war with Russia. Text of Russian Non-Paper -------------- ¶11. (C) Begin text of informal Embassy translation: On the blatant provocation by the Georgian side The Russian side expresses the most serious concern in connection with the arbitrary action (proizvol) committed by Georgian security forces yesterday evening and early morning against Russian military personnel who were on territory of Georgia, in the staff of the Group of Russian Forces in the Trans-Caucasus (GRVZ) completely legally and in accordance with treaties. The series of arrests undertaken by Georgian authorities on 27 September against Russian officers of the GRVZ was the latest blatant attack confirming the anti-Russian course of the leadership of Georgia. The actions of the Georgian side contradict the conditions of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Georgia on the timetable and regime of temporary functioning and withdrawal of Russian military bases and other military sites of Russian Forces in Trans-Caucasus deployed on the territory of Georgia; in particular, of Article 4, which mandates "the provision of normal living conditions and temporary functioning" of Russian military bases. Despite the treaties, the Georgian authorities continue to put outrageous obstacles in the path of the normal work and living conditions of Russian military personnel, who are responsible for the fulfillment of their obligations, inter alia in the interests of and in accordance with the wishes of Georgia itself. Last week the last echelon of Russian military equipment was sent from Georgian territory in accordance with the timetable planned for 2006 for the withdrawal of equipment and materiel by bilateral Agreement. The logic of steps by the Georgian side clearly directed at disruption of the process, worked out with such effort, of withdrawing the Russian military bases is completely incomprehensible to us. The provocative actions of the Georgian side against Russian military personnel in Georgia when taken together with the incessant chain of defiant actions of Tbilisi, together with the use of force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, exacerbate tensions throughout the region and constitute a direct threat to stability and security in the Trans-Caucasus. The consequences of such actions are unpredictable and fraught with the most negative effects both on bilateral Russian-Georgian relations and the region-wide situation. Given the existence of unregulated conflicts in the Trans-Caucasus, the irresponsibility of the Georgian side cannot remain unnoticed by the international community. We consider the unceremonious and impudent character of the actions by the Georgian "siloviki" with regard to Russian citizens, and other actions by the Georgian side directed at undermining existing agreements, demolishing the negotiating and peacekeeping formats and mechanisms in the region, worthy of unqualified condemnation by all leading international organizations, in the first instance the UN and OSCE, MOSCOW 00010986 003 OF 003 directly involved in the issue of world security and conflict resolution. We expect the Georgian provocations will be given an appropriate and unbiased evaluation by the international community. It must be recognized in Tbilisi that the period of indulgence and permissiveness, including by a number of Western states, has ended and that the time has come to answer for one's actions. Concrete conclusions will be drawn in Russia from the Georgian leadership's line. We have no intention of leaving our citizens in trouble -- whether ordinary tourists or military personnel fulfilling their service obligations abroad in accordance with international treaties. The reaction of the Russian side will be appropriate calculated as a warning against the repetition of such unfriendly acts. End text. BURNS