RUSSIA'S "DEMOCRATS" IN DISARRAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010861

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S "DEMOCRATS" IN DISARRAY

REF: MOSCOW 10620

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Russia's "democrats" remain in
near-terminal disarray. Personality disputes, disagreements
over accommodating with the Kremlin, differences over the
viability of political activity, and difficulties in
political party registration undercut efforts aimed at
uniting in advance of the 2007 Duma elections. While some
believe the Kremlin wants a unified democratic (or
"rightist") opposition, if only for appearances sake, the
democrats remain stymied by Yabloko chairman Yavlinskiy's
insistence on a paramount leadership role. In meetings with
the Central Election Commission and other senior government
officials, the Ambassador will continue to underscore concern
over the failure of the Russian Republican Party under
Vladimir Ryzhkov to be registered to date; separately, the
democrats will need to make tough decisions about their
political future. End Summary


2. (C) In recent introductory calls on Yabloko's Grigori
Yavlinskiy and Republican Party's Vladimir Ryzhkov, a picture
of disorganization, backbiting, and alleged pandering to the
Kremlin emerged, further complicating the prospects of a
unified democratic opposition capable of crossing the seven
percent threshold to the Duma.

--------------
"Democrats" divided
--------------


3. (C) The real issue, according to Ryzhkov, is that there
are three camps within the democratic opposition: those who
despise Putin and "argue for war crimes tribunals" (Committee
2008's Kasparov, former Prime Minister Kasyanov),who have
scant public traction; those who are prepared to seek some
degree of accommodation with the Kremlin (SPS' Belykh and
Yabloko's Yavlinskiy) and in return allegedly receive party
registration, under the table support, some access to the
media, and occasional meetings with Presidential
Administration Deputy Head Vladislav Surkov; and those, like
Ryzhkov, who oppose Putin, but continue to play within a
"managed" system and are denied party registration, as well
as access to the media and Kremlin leadership. While Belykh
doubted whether a union of rightist parties would cross the
seven percent Duma threshold, Ryzhkov optimistically argued
that they could garner between 10-15 percent of a general
vote. However, Ryzhkov stressed that personality and
attitude towards the Kremlin are significant hurdles to the
otherwise rational calculus to unite.


4. (C) First and foremost, Ryzhkov, Belykh and SPS Chubays
all agreed, Yavlinskiy is a pill, and his leadership of a
combined democratic opposition would be a bitter one for many
to swallow, given his insistence that all other parties
subordinate themselves to Yabloko and admit to the policy
errors of their past. Yavlinskiy himself told us that the
other democratic opposition "will all come to me, they have
no other option," given the amendments to the electoral law
that encourage the consolidation of political parties. In
his meeting with us, Ryzhkov accused Yavlinskiy of promising
to "deliver" a united rightist opposition to Surkov, thereby
rounding out the political spectrum. Yavlinskiy dismissed
Ryzhkov as "a nothing," while insisting that if he had access
to the media, Yabloko alone would draw 15 percent. Political
consultant Dmitri Oreshkin told us that it's "psychological"
-- Yavlinskiy does not want to come into the Duma as part of
a rightist union, but as the undisputed leader of the
"democratic" forces. When Duma member and Party of
Entrepreneurs representative Oksana Alekseyeva was asked what
was the main obstacle to a coalition of Russia's
traditionally democratic parties, she said without
hesitation: "Yavlinskiy."


5. (C) Second, tactics among democratic parties diverge.
The Other Russia conference organized in advance of the G8
summit clarified the divisions: Yabloko and SPS rejected the
conference outright -- Yavlinskiy declined to be one of a
crowd, and Belykh said that he didn't like the company that
the conference organizers were prepared to keep in order to
show that opposition to Putin's Russia was alive and well.
Outside observers, including Oreshkin, Indem President
Georgiy Satarov and Ekho Moskvy chief editor Aleksey
Vennediktov, endorsed the line that both parties chose to
continue their tacit understanding with the authorities,
according to which the Kremlin tolerates their fundraising
and views them as politicians with whom they are prepared to
do business. As evidence of this tacit accord some point to
Surkov's invitation of both Belykh and Yavlinskiy to a public
roundtable debate on his conception of "sovereign democracy."
(In the case of SPS, Oreshkin argued that an additional

MOSCOW 00010861 002 OF 002


factor dictating compromise with the Kremlin was Chubays'
focus on securing Administration support for the reform of
RAO UES.) While Ryzhkov endorsed the Other Russia
conference, he subsequently repudiated Kasyanov's efforts to
transform the conference into a party that would further
Kasyanov's presidential bid. The Republican Party will no
longer attend Other Russia functions.


6. (C) Finally, there are disagreements over the political
landscape and room for maneuver in the presidential
elections. Yavlinskiy was dismissive of electoral politics
-- predicting that Putin's inner circle would prevail upon
him to remain in power for a third term; indifferent to the
unification of leftist parties -- characterizing it a Kremlin
project doomed to fail; and fatalistic about his role --
arguing that he was waiting "for the fall" of Russia and
devoting his time to preparing the next generation of
intellectual elite. In contrast, Ryzhkov reiterated that he
was prepared to play in the system and was actively working
to establish credible party chapters, despite continuing
difficulties with the election commission authorities,
including the party's removal from the electoral list in
Chechnya. Ryzhkov believed that there was still political
room for maneuver, and heralded the unification of leftist
parties as a "positive development" since it weakened the
hold of United Russia.

--------------
Ryzhkov's Moral Dilemma
--------------


7. (C) Ryzhkov acknowledged that unless he compromised with
the Kremlin along the lines of Yabloko and SPS, there was
little prospect of success for his party, which remains
unregistered, and his political future. While he accepted
this intellectually, he noted that morally it continued to
cause him pause. Ryzhkov reiterated his rejection of the
political stance of Kasyanov and Kasparov, stating that it
was important to recognize Russia's political realities, and
gave us the impression that he was leaning toward compromise
with Yabloko and SPS. Ryzhkov requested US assistance in
underscoring concern over the difficulties faced by the
Russian Republican Party in securing its registration. While
the CEC has until the end of the year to complete its review
of the Republican Party, Ryzhkov predicted that the party's
application would be rejected, following a series of
"technicalities" that have plagued his party's efforts to
organize over the last year.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) As the rightist parties continue negotiations, many
observers believe that the Kremlin also seeks a union of
democratic parties, if only to round out the political
spectrum and provide legitimacy to the electoral process.
Efforts by Republican Party and Yabloko regional leaders in
Astrakhan (septel) to unite are indicative of pressures
within both party structures to create viable political
alliances, and last year's agreement between SPS and Yabloko
to join forces secured the democrats a presence in the Moscow
Duma. The Ambassador will continue to raise the status of
the Russian Republican Party in meetings with the Central
Election Commission and senior government officials.
BURNS