RUSSIAN OPPOSITION LEADER BORIS NEMTSOV REJOINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001083

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OPPOSITION LEADER BORIS NEMTSOV REJOINS
THE POLITICAL FRAY, BUT KREMLIN PRESSURE LIKELY


Classified By: A/POL Bruce Donahue. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Boris Nemtsov, erstwhile co-leader of the
Union of Right Forces (SPS),will head an SPS committee
charged with forging a permanent alliance among democratic
opposition forces. News of the appointment came January 28,
just a day before GOR officials charged Nemtsov's former
business partner, Igor Linshits, President of the Neftyanoy
Bank, with illegal business practices and money laundering.
Nemtsov told us the campaign against Neftyanoy was a clear
warning from the Kremlin to avoid engaging in political
activities. Undaunted thus far, Nemtsov acknowledged that
the task of uniting the democratic opposition would be
difficult in the face of continued Kremlin pressure. From
another corner of the democratic camp, Konstantin Lazarev of
the Our Choice political council, told us separately that it
was increasingly likely that his beleaguered party would
throw in its lot with former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.
END SUMMARY.
.
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NEMTSOV PICKS UP THE POLITICAL GAUNTLET AGAIN
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2. (C) Boris Nemtsov, erstwhile co-leader of the SPS, former
Deputy Prime Minister during the Yeltsin era and, more
recently, advisor to Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko, has
agreed to head an SPS committee tasked with exploring options
for uniting democratic opposition forces. A senior official
from Yabloko welcomed the announcement but otherwise the news
failed to generate any significant media interest. In a
January 30 meeting, Nemtsov acknowledged to us that the
effort would be difficult but outlined a basic strategy he
thought would resonate positively among Russians. In his
view, the democrats' message had been too negative. In
particular, democrats had been far too critical of President
Putin, whom the great majority of Russians genuinely admired
and respected. Although Nemtsov claimed that the democratic
opposition collectively might be able to garner 15-20 percent
in popular support despite its negative message, he theorized
that it could increase this figure substantially with an
ambitious, attention-grabbing program that did not directly
attack the government or senior officials. Nemtsov said his
fundamental challenge was to persuade other opposition
members to "think big."


3. (C) As part of the opposition's alternative program,
Nemtsov said he wanted to advance a pro-EU, pro-NATO course
for the country, including eventual membership in both
organizations, while also espousing a strategy that dealt
with many of the anxieties of average Russians, including
fear of Islamic extremism (but not Muslims in general) and
Chinese encroachments upon Russia's economic and, perhaps,
territorial interests. Such a program reflected the
pro-Western outlook of most Russians, as well as their desire
to be perceived as a respected member of the European
community. The key, Nemtsov argued, was to present this
strategy as the only viable choice for Russia. Even if
Russia did not join the EU or NATO in the next 15 years, he
reasoned, the country would undergo significant, positive
change as it moved toward these goals. He cited the example
of Turkey as a nation that had transformed itself in its
quest to become a member of the EU.
.
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KREMLIN UNLIKELY TO AGREE WITH PRO-WESTERN APPROACH
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4. (C) Nemtsov said Kremlin officials would oppose this tack
and would continue to apply pressure more broadly on him and
his associates. He recounted events surrounding a raid on
the Neftyanoy Bank in mid-December, which he described as a
Kremlin warning to the bank's principal officers, including
Nemtsov and Igor Linshits, to avoid engaging in political
activities. Nemtsov said 200 personnel had been involved in
the raid. He had immediately telephoned Vladislav Surkov,
Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration (PA),who
initially indicated that the raid's purpose was strictly law
enforcement. However, according to Nemtsov, Surkov called
back a few days later to say that the incident was
"political" because of Nemtsov's association with liberal
political figures, including Yushchenko. In response to
Surkov's suggestion that Nemtsov's resignation from his post
as bank director would "help resolve the case," Nemtsov
resigned from the position, mainly to protect Linshits and
the bank from prosecution.


5. (C) Nonetheless, the GOR subsequently filed charges
against Linshits for illegal business practices and money
laundering. Nemtsov told us Linshits had taken refuge
temporarily in Munich but would probably wind up in Israel to

MOSCOW 00001083 002 OF 002


avoid extradition. Nemtsov added that in a January 25
meeting Surkov had given no hint that charges against
Linshits would be filed. He said he believed that Surkov's
PA colleague, Igor Sechin, had given the orders for the
campaign against Neftyanoy, but he declined to say how or why
he thought so.


6. (C) Speaking more broadly on Kremlin affairs, Nemtsov:

-- Described Putin as competent but paranoid. The President
was not concerned about domestic issues since virtually all
opposition in the country had been eliminated. The business
community, too, was "tamed" and obedient to the Kremlin.
Putin paid considerable attention to global public opinion,
but he relied on his close, personal relationships with world
leaders, including President George Bush, to mitigate
criticism, as well as to avoid taking action unless
absolutely forced.

-- Concluded that the British were chosen as the focus of the
recent spy scandal because of HMG's refusal to extradite
businessman and political activist Boris Berezovskiy and
Chechen envoy Akhmed Zakayev. Putin had pleaded for their
extradition in a meeting last October with PM Tony Blair,
promising "anything in return."

-- Speculated that the Kremlin would step up pressure against
Rodina and its leader, Dmitriy Rogozin. Putin was genuinely
concerned about the rise of nationalism and xenophobia in the
country and recognized the attraction -- and danger -- of
popular themes like "Russia for the Russians" and "Kill All
the Oligarchs." Putin viewed Rogozin as a charismatic
opponent who was capable of exploiting such sentiments
successfully. Although the Kremlin had created Rodina, it
could also destroy it.
.
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OUR CHOICE FALLS ON HARD TIMES
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7. (C) Elsewhere in the democratic opposition ranks, the Our
Choice party is struggling to remain intact, according to a
member of the party's national political council, Konstantin
Lazarev. He told us last week that the party, with an
estimated current membership of 40,000, might not succeed in
meeting the minimum membership requirements for registration.
Lazarev said Our Choice was considering joining forces with
former PM Mikhail Kasyanov in a move that, among other
things, would take advantage of the close ties between
Kasyanov and party leader Irina Khakamada. He added that Our
Choice possessed a superior organizational network,
particularly outside of Moscow, that would benefit Kasyanov.
.
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COMMENT
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8. (C) It is not inconceivable that the raid on Neftyanoy
was indeed part of the GOR's campaign to clean up dirty
banks. If, however, Nemtsov is correct in his assessment of
the political motivation behind the Neftyanoy campaign, he
would join a growing list of personalities targeted by the
Kremlin mainly for their political activities -- Berezovskiy,
former Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, and Kasyanov. In
addition to the effect such pressure has on Nemtsov's
personal and business interests, it will likely torpedo
Nemtsov's effort to unite the democratic opposition even
before it has a chance to get underway.


9. (C) Nemtsov also realizes that his association with the
Yeltsin era will probably limit support for any initiative
with his name on it, and he is counting on the next
generation of politicians to carry the liberal banner. Among
them is his own daughter, who competed in the Moscow Duma
election last December and was selected along with other
young politicians and activists to meet with visiting German
Chancellor Angela Merkel last month.
BURNS