RUSSIA: PUBLIC CHAMBER MEMBER ON PRESS FREEDOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010689

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: PUBLIC CHAMBER MEMBER ON PRESS FREEDOM

REF: MOSCOW 10605

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russell: Reasons: 1.4(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Pavel Gusev, owner and editor-in-chief of
Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK) and member of the Public Chamber,
described a "media vertical" of direct government ownership
and indirect corporate persuasion that has left the majority
of Russians with a limited range of viewpoints and most
opposition figures with limited media access. Gusev warned
that the Kremlin has in reserve a draft law that would
curtail internet and other press freedoms. Ekho Moskvy chief
editor has expressed concern over being squeezed out of the
market. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) We met with Pavel Gusev in his Moskovsky Komsomolets
office. Since his paper is "100% independent and
self-financed," Gusev maintained that he enjoyed greater
latitude on what he could publish compared to other media
outlets. Gusev has been editor since 1983, and purchased the
paper in the wave of privatizations following the collapse of
the Soviet Union. By virtue of his long tenure, he is
Chairman of the Moscow Journalists Union. At the last
moment, Gusev explained, he was appointed a member of the
Public Chamber, when Administration officials withdrew a
Kremlin media representative who lacked credibility. In the
Public Chamber, Gusev has promoted the concept of public
television stations, independent of federal or regional
ownership.

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ALTERNATIVES TO CENSORSHIP - OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION
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3. (C) Gusev briefly recounted the changes in the media over
the last 15 years, from the liberal atmosphere of the early
1990's to the increasing irascibility of the Yeltsin
government (inversely proportional to the former President's
popularity),leading to the systematic neutralization of
opinions unfavorable to the Administration under Putin's
Kremlin. During Yeltsin's decline, Gusev's newspaper faced
constant run-ins with the tax police, with 153 cases lodged
against MK in one year. At that time, however, a lively mass
media flourished, with many political programs, live
broadcasts, and debates on television. Gusev lamented that
now there was a "media vertical" controlled by the Kremlin.
To buttress that contention, he produced a list of newspapers
and television stations itemized by their corporate
ownership, and argued that except for MK, Vedomosti, and the
English-language Moscow Times, all national papers were
vulnerable to corporate persuasion, whether through direct or
indirect ownership, control of distribution networks, or
influence over sales outlets. The situation was worse at the
regional level, he asserted, with "90 percent" of the media
under the direct and indirect control of governors and mayors.


4. (C) Control under Putin, he explained, was more subtle
but certain. There were fewer tax cases, but more "guidance
and instructions." It was not a question of a story being
forbidden; instead, the Administration asked "why" do you
want to draw attention to this issue. The quiet
conversations usually do the trick, he noted, but when they
don't, the Administration rarely approaches the offending
press directly, but talks to their financiers and corporate
owners (reftel). A few redlines have emerged: Putin's family
and personal life are off-limits, except to deliberately
placed stories (with one impertinent article by MK on the
first daughters' social life drawing an explicit threat
against Gusev),as are critical articles on the government's
strategy towards Chechnya and on corruption within the
Kremlin inner circle.



5. (C) Gusev said that the Kremlin was actively considering
new media restrictions. While the internet media remained
unregulated, and many on-line newspapers, including MK, have
a "free for all" section where anybody can post their views,
Gusev warned that the Administration was actively evaluating
means to restrict internet coverage and had already drafted a
law that it held in reserve. He predicted that the draft
would be introduced and passed sometime after the upcoming
Duma elections. While railing against speculation over a
successor ("democracies do not have successors; they have
candidates"),Gusev said that, after a series of
conversations with the First Deputy Prime Minister, he was
convinced that Medvedev was less suspicious of the media and
would tolerate an atmosphere of greater media freedom.

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OPPOSITION MEDIA ACCESS
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6. (C) Gusev, who described himself as a Yabloko party man,
reiterated that opposition politicians, with limited access
to television audiences and a reliance on radio and print,
were denied a meaningful opportunity to compete in elections.
Somebody like Yabloko's Yavlinsky, Gusev explained, could
get interviewed in MK, air-time on Echo Moskvy, and coverage
on a few other radio stations, but that was it. Opposition
politicians "simply don't have access." SPS leader Nikita
Belikh told us that with the forced cancellation of
previously popular political talk shows, there was little
scope for appearing in prime time. The few times he was
invited, he noted, was as a representative of a distinctly
unpopular point-of-view (e.g. defending jury trials),whereas
he characterized the television coverage of United Russia
politicians and purported succession candidates to Putin as
relentlessly positive.


7. (C) While Golos director Lilia Shebanova was less dire
in her analysis to us, noting that some opposition-controlled
papers still existed in the regions, with Internet an egress
to the well-educated and more affluent city voters, there was
general consensus that certain figures were off-limits.
Irina Yasina, director of the now-defunct "Open Russia" (an
NGO founded by disgraced and imprisoned oligarch Mikhail
Khodorkovsky),now finds herself a persona non grata. Since
Khodorkovsky's arrest in 2003, she told us that she has
received two invitations to appear on television -- once on a
minor station, another on a late night show. In both
instances, her appearance was subjected to rigorous editing;
as a result, Yasina (like her well-known reformer-economist
father) has sworn off television.


8. (C) Ekho Moskvy Chief Editor Aleksey Vennediktov
expressed concern to us that the Administration's new tactic
of funding competitor stations and foreclosing regional
outlets could prove effective in making his liberal radio
station unprofitable. The station, he noted, was under
"tremendous pressure," having lost out on eight regional bids
and increasingly restricted in its ability to expand its
service. A year ago, Moscow had 40 radio stations, 36 of
which were of the popular (and more profitable) music
variety; this year, there are 45 stations, only 33 of which
are music channels. Vennediktov's corporate boss, Gazprom,
has funded a rival station, whose sound quality, Vennediktov
conceded, was twice as good as that of Ekho Moskvy's. If
Ekho Moskvy failed to secure ratings, Vennediktov noted,
there would be ready grounds for his dismissal. Deputy Head
of the Presidential Administration Surkov, Vennediktov
related, openly gloated that the Kremlin was after Ekho
Moskvy's bottom line.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) The walls and shelves of Gusev's office are adorned
with Communist heroes, including a larger-than-life portrait
of Stalin, as reminders, he said, of the figures who shaped
modern Russia. The irony of Gusev complaining about
restricted press freedom while surrounded by the Marxist
pantheon was not lost on us, but his experience and long-term
perspective should not be dismissed. Gusev's comments
distill the strong concerns of election watchdogs and
opposition politicians over the pre-election day impediments
to participating in parliamentary and presidential elections.

BURNS