RUSSIA: PUBLIC CHAMBER MEMBER ON PRESS FREEDOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010689 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA: PUBLIC CHAMBER MEMBER ON PRESS FREEDOM REF: MOSCOW 10605 Classified By: DCM Daniel Russell: Reasons: 1.4(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Pavel Gusev, owner and editor-in-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK) and member of the Public Chamber, described a "media vertical" of direct government ownership and indirect corporate persuasion that has left the majority of Russians with a limited range of viewpoints and most opposition figures with limited media access. Gusev warned that the Kremlin has in reserve a draft law that would curtail internet and other press freedoms. Ekho Moskvy chief editor has expressed concern over being squeezed out of the market. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) We met with Pavel Gusev in his Moskovsky Komsomolets office. Since his paper is "100% independent and self-financed," Gusev maintained that he enjoyed greater latitude on what he could publish compared to other media outlets. Gusev has been editor since 1983, and purchased the paper in the wave of privatizations following the collapse of the Soviet Union. By virtue of his long tenure, he is Chairman of the Moscow Journalists Union. At the last moment, Gusev explained, he was appointed a member of the Public Chamber, when Administration officials withdrew a Kremlin media representative who lacked credibility. In the Public Chamber, Gusev has promoted the concept of public television stations, independent of federal or regional ownership. -------------- -------------- ALTERNATIVES TO CENSORSHIP - OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Gusev briefly recounted the changes in the media over the last 15 years, from the liberal atmosphere of the early 1990's to the increasing irascibility of the Yeltsin government (inversely proportional to the former President's popularity),leading to the systematic neutralization of opinions unfavorable to the Administration under Putin's Kremlin. During Yeltsin's decline, Gusev's newspaper faced constant run-ins with the tax police, with 153 cases lodged against MK in one year. At that time, however, a lively mass media flourished, with many political programs, live broadcasts, and debates on television. Gusev lamented that now there was a "media vertical" controlled by the Kremlin. To buttress that contention, he produced a list of newspapers and television stations itemized by their corporate ownership, and argued that except for MK, Vedomosti, and the English-language Moscow Times, all national papers were vulnerable to corporate persuasion, whether through direct or indirect ownership, control of distribution networks, or influence over sales outlets. The situation was worse at the regional level, he asserted, with "90 percent" of the media under the direct and indirect control of governors and mayors. ¶4. (C) Control under Putin, he explained, was more subtle but certain. There were fewer tax cases, but more "guidance and instructions." It was not a question of a story being forbidden; instead, the Administration asked "why" do you want to draw attention to this issue. The quiet conversations usually do the trick, he noted, but when they don't, the Administration rarely approaches the offending press directly, but talks to their financiers and corporate owners (reftel). A few redlines have emerged: Putin's family and personal life are off-limits, except to deliberately placed stories (with one impertinent article by MK on the first daughters' social life drawing an explicit threat against Gusev),as are critical articles on the government's strategy towards Chechnya and on corruption within the Kremlin inner circle. ¶5. (C) Gusev said that the Kremlin was actively considering new media restrictions. While the internet media remained unregulated, and many on-line newspapers, including MK, have a "free for all" section where anybody can post their views, Gusev warned that the Administration was actively evaluating means to restrict internet coverage and had already drafted a law that it held in reserve. He predicted that the draft would be introduced and passed sometime after the upcoming Duma elections. While railing against speculation over a successor ("democracies do not have successors; they have candidates"),Gusev said that, after a series of conversations with the First Deputy Prime Minister, he was convinced that Medvedev was less suspicious of the media and would tolerate an atmosphere of greater media freedom. -------------- OPPOSITION MEDIA ACCESS -------------- MOSCOW 00010689 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Gusev, who described himself as a Yabloko party man, reiterated that opposition politicians, with limited access to television audiences and a reliance on radio and print, were denied a meaningful opportunity to compete in elections. Somebody like Yabloko's Yavlinsky, Gusev explained, could get interviewed in MK, air-time on Echo Moskvy, and coverage on a few other radio stations, but that was it. Opposition politicians "simply don't have access." SPS leader Nikita Belikh told us that with the forced cancellation of previously popular political talk shows, there was little scope for appearing in prime time. The few times he was invited, he noted, was as a representative of a distinctly unpopular point-of-view (e.g. defending jury trials),whereas he characterized the television coverage of United Russia politicians and purported succession candidates to Putin as relentlessly positive. ¶7. (C) While Golos director Lilia Shebanova was less dire in her analysis to us, noting that some opposition-controlled papers still existed in the regions, with Internet an egress to the well-educated and more affluent city voters, there was general consensus that certain figures were off-limits. Irina Yasina, director of the now-defunct "Open Russia" (an NGO founded by disgraced and imprisoned oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky),now finds herself a persona non grata. Since Khodorkovsky's arrest in 2003, she told us that she has received two invitations to appear on television -- once on a minor station, another on a late night show. In both instances, her appearance was subjected to rigorous editing; as a result, Yasina (like her well-known reformer-economist father) has sworn off television. ¶8. (C) Ekho Moskvy Chief Editor Aleksey Vennediktov expressed concern to us that the Administration's new tactic of funding competitor stations and foreclosing regional outlets could prove effective in making his liberal radio station unprofitable. The station, he noted, was under "tremendous pressure," having lost out on eight regional bids and increasingly restricted in its ability to expand its service. A year ago, Moscow had 40 radio stations, 36 of which were of the popular (and more profitable) music variety; this year, there are 45 stations, only 33 of which are music channels. Vennediktov's corporate boss, Gazprom, has funded a rival station, whose sound quality, Vennediktov conceded, was twice as good as that of Ekho Moskvy's. If Ekho Moskvy failed to secure ratings, Vennediktov noted, there would be ready grounds for his dismissal. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Surkov, Vennediktov related, openly gloated that the Kremlin was after Ekho Moskvy's bottom line. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) The walls and shelves of Gusev's office are adorned with Communist heroes, including a larger-than-life portrait of Stalin, as reminders, he said, of the figures who shaped modern Russia. The irony of Gusev complaining about restricted press freedom while surrounded by the Marxist pantheon was not lost on us, but his experience and long-term perspective should not be dismissed. Gusev's comments distill the strong concerns of election watchdogs and opposition politicians over the pre-election day impediments to participating in parliamentary and presidential elections. BURNS