LAVROV'S MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 010382

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM IS SY LE RS
SUBJECT: LAVROV'S MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY

REF: A. STATE 148157

B. TEL AVIV 3390

Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: With FM Lavrov's September 7-9 trip to the
Middle East, promotion of a "universal" peace process,
experts' conference, renewed Syria track, and support for the
Arab League ministerial session at UNGA, the GOR continues to
seek "player" status in the region. Practically, GOR support
for UNSC 1701 will be bilateral and limited to an engineering
battalion, numbering 300. Lavrov pushed for normalized
Lebanon-Syria relations, within the context of Syrian
cooperation in the Hariri investigation. Lavrov told the
Syrians that the GOR would thoroughly investigate charges
that Russian weapons were transferred to Hezbollah, and
briefed PM Olmert on this "serious approach." The MFA views
a possible Palestinian unity government as vindication of
engagement with Hamas, and questioned whether it was
practical to expect a new government to simultaneously
implement the three conditions for Western recognition.
Upcoming visits to Moscow this fall by UAE Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed, PM Olmert, and President Mubarak provide
opportunities for continued GOR activism. End Summary


2. (C) In a September 15 meeting, Russian MFA Director for
the Middle East and North Africa Sergey Vershinin provided a
readout of Foreign Minister Lavrov's whirlwind September 7-9
trip to Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Ramallah. Lavrov
undertook the swing with two overriding objectives: (1) to
spur implementation of 1701 and (2) to assess, in the wake of
the Israel-Lebanon war, regional interest in another round of
"universal" peace process diplomacy.

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Beirut: Nasrullah, GOR aid, peace process
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3. (C) In Beirut, Lavrov met "with all of Lebanese society"
-- specifically, President Sinoria, Nabbi Berri, and FM
Sallukh, with a pre-trip telephone call to Saad Hariri, who
was out of town. While recognizing the Lebanese Christian
argument that Hezbollah's popularity was damaged by the war's
destructiveness, the GOR found Nasrallah's star ascendant,
and calculated that any dip in domestic support was offset by
his improved standing in the Arab world. From a local
player, he was transformed into a regional power. Lavrov
agreed with Sinoria's assessment that disarming Hezbollah
could only be done within a Lebanese political compact,
without interference from the international community.
Vershinin praised the "mood" among Sinoria and his advisers
to push disarmament, but underscored the GOR belief that any
"sharp" action would precipitate civil war. It would be an
easier process if Hezbollah were an outside force -- if it
were a question of blocking Iran or Syria; however,
Hezbollah's indigenous standing meant that dialogue would be
key to any resolution. Vershinin repeated the GOR's
conclusion that there was no significant Iranian choreography
of the war: "ideological closeness, yes; direct commands,
never." Iran benefited by the international community's
attention towards Lebanon and away from questions of nuclear
proliferation, but there was no direct evidence of Iran
having masterminded events.


4. (C) In response to reftel (A) points on maintaining
momentum in Lebanon, Vershinin expressed in careful terms the
GOR delegation's dismay over the extent of the destruction of
civilian infrastructure, and questioned the intensity of
Israeli attacks in the days immediately preceding the
ceasefire. He noted that the GOR was committed to full
implementation of 1701. While both the GOL and UN requested
GOR participation in UNIFIL-2, Russia decided to send up to
300 military sappers/engineers in a bilateral capacity to
assist in the reconstruction effort. Finance Minister Kudrin
will attend the September 18 WB/IMF discussions in Singapore,
but Vershinin signaled that it was unlikely that the GOR
would commit to more humanitarian assistance beyond the four
cargo loads already provided. Under consideration would be
additional de-mining support.


5. (C) Noting GOR efforts to encourage direct
Lebanese-Syrian negotiations over Shabaa farms would not
resolve the broader question of peace between Lebanon and its
neighbors, Vershinin said that FM Lavrov believed another
"universal" effort aimed at negotiating a comprehensive peace
was required, along the lines of the Madrid conference.
Vershinin argued that this round of peace should attempt to
"attract" Iran to the negotiating table, in order that any
negotiated outcome would be stable and enduring.
Acknowledging US resistance to this proposal, Vershinin
replied that "if Iran has influence, we should work with it."
Vershinin pointed to the presence of a million Russian

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speakers in Israel, including concentrations under Hezbollah
rocket attack in Haifa, as one reason for Russian diplomatic
activism. There were numerous Jewish organizations in Russia
who sought to deepen GOR engagement in the Middle East.

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Syria: Asad confident, ready to negotiate
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6. (C) The GOR found Asad confident and pragmatic in the
aftermath of the war. Asad told the GOR that this should be
"the last war" in the Middle East and that Syria sought a
universal settlement, wanted peace with Israel, and was ready
for contacts and negotiations. The GOR conveyed this to PM
Olmert, and interpreted recent GOI actions (reftel B) as
indicative that Israel may be preparing a Syria track.
Olmert, Vershinin said, was not categorical in ruling out a
renewed effort with Syria.


7. (C) Asad, Vershinin commented, was realistic about
normalizing relations with Lebanon and told the GOR that he
was prepared to host Sinoria, although there was no agreement
on dates. Vershinin defended high-level engagement with
Syria as essential, given that it was an "original" peace
process player. If Syria was not constructive, Vershinin
argued, nothing substantive could be accomplished. The GOR
had pressed Syria to cooperate fully in the Hariri
assassination investigation, but Vershinin was non-committal
on what message had been passed to Syria on halting support
for terrorism against Israel. Vershinin merely stressed that
the only GOR-Palestinian contacts on this trip were with
Abbas.

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Russian weapons to Hezbollah
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8. (C) The GOR told Syria that it would need to undertake a
comprehensive investigation of Russian weapons supplied to
the SARG, in order to determine whether there was leakage to
Hezbollah. Syria reacted positively to the investigation,
within the context of examining how to revive "normalized"
trade relations -- including military-technical ties -- in
accordance with international obligations. Vershinin had no
details to add on the status of the GOR investigation, except
to underscore that the GOR had adopted a "very serious"
approach that had been briefed to PM Olmert.

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Israel: Olmert searching for new strategy
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9. (C) Despite the allegations over the illegal arms
transfers to Hezbollah, Vershinin insisted that relations
with Israel were good, with Russia enjoying a more intensive
dialogue with the GOI than with many others in the region.
The weapons controversy, he noted, would not derail the
October 15 visit of PM Olmert to Moscow, following on the
visit by Foreign Minister Livni and an ongoing security
channel dialogue. Vershinin again underscored the bilateral
component of the relationship, with the over one million
former residents of the Soviet Union constituting a "Russian
street" that energized relations. The trip will focus on
bilateral ties, with Putin having instructed the MFA to
develop concrete initiatives rather than organize "just
another friendly visit."


10. (C) The GOR concluded that Olmert's difficult domestic
predicament ultimately will translate into greater
receptivity on rejuvenating a universal peace initiative.
"Unilateral disengagement is dead," Vershinin commented, and
"Olmert is not excluding any alternative policy initiatives
at this stage." Olmert told Lavrov that it would be
impossible to talk peace without the return of the Israeli
soldiers, and requested GOR assistance. Subsequently,
Vershinin noted, the GOR talked to the Palestinians, Syrians
and Iranians (to no apparent effect, although Putin
underscored Russian responsiveness to the GOI request in his
mid-September meeting with Western analysts). Since (at
least in Russian eyes) Olmert lost militarily, the GOR
believes that the Prime Minister is looking for a diplomatic
success.


11. (C) While Vershinin acknowledged the GOI "allergy" to
an international peace conference (with the Israeli Embassy
here telling us they threw cold water on the concept),the
GOR has decided to read the absence of a categorical
rejection as a yellow light for the GOR to continue to flog
its proposal. The concept of a conference, Vershinin
insisted, resonated in the region. The GOR was not looking
for a "one-day show," Vershinin argued, but a beginning of a
process that would renew all three tracks to a comprehensive

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peace. That said, Vershinin implied that the GOR's alternate
proposal, a meeting of international experts first proposed
by Putin during his May 2005 Egypt visit, continued to be
kicked around within the MFA, despite a similar Israeli cold
shoulder.

l2. (C) The GOI Embassy tells us that most of the focus of
the GOR visit was on Lebanon, although their readout was
limited given the preponderance of time spent in a
Lavrov-Olmert one-on-one session. They described the visit
as less operational, and more an exchange of views, with the
GOR pushing for the resumption of a Syria track and demurring
on any stationing of international peacekeeping troops along
the Syrian border.

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PA: Looking favorably on unity government, AL ministerial
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13. (C) Lavrov's swing through the region has swung the MFA
behind the Arab League concept of a ministerial session on
the margins of UNGA. It was important, Vershinin said, to
demonstrate to the region that the international community
was not indifferent to the long-standing crisis in the
region. Vershinin acknowledged that the Quartet meeting on
September 20 could play this function, but argued that the
meeting would be focused more narrowly on how to respond to
the possible unity government between Fatah and Hamas.


14. (C) Should a unity government materialize, Vershinin
made it clear that the GOR would seek to take credit for the
development, which he attributed to open GOR lines of
communication with both Fatah and Hamas. Vershinin
reiterated that there was no legal impediment to engaging
Hamas, since the GOR did not classify the organization a
terrorist organization. The Palestinian factions, he
maintained, realized that they had reached a dead end and
were looking for a way out. Vershinin previewed GOR
arguments that would favor easing the requirements for a
unity government to be recognized by the international
community, arguing that "simultaneous" implementation of all
three conditions (to recognize Israel and previously signed
peace treaties, as well as to renounce terrorism) was
unrealistic. While a unity government would not answer 100
percent of the international community's concerns, Vershinin
maintained, it would provide Abbas with the authority he
needed to negotiate a way forward. Vershinin took on board
our reiteration that all three conditions would need to be
satisfied by Hamas before the US could recognize a unity
government.

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Comment
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15. (C) Lavrov's whirlwind trip to the region was
overshadowed by the visits of PM Blair and UNSYG Annan, but
Russian activism will continue. As Russian lobbying for a
conference, meeting, and ministerial indicate, the GOR
continues to seek "player" status in the Middle East,
simultaneously embracing the Quartet process, while promoting
an Arab League ministerial to assuage Arab allies. If a
Fatah-Hamas unity government becomes a reality, we will
continue to press back against GOR instincts to shrink or to
accept a phased implementation of the core conditions
governing western recognition of Hamas. In addition to the
mid-October visit of Olmert, the GOR will host UAE Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Zayed on September 19 and Egyptian
President Mubarak on November 2.
BURNS