MFA HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIAL ON REGULARIZING TIES, UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001025

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PREL KUNR PHUM RS
SUBJECT: MFA HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIAL ON REGULARIZING TIES, UN
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL


Classified By: A/POL Bruce Donahue. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 18 meeting, A/S Lowenkron and
Vladimir Parshikov, Director of the MFA Department of
Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, agreed to more
frequent consultations. Lowenkron laid out the USG position
on the UN Human Rights Council, and Parshikov responded that
the GOR favored finding consensus, including by accommodating
regional groups, before moving forward on the issue. The GOR
also favored a Council roughly the size of the current one,
favored a simple majority vote to elect Council members, and
was cool to the idea of country-specific resolutions.
Lowenkron underscored the importance of NGOs, and Parshikov
argued that Russia was moving in the right direction on
democratic development. END SUMMARY.
.

2. (C) A/S Barry Lowenkron held an introductory meeting
January 18 with Vladimir Parshikov, Director of the MFA
Department of Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, as
well as with his deputy, Grigoriy Lukyantsev. Parshikov
reported that his department has six sections, as follows:

-- universal cooperation on human rights, including the UN's
Third Committee on Human Rights, the UN's Human Rights
Committee "and hopefully, the Human Rights Council";
-- social development in the UN and European structures;
-- cooperation on human rights in European institutions,
including the Council of Europe and OSCE;
-- migrants and refugees;
-- human rights in the CIS, notably in the Baltic states; and
-- international cooperation on culture, sports and leisure.


3. (C) Parshikov noted that his department had last held
regular meetings with its State Department counterparts in

1997. He and Lowenkron agreed to resume a regularized
dialogue, with Lowenkron suggesting that Parshikov visit
Washington next year as part of that effort.
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HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
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4. (C) Lowenkron laid out the U.S. position with regard to
the Human Rights Council, underscoring the importance of
having a smaller body than the Commission, meeting more
frequently than the Commission's once-a-year sessions and
establishing a higher bar on membership. The USG was deeply
committed to the issue, and the U.S. Congress was keen to see
genuine reform.


5. (C) Parshikov agreed that the current arrangement did not
serve anyone's interests and said the GOR favored reform of
the UN's human rights structure as soon as possible. Given
the range of views in the international community about how
to proceed, however, the GOR believed it was important to
accommodate regional groups while still pushing ahead with
reforms. The U.S. position did not enjoy the support of even
the Western group, Parshikov argued. Noting that General
Assembly President Eliasson was working hard on the issue and
had called for resolving it by February, Parshikov doubted
that that would occur so soon. That being the case, the
current Commission would meet again before a consensus could
be pinned down on the Council.


6. (C) Elaborating on Parshikov's points, Lukyantsev
reiterated that the GOR favored reform but felt that it
should be done by full or at least partial consensus. Both
the GOR and USG based their positions on principles, but both
might have to make compromises. Rumors that a vote might
take place before a consensus could be hammered out worried
the GOR, Lukyantsev continued.


7. (C) From the GOR's perspective, for instance, consensus
was needed on the Council's composition. Because the Council
would deal with "universal questions," it should not be too
small. Twenty to thirty members were too few, and the right
number was closer to the current fifty-one, Lukyantsev
argued, with the GOR prepared to accept something as low as
forty-eight. Geographical balance was also important.


8. (C) Consensus was also needed on the process of selecting
members, Lukyantsev argued. The GOR believed that in the
interests of fairness and balance, a simple majority vote was
appropriate rather than the two-thirds favored by the U.S.
Lukyantsev added that instituting a two-third vote would
ensure that countries like Cuba and China would become
Council members but could keep the U.S. out of the Council.
Lowenkron responded that the USG recognized that but was
ready to take its chances regarding membership, since
establishing a strong Council was more pivotal. Over the
long-term, a two-thirds vote coupled with a smaller Council
(and other selection procedures) would reduce the likelihood

MOSCOW 00001025 002 OF 002


of non-democratic countries joining the Council. Lukyanov
agreed that that would be the case theoretically but
expressed doubt about the practicality of such an approach.


9. (C) Discussion then turned to the issue of
country-specific resolutions. Lowenkron stressed that for
introducing such resolutions, the USG would not accept
requiring a two-thirds vote; this was a red line for us.
Lukyantsev said that the GOR was not even considering a
two-thirds vote requirement on that issue, but was
considering the proposal that only regional groupings could
offer country-specific resolutions regarding countries in
their regions. More generally, however, the GOR questioned
the merit of country-specific resolutions, Parshikov added,
since these tended only to serve a public relations role.
For example, rather than criticize the Baltic States
individually for their treatment of ethnic Russians, the GOR
preferred to do so in the context of a thematic resolution on
racism or ethnic discrimination. Lowenkron responded that
the Council could allow for both country-specific and
thematic resolutions. If the UN created an effective Council
that would meet often, it could take up country-specific
resolutions that had teeth and could thus be valuable.
Parshikov commented that the most recent country-specific
resolution on Cuba had been extremely mild; if the UN had
passed a resolution adopting that tone regarding Chechnya,
even the GOR would have supported it.
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DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA - NGO LAW
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10. (C) Lowenkron noted that both the U.S. Congress and
American NGOs were concerned about the new Russian NGO law.
Parshikov responded that the GOR had its own parliament and
NGOs to answer to on the issue. The media also weighed in,
Parshikov continued. It was not true that Russia was moving
away from democracy, he argued, and there were many voices
heard on all issues.


11. (C) Lowenkron said that soon after assuming his current
position, he had met with a cross section of NGOs. He had
promised them that he was always prepared for a dialogue with
them, even if he would not always agree with their views.
Throughout the world, NGOs are a reality and are here to
stay, Lowenkron emphasized.


12. (C) Parshikov responded that the GOR also aimed to create
civil society. Russia was a young democracy and faced
challenges in achieving this goal, he continued, although the
country was on the right track. Lowenkron replied that the
Secretary viewed movement on democracy as a trajectory rather

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than a snap-shot. In that spirit, we needed to have a
dialogue on Russia's trajectory. Parshikov agreed on the
need for a dialogue, but added that it should be between
equal partners. The U.S., being a more mature democracy, had
the right to share its experiences with Russia but not to
dictate to it. Lowenkron stressed that the U.S. was not
dictating change to Russia, underscoring the Secretary's view
that democracy by its definition cannot be imposed from the
outside.


13. (U) A/S Lowenkron has cleared this cable.
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