ECONMIN ASTORI SAYS GOU IS ON TRACK FOR JCTI

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000828 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND EB DEPT PASS USTR FOR EISSENSTAT AND CRONIN NSC FOR FISK AND CARDENAS TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLASS USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/BASTIAN SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON UY SUBJECT: ECONMIN ASTORI SAYS GOU IS ON TRACK FOR JCTI REF: MONTEVIDEO 811 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge met with Economy Minister Danilo Astori on September 6 to ascertain the GOU's plans prior to the October 2-3 JCTI in Montevideo. Astori noted President Vazquez's personal investment to build consensus for his FTA vision and stressed the importance of the upcoming Vazquez-Lula meeting on September 8. He confirmed that Industry Minister Lepra will go to Washington in mid-September and seek a meeting with USTR's Susan Schwab, at which time he may formally request an FTA. Astori said he understands that an FTA would have to be modeled after the Peru FTA, given the time constraints linked with TPA expiration, but he emphasized the need for selected modifications, so as to avoid the appearance of Uruguay having "rolled over." In a separate meeting on the same day, EconMin Trade Policy Director Dario Sarachaga told EconCouns that his technical team could accept much of the Peru FTA but would push very hard to put the GOU's imprimatur on the IPR chapter, for which the Uruguayan clear preference is the text of the US-Chile FTA. Astori was convinced that Vazquez "is committed to an FTA and will look for any and all ways to reach this goal." The next few weeks will be crucial. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Astori was very much focused and on message. He recalled that he had first enunciated the need for closer trade relations with the U.S. over a year ago, and that nine months had already elapsed since his bombshell January interview in the business weekly Busqueda, which had called on the GOU to negotiate an FTA with the U.S. Astori described the August 31 meeting of ministers in much the same way as Lepra had (reftel),with Vazquez very much in charge, laying out the strategy to follow and giving ministers their marching orders. (Note: Today's Busqueda ran an extensive description of this meeting, in which Lepra was tasked with continuing contacts with the U.S., Astori with lobbying his Brazilian and Argentine counterparts --this was done late last week in Rio--, Ag Min Jose Mujica with enlisting Chavez's support, and ForMin Reinaldo Gargano with contacts with the Argentine Foreign Minister. The article also explains how Mujica succeeded in "co-opting" Gargano to go along with the President's plans. End Note.) Astori also said that Vazquez had mentioned he had contacted Chavez, who was allegedly ready to assist in bringing Brazil and Argentina over to Uruguay's position on FTAs (Note: We had heard a similar line from Lepra. End Note.) ¶3. (C) Astori emphasized the importance of the upcoming September 8 meeting between Lula and Vazquez in Porto Alegre. He confirmed that the single-item agenda for this one-hour meeting was to seek Brazil's support for Uruguay's decision to seek bilateral FTAs. Astori said he expected to have "good news to report on Friday." He added that the GOU planned to present a formal request to Mercosur after the October JCTI regarding an FTA with the U.S. The request would be made at an extraordinary assembly of the Mercosur Council called for this specific purpose, to be held either in Uruguay or in Brazil. Astori quipped that Brazil appeared of late to be much more worried about Uruguay negotiating an FTA with China than one with the U.S. ¶4. (C) Astori confirmed that Lepra will go to Washington in mid-September to advance the JCTI, possibly accompanied by Presidential Chief of Staff Gonzalo Fernandez. Lepra will seek to meet with USTR Susan Schwab, he said, and quite possibly --depending on advances at Vazquez's next meeting of ministers on September 14-- to verbally request the opening of FTA negotiations at that time, i.e. prior to the JCTI. Astori said that Vazquez understood that the GOU would have to accept much of the text of the Peru FTA, if an agreement were to be concluded prior to the expiration of Trade Promotion Authority. However, Astori emphasized that the GOU could not say so publicly and that some alterations would have to be made in a few chapters, so as to put Uruguay's imprimatur on the document. He explained that this was the only way to "sell" an agreement to the government's constituency. The President is "committed to an FTA", Astori sressed, and "will look for any and all ways to reach this goal." ¶5. (C) Earlier in the day, EconCouns had met with EconMin Trade Policy Director Dario Sarachaga, to assess progress by the GOU's technical teams. Sarachaga said the teams were making good progress with their analysis. He noted that they were receiving technical assistance from the World Bank and from Chilean experts who had been involved in Chile's own FTA negotiations. He said the document that Vazquez had cirulated to the opposition some three weeks ago, which gave a preliminary assessment of the cost-benefit of an FTA, had been a poor summary of the study the Econ Ministry had prepared. Since then, the Econ Ministry had absorbed the IPR portfolio from the Industry Ministry, so that it now handles almost all sectors, except for minor areas left to the Foreign Ministry. In passing, he lamented "confusing" USG signals over the past month, which had made his job more difficult. We all know that an FTA is the only way to get what we want, he said. ¶6. (C) It was clear to the technical team, Sarachaga said, that the GOU would have to accept the quasi-totality of the Peru FTA because of TPA time constraints. He stressed, however, that this could in no way be admitted publicly. We could accept the first ten chapters as they are, he said, but we would have to make changes in some of the following chapters, most of them cosmetic to give the appearance that the GOU is not being "dictated" a format. He expected, however, that the GOU would push hard for more subtantial changes to the IPR chapter, "the only chapter where we have more significant discrepancies." Sarachaga noted that the IPR chapter in the US-Chile FTA was more consistent with the Uruguayan reality and would not require any legislative changes. He believed that, because of the visibility of IPR issues, this was the perfect chapter in which to put Uruguay's imprimatur, as evidence that the GOU did not just accept the text of the Peru FTA wholesale. In addition, he noted that any and all references to a Chilean text would make the whole document much easier to "sell", because of the ideological affinities between the Chilean and Uruguayan Left. ¶7. (C) Comment: Our meetings at the Econ Ministry track with what we had heard from Lepra. The additional information and details gleaned in these meetings confirm that Vazquez is moving down the road towards an FTA with eyes wide open and with a defimite plan of action. Vazquez has invested himself personally in this endeavor and he has put his government's credibility on the line. We will report next week following the Vazquez-Lula meeting. End Comment. Nealon