Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MONTEVIDEO415
2006-05-10 17:24:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Montevideo
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER AMBASSADOR MAISTO'S VISIT TO URUGUAY

Tags:  OVIP PREL AORC PGOV SOCI UY 
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DE RUEHMN #0415/01 1301724
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101724Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5750
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2510
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0402
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY SANTIAGO 2845
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J-5//
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
,UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000415 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/OAS AMBASSADOR JOHN F. MAISTO, DAN CENTO AND
OLWYN STAPLES
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC DBARNES, CCROFT AND SMURRAY
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR RPORTMAN AND EEISSENSTATT
TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DDOUGLAS
COMMERCE FOR SECRETARY CGUTIERREZ AND ITAITA/MAC/WBASTIAN
NSC FOR DFISK AND SCRONIN
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP PREL AORC PGOV SOCI UY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER AMBASSADOR MAISTO'S VISIT TO URUGUAY


,UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000415 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/OAS AMBASSADOR JOHN F. MAISTO, DAN CENTO AND OLWYN STAPLES DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC DBARNES, CCROFT AND SMURRAY DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR RPORTMAN AND EEISSENSTATT TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DDOUGLAS COMMERCE FOR SECRETARY CGUTIERREZ AND ITAITA/MAC/WBASTIAN NSC FOR DFISK AND SCRONIN SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OVIP PREL AORC PGOV SOCI UY SUBJECT: SCENESETTER AMBASSADOR MAISTO'S VISIT TO URUGUAY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your visit to Uruguay on May 18 comes on the heels of a very successful May 4 meeting between Uruguayan President Vazquez and President Bush in Washington. Uruguay is important to U.S. interests as an example of temperate, long-standing democracy in a region that has largely lurched to the populist left. Vazquez stated that he seeks expanded trade ties with the U.S. While he is sometimes hesitant to use the words "Free Trade Agreement" in public, has also stated that if expanded trade with us means an FTA, so be it. Uruguay has also expressed general frustration with the Mercosur trading bloc -- and in particular Mercosur's unwillingness to resolve Uruguay's very serious papermill dispute with Argentina. Vazquez is a pragmatist above all, and what he most wants for Uruguay is jobs, investment and growth. At home and abroad he has been caught between the competing demands of radicals and moderates who vie on how best to achieve his goals. End Summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Domestic politics: Vazquez and his coalition Frente Amplio (FA) Government completed their first year in power on March 1, with generally high marks (reftel). Polling in January estimated that Vazquez enjoyed a 54% approval rating. It is apparent that his adroit and pragmatic leadership along with Uruguay's strong institutions and the basically conservative nature of its society prevented the radical tilt some observers predicted during the 2004 electoral campaign. The President seems to prefer the term "progressive" rather than "leftist" to describe his administration. Looking back, Vazquez' campaign promise to "shake the trees to their roots" has meant more in terms of rejecting outdated socialist thinking than anything else. The moderates in his cabinet generally have the upper hand, and Vazquez has been more challenged by the radicals within his FA coalition than he has by the two discredited opposition parties (Blancos and Colorados) who ruled the country during the past centu
ry. In his efforts to be practical, Vazquez relies on a relatively small cadre of experienced officials to get things done. A key ally in domestic politics has been AgMinister and ex-Tupamaro guerrilla leader Jose Mujica, who has often countered the ideologues on the far-left. Vazquez was also able to appease many radicals by addressing the human rights abuses committed during the "dirty war" period of the military dictatorship and by finding the buried bones of disappeared persons. His leadership style is now predictable: he stays above the fray and allows competing factions in the FA to debate an issue to exhaustion and then weighs in with a final decision. This method will be sorely tested in 2006 as the GOU attempts to reform taxes, education, and defense -- and possibly faces an eventual showdown with powerful communist-dominated labor unions. ¶3. (SBU) Foreign policy has been a formidable challenge, compounded by the stubbornly ideological, anti-US Foreign Minister Reinaldo Gargano. By far, the GOU's most serious problem has been the severe bilateral dispute with Argentina over the construction of paper mills on the shared Uruguay river -- not only because of soured bilateral relations with Uruguay's closest neighbor, but also because of the implications to foreign investment, an independent foreign policy, and Mercosur. Uruguay has a heavy debt burden and no known hydrocarbon deposits, so that Venezuelan oil and money provide considerable temptation for boosting the economy. However, Vazquez appears to model himself more after Chile's ex-President Ricardo Lagos, and his mild leadership style stands in sharp contrast to the populist bombast of Hugo Chavez, Nestor Kirchner and Evo Morales. His well-qualified economic team, headed by Economy Minister Danilo Astori and Industry Minister Jorge Lepra, pursues prudent and sensible macroeconomic policies and further reflects his administration's pragmatic emphasis. As much of the region has lurched to the left, Vazquez has gone out of his way to seek good relations with the U.S., and Uruguay remains a stable anchor in a storm-tossed region. -------------- Issues Likely to Surface -------------- ¶4. (SBU) We expect that President Vazquez would actively engage in a discussion of how regional political and economic trends may develop in the years to come and the U.S. vision for the region. Vazquez will be open to commenting on Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro, Evo Morales and Nestor Kirchner, etc. Soliciting Vazquez' views of China and the EU may also be useful. Foreign Ministry officials will be more willing to discuss non-regional relationships, for instance with Iran and the EU. They will also gladly engage in discussions on Argentina, Bolivia, the OAS, and various multi-lateral issues. ¶5. (SBU) President Vazquez' stated interest in closer trade ties with the United States has implications for Mercosur. The FM, more than other parts of the GOU, tends to value the relationship with Mercosur quite highly. A follow-up meeting of the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment (JCTI) which met in April is scheduled for October in Uruguay. The administration has stated publicly that it hopes to present some sort of expanded trade agreement at that time. FM Gargano has threatened to resign if the GOU begins negotiations of an FTA. ¶6. (SBU) The paper mill dispute with Argentina is Uruguay's most pressing foreign policy problem. The dispute over one Finnish and one Spanish pulp mill under construction on the Uruguayan side of the Uruguay River, is an issue of paramount national interest. The proposed $1.7 billion investment is equivalent to 10% of Uruguay's GDP. Argentine government officials, some local inhabitants and environmental activists claim the plants would harm fishing, farming, and tourist areas along the Uruguay-Argentina border. Protesters from Argentina have blocked bridges between Argentina and Uruguay off and on since the first of the year at great cost to Uruguay's trade and tourism revenues. An independent review of the preliminary World Bank environmental impact study (CIS) reports that these concerns appear exaggerated, since the plants use the latest EU technology. Uruguay has recently complained at the OAS and pressed its case with the World Bank. On May 4, Argentina filed a case with the World Court in opposition to the construction of the paper mills. ¶7. (SBU) Uruguayan fugitive Juan Peirano Basso is sought by Uruguayan authorities for stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from bank depositors. Peirano was given Legal Permanent Resident status in the U.S., but Uruguayan and U.S. authorities have since worked closely towards his eventual arrest and possible extradition. ¶8. (SBU) Uruguay has no known hydrocarbons deposits and is seeking energy supplies from Bolivia and Venezuela, which is using this vulnerability to expand its exports of oil and is seeking to take an interest in Uruguay's refinery. Uruguay currently buys 50 pct of its oil from Venezuela under favorable terms. Venezuela has said that it wants to participate with Uruguay in a proposed gas pipeline from Bolivia that would pass through Paraguay and Brazil, but exclude Argentina. We can recognize Uruguay's need for reliable energy supplies, while pressing the GOU to enter into agreements that are market-based and do not come with political strings from Caracas. The GOU's reaction to Evo Morales' nationalization of hydrocabons in Bolivia is not yet clear. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Given your compressed schedule in Uruguay, your remarks to the press will be especially important. You are well and favorably known to the Uruguayan media from your previous visits. You will have ample opportunity to speak on the role of the OAS, the Summit of the Americas (SOA),the hemispheric social charter, transparency in government and the effect of modern knowledge-based society on governability and development. End Comment. Nealon

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