MERCOSUR - LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT? URUGUAY'S QUANDARY

,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000254 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/AS SHANNON AND EB/AS WAYNE DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC BARNES, CROFT AND MURRAY DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLAS COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC BASTIAN NSC FOR FISK AND CRONIN SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016 TAGS: ECON ETRD PREL PGOV PINR AORC UY SUBJECT: MERCOSUR - LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT? URUGUAY'S QUANDARY REF: A. MONTEVIDEO 229 ¶B. MONTEVIDEO 207 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOU's perception of Mercosur has undergone an extraordinary change over the past year, going from wide-eyed enthusiasm to deep disillusion to even questioning the wisdom of full membership. After initial declarations prioritizing the ""deepening of Mercosur"", the GOU experienced a series of disappointments, from a lackluster presidency pro tempore to recurring market access problems with its larger neighbors. It also witnessed the increasing tendency of Brazil and Argentina to negotiate bilateral agreements without consulting the other Mercosur members, and the emergence lately of Venezuela as a third member of this axis. The severe paper mills dispute with Argentina, possibly one of the worst crises ever between the two countries, has severely strained Mercosur, as has Brazil's conspicuous silence on the issue and lack of leadership. ¶2. (C) While some in the political opposition long questioned the relevance of Mercosur membership, the debate is now permeating the Frente Amplio (FA) itself, with prominent GOU members questioning whether the status of associate member would not be more appropriate. Additionally, the emergence of the U.S. as Uruguay's leading export market has generated a broad-based discussion over the usefulness of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S., with some couching the debate in terms of a choice between Mercosur and the U.S. President Vazquez himself confirmed to us privately that he wants to start discussions on an FTA (ref A). Seen from Uruguay, Mercosur is probably at its most moribund state ever. FTA negotiations between Uruguay and the U.S. would affect the dynamics of Mercosur and may break down the Summit of the Americas anti-FTAA ""consensus"". In the end, however, Uruguay will almost certainly remain a Mercosur member but will push hard for more freedom of action in international trade negotiations. End Summary. -------------- The initial euphoria �A; -------------- ¶3. (C) Although Mercosur was already showing strains when the FA took office in March 2005, it was clearly the FA's number one foreign affairs priority (8 out of 25 foreign policy points in the FA's platform called for a stronger Mercosur). The number two priority was Latin American solidarity. In his inaugural speech before a joint session of Congress, President Vazquez emphasized his ""committment to Mercosur and to integration as a strategic priority in Uruguay's international agenda...this administration wants more and better Mercosur."" He also called for Latin American brotherhood, stressing that ""we will actively develop our relations with all other Latin American countries, without exception, for we feel we are equal brothers."" Vazquez's first foreign trip upon being elected was to Argentina, and his first outside trip after taking office was to Brazil. ¶4. (C) Enthused by the prospects of a stronger and expanded Mercosur, which would join together the ""progressive"" governments of the region, ForMin Gargano gushed that a virtual arc of progress"" was taking shape, from the Caribbean (Cuba and Venezuela) through Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. Vazquez's first actions were to renew relations with Cuba and to sign agreements with Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil. Presidents Kirchner, Lula and Chavez were shining stars. However, Gargano's initial notion that Cuba could somehow join Mercosur was quickly shot down, after the other Mercosur members and his own GOU pointed out that Cuba did not meet the ""democracy clause"" necessary to join the bloc. Gargano backed out in humiliation, having to admit Cuba's lack of democratic credentials. -------------- Reality bites back -------------- ¶5. (C) In the meanwhile, economic integration --Mercosur's raison d'etre-- was taking the back seat. There were numerous meetings, hyperbolic talk of a South American Community of Nations and of a Mercosur Parliament, but little was done in terms of trade facilitation. Little was achieved either during Uruguay's pro tempore presidency of Mercosur, apart from the institution of a new dispute settlement mechanism (which, incidentally, was not activated for the paper mill dispute between Argentina and Uruguay). There was no progress on the harmonization of the Common External Tariff (CET),a crucial issue. The highlight of Uruguay's presidency, from ForMin Gargano's standpoint, was the induction of Venezuela into Mercosur as a ""member in the preparatory stages of accession"". Chavez appears content with this status, which allows him access to a bigger bully pulpit to express his views. He does not seem in any haste to implement the hard measures necessary to comply with Mercosur's CET. High-level contacts at the Mercosur Secretariat and at the GOU's Economy and Foreign ministries view suspiciously Venezuela presence within Mercosur and doubt that Chavez will ever bite the bullet to become a full member. ¶6. (C) Uruguay's presidency also saw the GOU becoming increasingly irrelevant to its two large neighbors. Presidents Lula and Kirchner picked without consultations Argentina's Chacho Alvarez to replace Duhalde as Mercosur President. They also repeatedly met and negotiated bilateral agreements, without consulting the GOU. All in all, Argentina and Brazil held eight bilateral working-level meetings in 2005, which resulted in the signing of 30 bilateral protocols, and in the creation of a bilateral commercial safeguard mechanism (MAC) in January 2006. GOU contacts tell us that the governments of Argentina and Brazil negotiated the entry of Venezuela into Mercosur on a bilateral basis, and that ForMin Gargano tried to take the credit for a fait accompli. There is now some evidence of a tri-lateral axis emerging between the GOA, GOB and GOV, which met five times without Uruguayan participation. Meanwhile, repeated problems of market access for Uruguayan exports into Argentina (bicycles, tires) and into Brazil (rice) continued to highlight the dysfunctionality of the trading bloc and perceived bullying by its larger members. ¶7. (C) Finally, the serious crisis with Argentina over the building of giant paper mills on the Uruguayan side of a joint river (ref B) exacerbated the relationship between the two neighbors and glaringly exposed Mercosur's failings. Vazquez is incensed that Kirchner allowed the bridges leading into Uruguay to be blockaded, thus disrupting the free flow of goods between the two countries and violating the first article of the Treaty of Asuncion establishing Mercosur. Compounding the offense is the fact that Argentina currently holds the presidency pro tempore of Mercosur. The conflict has caused significant damage to the Uruguayan economy by reducing the flow of Argentine tourists at peak summer season and hampering the flow of goods and imports of raw materials. Some estimates put the amount of damage at $200 million so far. ¶8. (C) With pretensions to regional leadership, Brazil has historically been the guiding force of Mercosur and has used it extensively as a tool in international trade negotiations. From the four plus one mechanism with the U.S. to negotiations with the EU to Mercosur's position vis-a-vis the FTAA, officials from this and previous governments in Uruguay tell us that Brazil called the shots. The GOU willingly went along, as membership in such a large trade bloc was perceived as providing added weight in negotiations. No significant trade agreements have materialized, however, with this policy. Mercosur rejected the FTAA at the recent Summit of the Americas and the perrenial negotiations with the EU are at a standstill. The increasing perception in Uruguay is that following Brazil's lead has not generated any advance with Uruguay's major markets. It appears that Brazil's leadership has waned over the past few months, as President Lula is absorbed with his re-election efforts. Lula does not appear to be putting much effort into re-launching Mercosur but prefers to appease Kirchner and accept Chavez. Brazil, the traditional leader of Mercosur, has also remained conspicuously silent in this paper mill dispute, when it would have, in better times, offered and/or provided mediation. Ex-GOU Finance Minister Alfie recently declared that ""Brazil's position in this, as the most important member of Mercosur, has been absolutely tepid."" ¶9. (C) While Mercosur may have benefitted its larger members in many aspects over time, it has been a wash for Uruguay. Uruguay's initial thoughts when joining the trading bloc were that its tiny market would expand sixty-fold and that foreign direct investment (FDI),especially from Brazil, would devlop its industrial base. The reality is that sales to Mercosur peaked seven years ago and FDI never really occurred. The percentage of Uruguayan exports going to Mercosur (principally Brazil and Argentina) is now practically where it was in 1993. Exports to Mercosur peaked in 1998 at 55% of total exports, but shrunk to 22% by 2005, a mere 12% above 1993 levels in dollar value. Meanwhile, the economic and financial crisis of 1999-2002 resulted in a diversification of Uruguay's foreign trade to extra-zone markets, in particular NAFTA, which absorbed 30% of exports in 2005 (with the U.S. taking in a whopping 24% of total exports). Exports to the U.S. in 2005 were 412% up from their 1993 levels. The new reality is clear: Uruguay sells more to the outside world, without trade agreements, than to Mercosur within the framework of the CET. This new reality is sinking in fast, not only with the opposition, which has doubted the benefits of membership for a while, but also within the GOU and the FA. -------------- Where do we stand? -------------- ¶10. (C) Starting from such a basis of euphoria made the letdown even harder for Uruguay. While Mercosur has had its ups and downs with successive GOUs, for the first time the disappointment appears to be generalized within public opinion. The opposition, opinion leaders and even average Uruguayans are incensed at the way Uruguay has been treated by Argentina and Brazil. As when it was launched in 1992, Mercosur has turned into an everyday topic of discussion, but for other reasons. Most sectors of the FA, and Vazquez himself, realize that the ""virtual arc of progress"" has failed to deliver. At the same time , the most active proponents of Mercosur, Gargano in the lead, are being blamed for the organization's failures. Gargano has become the laughing stock of politicians, journalists and even officials within his own ministry. ¶11. (C) Economy Minister Astori started a debate early in the year by advocating negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S. The idea of ""going with the U.S."" is gaining strength, the more so as Mercosur's failings become apparent. Even Vazquez made a surprising remark to his Cabinet about the benefits that an FTA with the U.S. brought to Vietnam. (Note: He privately told us that he wants an FTA with the U.S. and will pitch it to POTUS at their May 4 meeting in Washington. End Note. See ref A). Discussion of the benefits of an FTA with the U.S. has made front-page news for the past three months in Uruguay. -------------- What comes next -------------- ¶12. (C) In this broad-based discussion engulfing the country, politicians and commentators have staked their positions as to what Uruguay's future should be. They range from leaving Mercosur to becoming an associate member like Chile or Bolivia to staying within the bloc but with freedom to undertake bilateral trade talks with outsiders. Pablo Mieres, leader of the small Independent Party, advocates that Uruguay plainly leave Mercosur. He admits having gone full-circle, from his beginnings as a fervent proponent of Mercosur. Mieres lists four factors that led to his turnaround: 1) the paper mills conflict with Argentina 2) the growing bilateral and exclusive relationship between Brazil and Argentina 3) the increasing number of exceptions to the CET which benefit the larger countries and harm Uruguay's exports to the region 4) Uruguay's declining overall trade with Mercosur. Uruguay is straight-jacketed within Mercosur, Mieres claims, and the only way forward is to negotiate bilaterally with other markets, whether Mercosur partners like it or not. ¶13. (C) Ex-Finance Minister Alfie, a prominent Colorado Senator, advocates that Uruguay change its status from full member to that of associate member. He argues that Mercosur membership is a hindrance to the country's development, as Uruguay cannot pursue an independent trade policy and carries no weight within the organization. For Blanco Party leader Senator Larranaga, ""Mercosur has never been in as bad a shape as it is now"". Ex-ForMin Abreu, also a Blanco, sees Mercosur as a ""process stuck in neutral"", with diverging views among its members regarding even its essence. Still, Abreu does not believe that leaving Mercosur is an option for Uruguay. ¶14. (C) President Vazquez recently admitted that ""Mercosur is going through one of its worst moments"". He stressed that Mercosur is not a club where there are VIP members and others. Integration is not built (...) with bullying (...) or with deals under the table."" Economy Minister Astori believes that Mercosur's priorities are erroneous: ""The regional parliament is a very important objective,"", he says, but it will only be achieved when the commercial and economic problems are resolved."" Meanwhile, a group of factions within the Frente Amplio prepared a draft document to be discussed in the FA's March 25 plenary. According to press reports, the document criticizes the functioning of Mercosur and is sharply critical of GOA/GOB bilateralism. While stating that Mercosur is undergoing a profound crisis, it recommends that Uruguay remain in the bloc but proposes the opening of trade negotiations extra-zone, in particular with the U.S. If approved by the plenary, the document would significantly alter the original FA platform, which rejected bilateral trade negotiations and the FTAA. -------------- -------------- Comment: Uruguay to stay but press for more freedom to act -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) The momentum towards bilateral trade agreements, whether it be with the U.S., with China or with other important trade partners for Uruguay, appears unstoppable --except, of course, if such partners declined the offer. Argentina's Kirchner declared early this year after meeting with Brazil's Lula that Uruguay was ""free to negotiate an FTA with the U.S. if it wished to"". While Mercosur Decision 32 of 2000 prohibits members from negotiating individually without prior consent from the other members, it is unlikely that, if officially asked, Kirchner would deny Vazquez this opportunity, given his previous declaration and the fact that do so would throw oil on the fire of an already extremely tense relationship. Neither would Lula, who by doing so would seriously jeopardize his leadership. Brazil has been willing to give away significant advantages to Argentina in order to preserve Mercosur's cohesion. It would most probably be willing to do the same for Uruguay. ¶16. (C) It is likely, then, that Uruguay will continue as a full member of Mercosur, but will press for special exemptions to negotiate one or two bilateral trade agreement with its major outside trade partners. A status of associate member in the medium-term is not to be excluded, but the likelihood of pulling out from the bloc is probably nil. Mercosur will continue to limp along, with Venezuela with one foot in and Uruguay with one foot out, and may emerge as a weakened trade bloc. Paradoxically, it may become stronger in the foreign policy arena, where members still tend to coordinate their votes on major issues. ¶17. (C) Uruguay's own evaluation of Mercosur has made us ponder whether a USG evaluation of Mercosur's usefulness to our own national security goals may not be warranted. An assessment of our relationship with the organization may be called for in light of Mercosur's decided anti-FTAA stance, its increasing political rather than economic focus, and the emerging bilateral and sometimes tri-lateral axis between Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. End Comment. Nealon