OPPOSITION COALITION SET TO LAUNCH THREE-STEP

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000795 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO SUBJECT: OPPOSITION COALITION SET TO LAUNCH THREE-STEP DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN REF: A. MINSK 692 ¶B. MINSK 629 ¶C. MINSK 707 ¶D. MINSK 764 ¶E. MINSK 442 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CONSTANCE PHLIPOT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D ) ¶1. (C) Summary: Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met with United Democratic Forces (UDF) Political Council member Viktor Ivashkevich to discuss the UDF's preparations for the tentatively scheduled 2007 municipal elections and the new executive body that was formed to implement the coalition's plan of action (Ref A). Despite the concern of some UDF leaders, former opposition presidential candidate and overall leader of the UDF Aleksandr Milinkevich selected Ivashkevich to serve as the head of the executive arm, or Secretariat. Ivashkevich outlined the UDF's three-step strategy for promoting democratic change, which emphasizes intense regional travel for Milinkevich and voter mobilization for the upcoming municipal elections. The creation of the Secretariat may be an indication that the opposition is SIPDIS trying to focus more on voter outreach than on internal disputes. End Summary. Ivashkevich Leads Secretariat -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 25, deputy leader of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) and former mass activities planner for Milinkevich's campaign team Viktor Ivashkevich explained to Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff the UDF's plans for the local and district council elections that are to be held in January. The Political Council (PC) agreed to form an executive body, a Secretariat, in charge of implementing the campaign strategy and one-year plan. Milinkevich wanted leader of the Belarusian Communist Party (BCP) Sergey Kalyakin to chair the Secretariat, but the latter refused, allowing Milinkevich's SIPDIS second choice, Ivashkevich, to assume the position. ¶3. (C) Pol/Econ Chief noted that some UDF members have expressed concern that a staunch BPF activist like Ivashkevich would only exacerbate party tensions in the coalition, but Ivashkevich replied that he has yet to hear any complaints. Ivashkevich is working with the UDF PC, the supreme organ of the coalition, to select the coalition members who will staff the departments within the Secretariat. Currently, Ivashkevich envisions the creation SIPDIS of at least seven departments: preparation of democracy and election related material, distribution of material, legal affairs, volunteer recruitment, volunteer training, mass demonstrations, and international affairs. The Three-Step Plan -------------- ¶4. (C) The plan of action approved by the PC consists of three parts. The first stage calls for mobilizing and recruiting volunteers to support the campaigns of the UDF local election candidates. In September and October, UDF leader and former opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich will visit 28 regional cities that make up approximately 50 percent of Belarus' voters to strengthen support for the UDF and its candidates. ¶5. (C) The second stage is to coordinate and support campaigns for the selected candidates during the months of November and December. The UDF plans to coordinate the selection process for at least 150 candidates in the 28 regional cities on Milinkevich's tour. UDF's individual parties and member organizations have yet to submit to the Secretariat lists of candidates, but Ivashkevich suspects the SIPDIS UDF will require aspiring candidates to collect at least 200 signatures of voter support. Ivashkevich knows that it may be difficult to find 150 willing candidates (ref B),but signature collection will help to avoid or minimize inter-party struggles. The final stage is to wait for the election results, assess the immediate political impact of possibly higher gas prices (ref C),and determine whether an active push for new presidential and parliamentary elections would be prudent. Secretariat Aware Of Early Election Threat SIPDIS -------------- ¶6. (C) Ivashkevich stressed that the UDF campaign strategy was created on the assumption that municipal elections will be held in January 2007. When Pol/Econ Chief asked about rumors the elections could be moved to Fall 2006, Ivashkevich said if that were the case, the announcement would come sometime in August. (Note: According to Belarusian law, the GOB is to announce the date of elections no later than 90 days before Election Day.) However, Ivashkevich reassured Pol/Econ Chief that should this happen, the UDF would quickly make the necessary adjustments to its campaign strategy. Where Support Lies -------------- ¶7. (C) According to Ivashkevich, the UDF is receiving increasing help from three sources. Trade unions, although small and occupied with their own activities, are helping the UDF distribute information in work places. Another group, which Ivashkevich dubbed the "Freedom Volunteers," consists of 100 independent, unaffiliated youths who agree to support the UDF, though not be under its control. Although Ivashkevich called the Freedom Volunteers an uncontrollable group, he claimed they were a source of "new blood" for the opposition. Entrepreneurs under the business interest NGO Perspektiva, traditionally a non-political group, are involving themselves as well in the UDF movement. (Note: In a separate meeting with Perspektiva leader Anatoly Shumshchenko on July 28, Shumshchenko denied Perspektiva was involved in the UDF movement or that the UDF approached them for assistance. However, he said that Perspektiva would not refuse help to the UDF if asked.) Internal UDF Problems More or Less Resolved -------------- ¶8. (C) Ivashkevich assured Pol/Econ Chief that this summer's power struggle between Lebedko and Milinkevich (Ref D) had been more or less resolved and Milinkevich's position as UDF leader was no longer questioned. (Note: Recent press reports on the state of play in the coalition indicate otherwise.) According to Ivashkevich, the UCP and BCP backed down because they did not have much support within the UDF and realized that if they seceded, they would receive as much material and financial support as they would as part of the UDF. ¶9. (C) When Pol/Econ Chief raised the concern of several leading organizations that felt they were being excluded from the decision-making process in the UDF's presidential campaign, Ivashkevich agreed that their concern was understandable. However, he pointed out that the umbrella organization Belarusian Assembly of NGOs has observer status on the PC and, in theory, represents most NGOs. Ivashkevich stressed there must be structure in the UDF and that NGOs should funnel their proposals through the Assembly. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Milinkevich originally wanted Kalyakin to chair the Secretariat and asked him four times to fill the position. SIPDIS Based on the complaints Emboffs heard about Ivashkevich's lackluster performance during the presidential election campaign and his poor planning of the April 26 Chernobyl March (Ref E),Kalyakin probably would have been a better choice. Regardless, credit should be given to the UDF for finally turning their words into actions by forming a campaign strategy and an implementing body well in advance of the local elections. Phlipot