Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK764
2006-07-21 14:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:
Pro-Lukashenko Communists Hijack Opposition Party
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHSK #0764/01 2021436 ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY DECL DATE ADF945E8 WSC5348) R 211436Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY MINSK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4750 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3389 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3749 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 3373 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3523 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1737 RUEHBS/USMISSION USEU 0117 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1230 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 00764
SIPDIS
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL DATE ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: Pro-Lukashenko Communists Hijack Opposition Party
Ref: Minsk 737
Classified by DCM Constance A. Phlipot for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 00764
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL DATE ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: Pro-Lukashenko Communists Hijack Opposition Party
Ref: Minsk 737
Classified by DCM Constance A. Phlipot for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 15, the pro-government Communist Party of
Belarus (CPB) and the opposition Belarusian Party of Communists
(BPC) held rival conferences regarding the CPB-proposed merger of
Belarus' two communist parties. According to CPB Central Committee
Secretary Georgy Atamanov, CPB's efforts at merger were the results
SIPDIS
of widespread discontent among grassroots Belarusian communists
with respect to BPC's anti-government platform and participation in
the United Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition campaign last year.
However, according to BPC Chairman Sergey Kalyakin, the merger
represents a clear and creative effort by the regime to eliminate
BPC as a viable opposition party. Both parties claim they are
ready for the tentatively scheduled January 2007 municipal
elections, and Kalyakin added that the opposition coalition is
working together relatively well on this initiative. END SUMMARY.
Dueling Conventions
--------------
2. (C) On July 15, the pro-government Communist Party of Belarus
(CPB) held a conference reportedly with the participation of
delegates from the opposition Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC)
to merge the two communist parties. Organizers of the merger
conference claimed 231 delegates participated, including 74 from
BPC, and issued a statement that described the merger as the "will
of most Communists in the country." [Note: Media sources sometimes
refer to the BPC the Party of Communists Belorusskaya, or PCB.]
3. (C) On July 15, the BPC held an extraordinary congress and
adopted a resolution condemning the CPB merger conference as a
"smokescreen" for the "stage-managed" creation of a new pro-
government political party. The resolution denied the BPC had any
connection with the CPB-initiated merger conference and declared
the merger invalid on the grounds that only the BPC was competent
on questions of party organization. Moreover, the resolution
asserted that the merger violated Belarus' political parties law
since neither the CPB nor the BPC had officially re-organized prior
to the merger conference.
CPB Claims to Be True Communists, "Kalyakin Is Off the Reservation"
-------------- --------------
4. (C) On July 19, CPB Central Committee Secretary Georgy Atamanov
explained to Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff that under Kalyakin's
leadership, the BPC had become an anti-government, anti-communist,
and rightist party (as opposed to the CPB which Atamanov described
as a genuine party of the left). Atamanov asserted that a split
between Kalyakin and his BPC base became inevitable when Kalyakin
joined the United Democratic Forces (UDF) coalition.
5. (C) According to Atamanov, the majority of BPC members were
"true communists" and had become disillusioned with direction of
their party. He attributed the participation and the support of 74
BPC members in the July 15 merger conference to this
disillusionment. Atamanov repeatedly stressed that the merger was
the consequence of the will of grassroots party members and not of
the parties' leadership or the Belarusian government. He ridiculed
any suggestion that the merger was an effort by the government to
eliminate an opposition party or to create its own party. When
asked, Atamanov expressed doubts that Kalyakin's party could last
much longer but said there would be a place for Kalyakin in CPB,
should Kalyakin accept CPB ideology.
Kalyakin: "The Regime Found a Creative Way to Get Rid of Me"
-------------- --------------
6. (C) On July 20, Pol/Econ Chief met with BPC Chairman Sergey
Kalyakin who insisted that only five BPC members participated in
the merger conference and had been expelled from the BPC.
Moreover, he predicted that CPB would not be able to produce a
single document that formally states BPC agrees to participate in
the merger conference and concluded that there never was a legal
merger of the two parties.
7. (C) Kalyakin asserted that the idea of the merger originated
not from the CPB but the GOB's Presidential Administration (PA),
specifically Deputy PA Head Anatoly Rubinov. According to
Kalyakin's PA sources, Rubinov held a meeting with other senior GOB
officials, including Minister of Justice Viktor Golovanov, shortly
before the merger conference to seek the legal liquidation of the
BPC and the political liquidation of Kalyakin himself. However,
Kalyakin said his party has a membership of approximately 5,000 and
would not likely lose the legal case. Note: according to
Belarusian law, parties can be liquidated only through the Supreme
Court or the party itself decides to disband. Thus, the Justice
Ministry would have to prove to the Supreme Court that as a result
of the alleged merger, the BPC has less than the 1000 members
necessary to maintain its legal status.
Preparations for Local Elections
--------------
8. (C) Kalyakin noted the UDF is working together relatively well
to prepare for the January 2007 local elections. He stated that
the UDF together would try to field approximately 400 candidates in
Minsk and the regional capital cities of the approximately 24,000
seats available. However, he predicted difficulties in recruiting
activists to assume the personal risks associated with contesting
elections that will surely be rigged.
9. (C) Atamanov did not know for how many seats his party would
field candidates, but estimated that CPB would win 40 percent of
the total number of available seats. Atamanov said that the local
elections had contributed to the effort to merge the BPC and CPB
since, according to Atamanov, BPC members in the regions outside
Minsk heavily supported the CPB platform. He claimed that whereas
Kalyakin would have few, if any, candidates in the regions beyond
Minsk, CPB would field at least 220 candidates for local councils
in the regions. Note: on July 19, the CPB formally requested the
Justice Ministry to verify the exact numbers of BPC and CPB
membership so that local BPC chapters could be re-registered under
the new communist party.
Party Leaders' Thoughts on Role of Parties in Lukashenko's Belarus
-------------- --------------
10. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked for Atamanov's thoughts about the low
popularity of political parties in Belarus compared to that of
other institutions of Belarusian society such as the presidency and
the Orthodox Church. Atamanov characterized Lukashenko's
government as strong and effective, stressing that "his government
works." By contrast, Atamanov said that political parties,
including to some extent his own CPB, lack the people's trust
because "they do not work." However, the CPB leader expressed
confidence that as Belarus matures into a full democracy, "as in
the case of the United States," political parties including the CPB
will play a dominant role in Belarusian politics.
11. (C) Kalyakin expressed some concern about rumors that
Lukashenko seeks to transform the Belarusian political system into
a parliamentary system, install his son as head of the new
parliament, and make the "expanded" pro-GOB CPB the "party of
power" (reftel). Kalyakin noted that to realize this plan, the GOB
would need to eliminate (at least legally) all genuine opposition
parties, including BPC. However, Kalyakin stressed he does not
know why the regime would choose such a complicated method of de-
registering his party. He pointed out that the Ministry of Justice
could have simply stripped away BPC's legal address and proceeded
with immediate deregistration. Regardless, Kalyakin doubted
Lukashenko is seriously thinking about his successor, unless the
president is facing serious health problems. As far as Kalyakin
is concerned, Lukashenko will tightly hold onto power as long as he
is alive.
Comment
--------------
12. (C) Kalkayin's observation that Lukashenko could find easier
ways to eliminate the BPC as a viable opposition party, such as
merely de-registering the party, is probably correct. However, the
merger tactic is much more subtle than the regime's recent
imprisonment of former opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr
Kozulin and is thus less likely to draw fire from Western
governments and human rights organizations. Moreover, we should
not dismiss out of hand the possibility that Lukashenko seeks to
hijack the BPC local chapters for GOB gain during the upcoming
local elections and for the eventual creation of a seemingly
legitimate avenue for his successor.
KROL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL DATE ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: Pro-Lukashenko Communists Hijack Opposition Party
Ref: Minsk 737
Classified by DCM Constance A. Phlipot for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 15, the pro-government Communist Party of
Belarus (CPB) and the opposition Belarusian Party of Communists
(BPC) held rival conferences regarding the CPB-proposed merger of
Belarus' two communist parties. According to CPB Central Committee
Secretary Georgy Atamanov, CPB's efforts at merger were the results
SIPDIS
of widespread discontent among grassroots Belarusian communists
with respect to BPC's anti-government platform and participation in
the United Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition campaign last year.
However, according to BPC Chairman Sergey Kalyakin, the merger
represents a clear and creative effort by the regime to eliminate
BPC as a viable opposition party. Both parties claim they are
ready for the tentatively scheduled January 2007 municipal
elections, and Kalyakin added that the opposition coalition is
working together relatively well on this initiative. END SUMMARY.
Dueling Conventions
--------------
2. (C) On July 15, the pro-government Communist Party of Belarus
(CPB) held a conference reportedly with the participation of
delegates from the opposition Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC)
to merge the two communist parties. Organizers of the merger
conference claimed 231 delegates participated, including 74 from
BPC, and issued a statement that described the merger as the "will
of most Communists in the country." [Note: Media sources sometimes
refer to the BPC the Party of Communists Belorusskaya, or PCB.]
3. (C) On July 15, the BPC held an extraordinary congress and
adopted a resolution condemning the CPB merger conference as a
"smokescreen" for the "stage-managed" creation of a new pro-
government political party. The resolution denied the BPC had any
connection with the CPB-initiated merger conference and declared
the merger invalid on the grounds that only the BPC was competent
on questions of party organization. Moreover, the resolution
asserted that the merger violated Belarus' political parties law
since neither the CPB nor the BPC had officially re-organized prior
to the merger conference.
CPB Claims to Be True Communists, "Kalyakin Is Off the Reservation"
-------------- --------------
4. (C) On July 19, CPB Central Committee Secretary Georgy Atamanov
explained to Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff that under Kalyakin's
leadership, the BPC had become an anti-government, anti-communist,
and rightist party (as opposed to the CPB which Atamanov described
as a genuine party of the left). Atamanov asserted that a split
between Kalyakin and his BPC base became inevitable when Kalyakin
joined the United Democratic Forces (UDF) coalition.
5. (C) According to Atamanov, the majority of BPC members were
"true communists" and had become disillusioned with direction of
their party. He attributed the participation and the support of 74
BPC members in the July 15 merger conference to this
disillusionment. Atamanov repeatedly stressed that the merger was
the consequence of the will of grassroots party members and not of
the parties' leadership or the Belarusian government. He ridiculed
any suggestion that the merger was an effort by the government to
eliminate an opposition party or to create its own party. When
asked, Atamanov expressed doubts that Kalyakin's party could last
much longer but said there would be a place for Kalyakin in CPB,
should Kalyakin accept CPB ideology.
Kalyakin: "The Regime Found a Creative Way to Get Rid of Me"
-------------- --------------
6. (C) On July 20, Pol/Econ Chief met with BPC Chairman Sergey
Kalyakin who insisted that only five BPC members participated in
the merger conference and had been expelled from the BPC.
Moreover, he predicted that CPB would not be able to produce a
single document that formally states BPC agrees to participate in
the merger conference and concluded that there never was a legal
merger of the two parties.
7. (C) Kalyakin asserted that the idea of the merger originated
not from the CPB but the GOB's Presidential Administration (PA),
specifically Deputy PA Head Anatoly Rubinov. According to
Kalyakin's PA sources, Rubinov held a meeting with other senior GOB
officials, including Minister of Justice Viktor Golovanov, shortly
before the merger conference to seek the legal liquidation of the
BPC and the political liquidation of Kalyakin himself. However,
Kalyakin said his party has a membership of approximately 5,000 and
would not likely lose the legal case. Note: according to
Belarusian law, parties can be liquidated only through the Supreme
Court or the party itself decides to disband. Thus, the Justice
Ministry would have to prove to the Supreme Court that as a result
of the alleged merger, the BPC has less than the 1000 members
necessary to maintain its legal status.
Preparations for Local Elections
--------------
8. (C) Kalyakin noted the UDF is working together relatively well
to prepare for the January 2007 local elections. He stated that
the UDF together would try to field approximately 400 candidates in
Minsk and the regional capital cities of the approximately 24,000
seats available. However, he predicted difficulties in recruiting
activists to assume the personal risks associated with contesting
elections that will surely be rigged.
9. (C) Atamanov did not know for how many seats his party would
field candidates, but estimated that CPB would win 40 percent of
the total number of available seats. Atamanov said that the local
elections had contributed to the effort to merge the BPC and CPB
since, according to Atamanov, BPC members in the regions outside
Minsk heavily supported the CPB platform. He claimed that whereas
Kalyakin would have few, if any, candidates in the regions beyond
Minsk, CPB would field at least 220 candidates for local councils
in the regions. Note: on July 19, the CPB formally requested the
Justice Ministry to verify the exact numbers of BPC and CPB
membership so that local BPC chapters could be re-registered under
the new communist party.
Party Leaders' Thoughts on Role of Parties in Lukashenko's Belarus
-------------- --------------
10. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked for Atamanov's thoughts about the low
popularity of political parties in Belarus compared to that of
other institutions of Belarusian society such as the presidency and
the Orthodox Church. Atamanov characterized Lukashenko's
government as strong and effective, stressing that "his government
works." By contrast, Atamanov said that political parties,
including to some extent his own CPB, lack the people's trust
because "they do not work." However, the CPB leader expressed
confidence that as Belarus matures into a full democracy, "as in
the case of the United States," political parties including the CPB
will play a dominant role in Belarusian politics.
11. (C) Kalyakin expressed some concern about rumors that
Lukashenko seeks to transform the Belarusian political system into
a parliamentary system, install his son as head of the new
parliament, and make the "expanded" pro-GOB CPB the "party of
power" (reftel). Kalyakin noted that to realize this plan, the GOB
would need to eliminate (at least legally) all genuine opposition
parties, including BPC. However, Kalyakin stressed he does not
know why the regime would choose such a complicated method of de-
registering his party. He pointed out that the Ministry of Justice
could have simply stripped away BPC's legal address and proceeded
with immediate deregistration. Regardless, Kalyakin doubted
Lukashenko is seriously thinking about his successor, unless the
president is facing serious health problems. As far as Kalyakin
is concerned, Lukashenko will tightly hold onto power as long as he
is alive.
Comment
--------------
12. (C) Kalkayin's observation that Lukashenko could find easier
ways to eliminate the BPC as a viable opposition party, such as
merely de-registering the party, is probably correct. However, the
merger tactic is much more subtle than the regime's recent
imprisonment of former opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr
Kozulin and is thus less likely to draw fire from Western
governments and human rights organizations. Moreover, we should
not dismiss out of hand the possibility that Lukashenko seeks to
hijack the BPC local chapters for GOB gain during the upcoming
local elections and for the eventual creation of a seemingly
legitimate avenue for his successor.
KROL