Opposition Leader Assures Ambassador He's A Man of

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 000737

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/16
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: Opposition Leader Assures Ambassador He's A Man of
Action

Ref: Minsk 731

Classified by DCM Constance Phlipot for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: United Democratic Forces leader Aleksandr
Milinkevich and his wife Inna Kulei provided a frank, yet
optimistic assessment of the opposition coalition during
the Ambassador's July 14 farewell meeting with them.
Ambassador stressed that many in the opposition, especially
the youth who participated in the election protests, have
grown impatient with the opposition leaders' focus on
foreign travel and internal leadership disputes.
Milinkevich acknowledged these concerns and explained that
following the elections it was necessary for him to focus
on keeping the coalition together. Milinkevich claimed to
have made some progress on this front, and with the recent
creation of an executive arm of the UDF, he is committed to
implementing "very concrete" initiatives to re-energize the
democratic movement. Milinkevich and Kulei also raised a
host of other issues, including Kulei's work on providing
assistance to victims of political repression, the current
assistance needs of the opposition, and Lukashenko's
possible plans to name his son Viktor as his successor.
End Summary.


2. (C) On July 14, Ambassador met with United Democratic
Forces leader and former opposition candidate Aleksandr
Milinkevich and his wife Inna Kulei. A visiting official
from USAID Kiev and Pol/Econ Chief also attended the
meeting. After presenting Kulei with a photo of her and VP
Cheney during the latter's May trip to Vilnius, Ambassador
engaged the couple on a wide range of issues.

Milinkevich Acknowledges Problems, Intent To Overcome Them
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Milinkevich said he does not plan to embark on any
more foreign trips in the near future, but will focus his
energy on building up the coalition and attracting more
democratic-minded Belarusians to the movement. Ambassador
noted that many of the students and youth who participated
in the demonstrations surrounding the March 19 presidential
elections are deeply disappointed with the UDF for losing
so much momentum amidst internal squabbles and leadership
disputes. Milinkevich acknowledged these concerns, but
explained that he has been consumed with the equally
difficult tasks of keeping the fragile coalition together
and attracting the unorganized but active youth.
Milinkevich conceded that up until NOW he has focused most
of his attention on the former task, but stressed that he
has achieved some success in keeping the UDF together and
is NOW encouraging all UDF members to start working. He
hopes that the democratic youth will see the UDF as an
organization of action and will renew their interests in
the democratic movement.


4. (C) Kulei, in defense of her husband's work, noted that
Milinkevich has not completely neglected the task of
attracting new members at the expense of keeping the
coalition together. She explained that Milinkevich works
closely with the Belarusian Assembly of Democratic
Organizations, an umbrella organization of some 230 NGOs,
and the Assembly has developed close relations with many
new informal youth networks.

Milinkevich Pushes Ahead In Spite Of Leadership Problems
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Milinkevich noted that the Political Council of the
UDF met on July 13 and agreed on a "very concrete" six-
month action plan that includes preparing for the January
2007 municipal elections. The Political Council also
established a Secretariat, which would serve as the
executive arm of the Political Council. After repeated
refusals by Kalyakin to accept the position, Milinkevich
asked BNF Deputy Viktor Ivashkevich to serve as temporary
head of the Secretariat. Milinkevich acknowledged that
Kalyakin, Lebedko, and UDF leader Bukhvostov were absent
from the meeting for various reasons, but the UDF leader
stressed "the UDF must stop planning and start doing."
Milinkevich noted he had recently completed a series of
trips in the regions and found that UDF headquarters in
several oblasts remained intact from the presidential
elections, including UCP regional chapters, and would
continue to support Milinkevich.


6. (C) Milinkevich hesitated to call the leadership
disputes in the coalition "tragic." He did not believe

MINSK 00000737 002 OF 003


Lebedko would split from the UDF, but would likely carry
out separate initiatives. On Kalyakin, Milinkevich
repeated his earlier assessment that since Kalyakin
returned from Moscow in June, he is keen on developing a
leftist wing of the UDF. Milinkevich asserted that the
vast majority of parties and organizations in the UDF
refused to back Kalyakin's initiative, but speculated that
Kalyakin would remain in the coalition. Milinkevich added
that Kalyakin is increasingly concerned that the GOB will
force strip Kalyakin's Communist party of its registration
and force it into a union with the pro-government Communist
party. (Note: On July 15, the pro-government Communists
held a unification conference with "disappointed members"
of Kalyakin's party and declared the latter's party will
lose its registration. Details reported in septel.)

UDF Efforts to Help Politically Repressed
--------------


7. (C) Kulei noted the UDF's Committee for Defense (CDR)
of the Repressed continued to make remarkable progress in
encouraging foreign governments and local religious
organizations to provide various types of assistance to the
politically repressed. She noted her organization cuts
across partisan and ideological lines and involves
activists from all opposition groups and parties. Kulei
explained CDR focuses on marshaling assistance for four
particularly repressed groups: 1) expelled or harassed
students; 2) workers who have been fired; 3) activists
beaten by GOB security forces; and 4) families of the
repressed. Kulei added that CDR recently launched a media
campaign involving letter exchanges between families of
repressed activists and families in Western countries.
Kulei stressed such a committee was instrumental in
bringing down the dictatorial regime in Poland.

Donor Assistance Must Reflect Present Realities
-------------- --


8. (C) Milinkevich encouraged all foreign donors to take
note of two critical developments in Belarus. First,
unlike several years ago, the GOB has ensured that the
overwhelming majority of opposition activists is unemployed
and is often unable to provide for their families. As a
result, the established opposition has found it extremely
difficult to attract new members. Second, the donor
community is allocating a disproportionate amount of
resources to holding conferences and seminars for the
opposition outside of Belarus than on the realization of
pro-democratic activities within Belarus. While expressing
appreciation for Western support of the Belarusian
democratic forces, Milinkevich said the international
community should consider providing opposition leaders more
resources to put into practice the knowledge gained at the
conferences.


9. (C) Milinkevich also informed Ambassador of his recent
conversation with two European Parliament MPs about the
possible creation of an information center for the UDF
under the auspices of the European Parliament. The MPs
informed him the European Parliament could make a decision
on the project in September. Ambassador added that the
U.S. was interested in supporting opposition activist Olga
Stuzhenskaya's information center in Brussels. Milinkevich
was familiar with these plans and agreed that that
Stuzhenskaya's center should represent all of Belarus'
democratic forces.

Lukashenko's Possible Plans on Choosing A Successor
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Milinkevich speculated that the possible GOB-
imposed unification of Kalyakin's Communist party and the
pro-Lukashenko Communist party could serve as a vehicle for
Lukashenko's successor. Milinkevich has heard that the
Belarusian president eventually plans to install his son
Viktor as his successor. The UDF leader provided a (very)
rough outline of the possible succession of events: the
expanded pro-GOB Communist party picks Viktor as leader of
the organization; Lukashenko directs National Assembly
deputies to organize themselves into several (subservient)
parties and makes the pro-GOB Communist Party the "ruling
party;" Viktor runs for Congress in the 2008 Parliamentary
elections and his pro-GOB Communist Party wins the most
seats; Viktor is elected Speaker of Parliament; and
Lukashenko formally transfers most of his governing power
to the Parliament Speaker.


MINSK 00000737 003 OF 003


Implications of Kozulin Trial For G8 Summit
--------------


11. (C) Given that Belarus would likely be raised during
G8 discussions, Milinkevich was surprised the regime gave
former opposition candidate Aleksandr Kozulin a harsh
sentence of five and one-half years in imprisonment.
(Note: Kozulin was convicted of "hooliganism" and
disturbing the peace. See reftel for details.)
Milinkevich noted that his contacts in the Belarusian
security forces assured him Kozulin would not be sentenced
to more than two years in prison. The UDF leader commented
that the stiff sentence sends a clear message to the G8
leaders and the international community that Lukashenko
will not buckle to Western pressures for political reform.


12. (C) When asked, Milinkevich told Ambassador the United
Democratic Forces (UDF) did not plan to be in St.
Petersburg during the upcoming G8 Summit to seek ad hoc
meetings with G8 leaders. Milinkevich noted that Russian
democratic parties and NGOs intended to convene a
conference in St. Petersburg during the G8 Summit and
members of the UDF were invited to participate, but for
reasons unknown to Milinkevich the conference was called
off.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) While admitting that serious problems continue to
confront the United Democratic Forces, Milinkevich and
Kulei went to great lengths to accentuate the positive.
Milinkevich wanted to leave with Ambassador the clear
impression that the UDF is forging ahead, with or without
opposition leaders Lebedko and Kalyakin. While we have not
yet seen the UDF's latest six-month plan of action,
Milinkevich claims it achieves what the coalition's earlier
two-year and one-year plans have not been able to do thus
far Q assign areas of responsibility to particular
individuals and organizations. Milinkevich will likely
find it difficult to implement his action plan at the
national and local level without the strong backing of
Lebedko and Kalyakin, but he appears to understand that as
long as he preoccupies himself with coalition
organizational issues, the prospects for widening the
campaign for democratic change remain extremely low.

Krol