OPPOSITION LEADER OUTLINES MULTIPLE PROBLEMS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000692 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREF BO SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER OUTLINES MULTIPLE PROBLEMS IN COALITION, BUT IS STILL HOPEFUL REF: MINSK 588 Classified By: Ambassador Krol for Reasons 1.4 B and D ¶1. (C) Summary: During a June 26 meeting with Ambassador, pro-democracy Belarusian Party of Communist (BPC) head Aleksandr Kalyakin described the United Democratic Forces (UDF) plan of action outlining "concrete" measures to coordinate the activities of the UDF leaders and to mobilize activists. Kalyakin expressed frustration with UDF presidential nominee Aleksandr Milinkevich's tendency to act as the representative of the UDF without consulting with other UDF leaders. Kalyakin commented that if Milinkevich wants to lead the UDF, he must demonstrate leadership and cooperate with other UDF leaders. Kalyakin denied rumors that the coalition is disbanding and dismissed the GOB proposal to unite BPC with the pro-government communist party. Kalyakin claimed Lukashenko is losing some of the personal control he had over all aspects of the government and that other members of his regime are making decisions for him. He encouraged more U.S. engagement of Belarusian officials despite GOB roadblocks. Kalyakin pra ised U.S. financial sanctions on members of the Lukashenko regime as a strong symbolic gesture but cautioned against expanding the list for fear of losing the support of people within the regime who want change. End Summary. New UDF Year Long Strategy Plan Effective July 2006 -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Belarusian Party of Communist (BPC) head Aleksandr Kalyakin told Ambassador that he and the other United Democratic Forces' (UDF) leaders, Aleksandr Milinkevich, Anatoly Lebedko, and Vintsuk Vyachorka, met in Vilnius during the week of June 19 to flesh out the coalition's strategy that was adopted by the UDF Political Council at the end of May (reftel). They created a two-page 12-step plan of action for July 2006-July 2007 that attempts to provide more concrete measures on how leaders can better coordinate the actions of the respective parties can mobilize people who want change (see paragraph 20 for an unofficial translation of the action plan). ¶3. (C) According to Kalyakin, Milinkevich offered Kalyakin the position of coordinator of this action plan, but Kalyakin stated that he was reluctant to take on such a project without knowing what actions are being contemplated. ¶4. (C) Kalyakin acknowledged that people are looking for direction and instruction. He admitted "the UDF has been on hiatus" since the April 26 Chernobyl opposition march. Kalyakin recognized that the UDF needs to engage people now; otherwise, they will consider the UDF defunct. Redefining Milinkevich's Role in the UDF -------------- ¶5. (C) Kalyakin told Ambassador that he had a frank conversation with Milinkevich about Milinkevich's role in the UDF. Kalyakin reminded Milinkevich that he was selected to be the UDF's presidential candidate, but the presidential campaign is over and he must work with others as an equal. Kalyakin stressed if Milinkevich aspires to lead the UDF, he must demonstrate leadership. Milinkevich's actions and remarks must reflect the agreed views of the UDF, not only his personal positions. ¶6. (C) The BPC leader is also frustrated with Milinkevich repeatedly accepting invitations to travel abroad to meet with foreign leaders as the representative of the UDF without consulting other UDF leaders. (Note: He noted that Milinkevich provides read-outs of the trips for the UDF leaders after he returns but does not consult with them before he goes to develop an agreed message.) Kalyakin admitted that this problem might work itself out because the leaders have agreed to meet more regularly to coordinate actions and plans and share information. ¶7. (C) Kalyakin intimated to Ambassador that with the conclusion of the elections, there is no need for Milinkevich to remain the de facto UDF representative. Although he did not articulate a clear position on the need for holding another democratic congress, Kalyakin did suggest to Ambassador that maybe someone besides Milinkevich could be selected to represent the UDF when the next presidential election comes along. In the meantime, Kalyakin told Ambassador that the Communist party will promote its own candidates for the January 2007 municipal elections, "as political parties do", but that it will continue to work within the framework of the UDF. Milinkevich Continues to Agitate Russia -------------- ¶8. (C) Kalyakin downplayed any threat from Russia to Belarusian independence and said Milinkevich's practice of raising Russia as a threat to Belarus' independence only served to drive away Russian support for the democratic opposition. He claimed Milinkevich's public statements on this issue do not reflect the view of all the democratic leaders. ¶9. (C) Kalyakin claimed from his Moscow contacts that Russia is actively looking for Lukashenko's successor. Kalyakin claimed that Russian President Putin does not want Lukashenko in power on the eve of the 2008 Russian presidential elections. According to Kalyakin, Putin wants to squelch once and for all Lukashenko's longstanding ambition to become a leader of Russia. Kalyakin added that Russia finds Milinkevich unacceptable as a leader and is looking for a successor within the regime. ¶10. (C) Ambassador asked Kalyakin how Russia perceives him. Kalyakin responded that generally the Russians accept him and treat him well, but he claimed the Communist Party in Russia has a poor reputation and thus the title of his party, Belarusian Party of Communists, also draws a negative reaction in many Russian circles. When Ambassador inquired whether Kalyakin had ever considered changing the party from Communist to Social Democrat, Kalyakin responded that he is open to it, but does not expect his party activists to approve such a proposal. Kalyakin referred to the further splintering of the Social Democratic party when it had attempted to unite with the Communist party in the past. UDF Looking to Expand, Not Disband -------------- ¶11. (C) Kalyakin told Ambassador that rumors about a crisis within the UDF Coalition are exaggerated. Kalyakin admitted that the leaders have different opinions on important issues but that no ONE wants to leave the coalition. ¶12. (C) When Ambassador inquired about expanding the UDF to include Aleksandr Kozulin's party Belarusian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) - Gramada, Kalyakin responded the UDF would like to explore ways to bring BSDP into the coalition. With Kozulin still in prison, the UDF leaders are trying to discuss options with BSDP deputies including Anatoliy Levkovich. While UDF would like to fold the BSDP party into the UDF, Kalyakin admitted that personal issues between Milinkevich and Kozulin and internal BSDP factions could make the union difficult, if not impossible. The UDF would like to pursue parallel actions if union is not possible. Kalyakin Recognizes the Importance of Domestic Travel -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Kalyakin told Ambassador that the UDF plans to focus more on travel within Belarus. Kalyakin did not see the usefulness of a lot of travel by the opposition leaders outside of Belarus; coalition efforts need to work to engage Belarusians, not foreign peoples. ¶14. (C) According to Kalyakin, U.S. NGO IRI's local representative in Vilnius Trygve Olsen has planned a trip for Kalyakin, Milinkevich, Lebedko and Vyachorka to the U.S. from July 22-27. Kalyakin told Ambassador that he is not keen about the trip; he believes that the UDF needs to focus on Belarus and that a trip to the U.S. would not be the best use of this time. Kalyakin's Party Will Not Unite with GOB Counterpart -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) Kalyakin dismissed the regime's proposal to hold a conference on July 15 to combine the pro-government Communist Party of Belarus and Kalyakin's Belarusian Party of Communists as a project of the Presidential Administration. Kalyakin believes that this conference is a construct of Presidential Administration first deputy head Anatoly Rubinov. He pondered whether Lukashenko even supported the idea. U.S. Travel and Financial Sanctions Have Symbolic Value -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) Kalyakin praised the U.S. financial sanctions on members of the Belarusian regime as a symbolic gesture, but predicted that they will not have much practical impact since GOB authorities do not have U.S. bank accounts or travel often to the U.S. Kalyakin cautioned against widening the sanctions too broadly for fear they would turn supporters of change within the regime into hardcore regime supporters. ¶17. (C) Kalyakin encouraged the USG and EU to continue to invite local GOB officials and Parliament members to meet their western counterparts. Kalyakin described the exchanges as invaluable exposure and learning experiences. Continuing to engage officials shows these Belarusians that there are alternatives to what the regime preaches. Lukashenko Losing Control? -------------- ¶18. (C) According to Kalyakin, since the elections Lukashenko has "lost his edge." He claimed that Lukashenko no longer has so much personal control over all aspects of the government as before and that officials now receive their instructions from people other than Lukashenko. Kalyakin asserted that decisions previously made by Lukashenko himself are now being made by Presidential Administration first deputy head Rubinov or State Secretary of Belarusian Security Council Viktor Sheiman. Comment -------------- ¶19. (C) Kalyakin appeared to be optimistic, despite the obvious problems within the UDF hierarchy. According to Kalyakin, the regime is facing grave internal problems, the countryside is tired of the regime, and Lukashenko's unpredictability weighs heavily on many GOB officials. We have heard from Milinkevich that Kalyakin had come back from several trips to Moscow "a changed man" - more pro-Moscow and less of a personal supporter. This conversation confirms some of Milinkevich's suspicions, but frankly we heard nothing new in the position Kalyakin described. Kalyakin has always been less prone to attack Moscow and as a party leader he too views Milinkevich not as his boss, but as a fellow leader and possible rival. ¶20. Begin Text of Unofficial Translation of UDF Action Plan GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR July 2006-July 2007 ¶I. Increase the effectiveness of the UDF's actions -Form a positive image of the UDF as a unified, strong, patriotic coalition; -Widen the membership of the UDF; -Perfect the structures and competence of the UDF's working departments; -Increase the popularity of the UDF leader among the population; II. Create a positive and attractive image of the future Belarus after change (of government) -Prepare a program of development for Belarus; -Organize a large public discussion on the future Belarus. Collect and analyze citizens' suggestions for the program of development of the country; -Inform society about the program and organizational and personnel alternatives to the current government; -Form a team to run the country and create a positive image of this team; -Write legislative bills; -Analyze the current and possible crises and negative tendencies in Belarus' future. Create an anti-crisis program for the UDF; III. Declare the current power illegitimate -Work on the Belarusian citizens' denouncement and abolition of the March 19 2006 election results; -Inform citizens of the authorities' malicious violations of law and citizens' rights and how they ignore citizens' interests; -Inform the population about the negative tendencies in Belarus' current development and the lack of prospects for the existing political and social-economic course; -Criticize the authorities' actions; IV. Penetrate the information blockade -Support and develop existing information sources and create new ones (i.e., Internet, local computer sites, mobile telephone connections, TV and radio broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, booklets, books, leaflets, audio-video cassettes and discs); -Create public sites of information product distribution; -Specifically inform important population groups (i.e., students, teachers, doctors, pensioners, entrepreneurs, religious groups, women, soldiers, workers of non-government enterprises, large factories, government apparatus, judicial organs, etc.); -Hold meetings between UDF representatives and the population; ¶V. Public mobilization "Volunteers of Freedom" -Prepare and distribute mobilization messages, signs, armbands, t-shirts, flags, stickers, placards, and calendars. Hold local demonstrations (similar to flash-mobs); -Sign up people to the "Volunteers of Freedom" in party offices and NGOs, at mass events, pickets, and at apartment entrances; -Organize the liquidation of illiteracy among the "Volunteers of Freedom" (by educating them) on the history and culture of Belarus, political science, geopolitics, etc.; -Hold training sessions with activists on different courses of action and organization for their practical jobs; -Campaign to gather resources in Belarus; VI. Protect people from repression and provide assistance to overcome the consequences -Formulate instructions and hold training sessions for activists; -Provide legal assistance in the courts and punitive government departments; -Help the families of the oppressed; -Find jobs for those fired; -Ensure the possibility for those expelled from educational institutions to continue their studies; -Organize HEALTH recuperation for victims of oppression; -Create a "black list" of human right violations and bring the charges to the public's attention; -Carry out a campaign to free political prisoners, called "Solidarity in the Name of Freedom"; -Work with international human rights organizations and philanthropy organizations; VII. Organize political campaigns during local council elections -Formulate and implement a strategy for the campaign; VIII. Conduct the campaign by collecting citizens' signatures under political and social-economic demands -Assess the actual problems that would be the reason to collect signatures; -Organize a signature collection campaign; IX. Mass demonstrations of pressure and protest -Develop and realize a prospective plan of general mass actions; -Organize a discussion in the independent press about the possibility of organizing in 2007 a countrywide, peaceful protest and a mass manifest demanding free elections; ¶X. Monitor public-political and social-economic processes and public opinions in Belarus XI. International action -Pass UDF messages to the international community; -Work with other governments, their institutes, parliaments, civil societies, and embassies; XII. Congress of Democratic Forces -The Congress of democratic forces would convene if necessary. End Text. Krol