BELARUS NAMES FOR ASSET FREEZE, TRANCHE 2

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000690 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/UMB AND INR/B DEPT PLEASE PASS TO OFAC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM BO SUBJECT: BELARUS NAMES FOR ASSET FREEZE, TRANCHE 2 REF: MINSK 584 Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Post provides the following information to supplement that gathered by the Department in consideration of freezing the assets of certain Belarusian regime officials. This is the second cable in this series (reftel). Aleksandr Radkov -------------- ¶2. (C) Radkov became Minister of Education in August 2003. He has since used his position for explicitly political purposes to support the dictatorial regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko and limit freedom of expression in Belarus. In July 2004 he signed an order revoking the accreditation of the European Humanities University, Belarus' only western-style university. GOB actions and statements made it clear the regime closed EHU solely for political reasons, because the university presented a threat to the regime by teaching its students to think for themselves. In this vein, Radkov has also instituted the mandatory teaching of a pro-Lukashenko state ideology in all academic institutions, and has introduced the teaching of text books (in history, politics, and even math) whose biased political content blatantly supports the current regime. Such moves are designed to ensure Belarus has no political plurality and that the entire educational system supports the current regime. ¶3. (C) In May 2005, Radkov signed and distributed a directive to all directors of high schools, colleges and universities, ordering them to expel students who participate in opposition or unsanctioned political activities. The document, "Measures to Prevent Students from Being Drawn into Illegal Activities of a Political Nature," also calls on all schools to influence the political and ideological development of Belarusian youth in support of Lukashenko. A large number of students were subsequently expelled for their pro-opposition political activities. Exact numbers are impossible to determine, but Post included information on several in the 2005 Human Rights Report, and knows of at least 14 who have been expelled since the March 2006 presidential elections for peacefully demonstrating or collecting signatures in support of opposition candidates. Others have recently reported having problems registering for summer classes. Under Radkov, the Ministry of Education blocked high school exchanges to the U.S. in 2005 and 2006. Vladimir Rusakevich -------------- ¶4. (C) Rusakevich was appointed Minister of Information in August 2003. Rusakevich greatly accelerated GOB efforts to destroy Belarus' independent press. His ministry closed 25 independent newspapers in 2004 alone, and several others in ¶2005. The Ministry of Information has issued written warnings to dozens of independent newspapers and brought many independent papers and journalists to court for trivial offenses--which often results in massive and disproportionate fines. Rusakevich personally signs all orders to warn or close newspapers. His ministry has also blocked access to printing plants and distribution networks in Belarus, forcing most of the country's most prominent independent papers to greatly curtail their circulation and several have gone out of business. State media face none of these problems. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media announced in 2005 and 2006 that Belarus is not compliant with OSCE standards on media freedom. Rusakevich's ministry also oversees state propaganda efforts, which ODIHR election observers determined played a serious role in making Belarus' recent elections neither free nor fair. Gennady Nevyglas -------------- ¶5. (C) Nevyglas was appointed Head of the Presidential Administration in January 2006. Nevyglas headed the National Security Council from September 2001 to January 2006. According to GOB organizational charts, the BKGB and Ministry of Interior both reported directly to NSC head Nevyglas. Under Nevyglas' supervision, both organizations committed numerous human rights abuses related to the October 2004 parliamentary elections, including the beating of peaceful demonstrators and the arrest of numerous opposition figures. Nevyglas even played a public role in the expulsion of a Russian journalist who reported on a large opposition demonstration in June 2003. ¶6. (C) The NSC is responsible for approving the sale of weapons abroad. During Nevyglas' tenure at the NSC credible evidence indicates Belarus sold weapons to a number of conflict zones and state sponsors of terror, including Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Although Belarus is very secretive about its arms trading, Nevyglas' position made him directly responsible for approving these sales. The proceeds from these sales do not go to the state budget, but to off-budget funds controlled by the Presidential Administration. Post has credibly heard, but cannot prove, that proceeds from illicit arms sales have enriched senior GOB figures. Yury Sivakov -------------- ¶7. (C) Yury Sivakov was Minister of Interior from 1999 to ¶2000. He subsequently became Minister of Sport and Tourism. A 2003 report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe found him to be directly responsible for the disappearance and presumed murder of four opposition figures in 1999 and 2000. The report's investigator found that Sivakov personally signed out the GOB's official execution pistol on two occasions when three of these people disappeared. A police official subsequently told the press this pistol was used to kill these three. The investigator also found a GOB document linking Sivakov to the murder of a former Minister of Interior. In December 2001, two Belarusian police investigators released a report accusing Sivakov of creating a death squad used to eliminate several opposition figures. The two investigators subsequently received political asylum abroad. Mikhail Orda -------------- ¶8. (C) Lukashenko created the Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRYU),headed by Mikhail Orda, after the 2001 presidential elections. Lukashenko saw that most youth voted against him and that many joined pro-democracy youth groups. He therefore created the BRYU, funded by the GOB and by extorting private businesses, to instill a pro-Lukashenko ideology among Belarus' youth. Orda's BRYU attracts members by a combination of threats and incentives. Members receive discounts from a number of businesses and draft deferrals, while non-members have trouble enrolling for popular classes or finding dorm rooms. The BRYU has threatened teachers with being fired if they do not join the organization and do not convince enough of their students to join. The GOB uses Orda and the BRYU to stage pro-government demonstrations and to publicly protest against western embassies. BRYU demonstrators are never arrested, unlike pro-democracy demonstrators who almost always are. In addition to heading the BRYU, Orda was also appointed to the upper chamber of parliament, where he has consistently supported government-backed legislation to restrict free speech and opposition activity. ¶9. (C) Orda and the BRYU have played an explicit role thwarting Belarus' democratic development. During a 2004 national referendum on removing Lukashenko's constitutionally imposed term limits, Orda and the BRYU held a press conference at 11 AM, nine hours before polls closed, announcing their "exit poll" showed Lukashenko's referendum was overwhelmingly approved. During the 2006 presidential elections, Orda and the BRYU held their press conference at 10 AM, ten hours before polls closed, announcing that 83.5% of people voted for Lukashenko. Orda and the BRYU subsequently declared both elections to have been fully democratic, even though OSCE observers found that both were blatantly neither free nor fair. State media heavily broadcast all these announcements, no doubt influencing the on-going voting. Orda's statements were clearly part of an orchestrated government strategy to persuade people that fraudulent official results were accurate. While his numbers tracked closely with the official results in b oth elections, they differed markedly from an independent Gallup Baltic Surveys exit poll that showed less support for the 2004 referendum. (In 2006 the government prevented any independent exit polling.) Pyotr Miklashevich -------------- ¶10. (C) Miklashevich has been Prosecutor General since November 2004. Under his tenure the GOB heavily cracked down on pro-democracy activists, NGOs, political parties, newspapers, and trade unions. Miklashevich played a central role in all these repressive acts. In the immediate aftermath of the March 2006 presidential elections, the GOB arrested at least 1,000 peaceful pro-democracy activists. The highly politicized Belarusian court system, over which Miklashevich has de facto control, found every single one of these people guilty, and nearly all spent 7 to 15 days in jail (a very small minority received fines and some minors were released). During a March 29 press conference, Miklashevich threatened a pro-democracy presidential candidate with jail for leading demonstrations. Pro-democracy activists regularly receive such short jail terms for their activities, not just after elections. Several opposition members are in jail at any given time. ¶11. (C) In addition to the numerous short-term arrests, the GOB under Miklashevich's command has secured the convictions of between 20 and 30 pro-democracy leaders to longer prison terms. The usual sentence for leading illegal demonstrations or representing unregistered groups is between 18 and 36 months of corrective labor. Miklashevich told a press conference on June 16 that his office continues to investigate an alleged terrorist plot against the GOB. Miklashevich accused the leaders of a pro-democracy election observation organization (who have remained in jail since late February),the leaders of a pro-democracy youth group, and the leader of a pro-democracy political party of plotting to plant bombs and of having received hand-to-hand combat training and chemical weapons training from "Arabs, Americans, and Georgians." Post is familiar with these organizations and their work, and views the allegations as unfounded and absurd. ¶12. (C) In close cooperation with the Ministry of Justice, Miklashevich's Procuracy General has prosecuted dozens of pro-democracy NGOs, independent newspapers, and opposition political parties in an effort to destroy independent civil society. Many of these organizations have been closed by the GOB or forced to pay large fines for often ludicrous offenses, such as "misusing quotation marks" on their letterhead. In 2004 alone, working through the Procuracy and courts, the GOB forced the closure of 24 independent newspapers. Oleg Slizhevsky -------------- ¶13. (C) Slizhevsky has been head of the Ministry of Justice's Public Associations Department since January 2005. This unit registers and works with NGOs, political parties and trade unions. His predecessor reportedly resigned to protest the regime using this office to close NGOs and political parties. Slizhevsky publicly bragged that in his previous job, heading the sub-division that registers NGOs, he personally deregistered 38 NGOs in 2004, winning every closure case he brought to court. ¶14. (C) Under Slizhevsky's close personal command, this office has worked hard to eliminate any independent civil society. In 2005 alone, Slizhevsky's office forced the closure of 80% of the local offices of pro-democracy political parties, deregistered 68 NGOs, and issued over 400 legal warnings to NGOs. Slizhevky's most common tactic is to accuse a political party or NGO of not having a legally registered office (under the GOB's draconian rules, it is nearly impossible for pro-democracy groups to acquire and register legal office space. One party that tried to abide by the rules only succeeded in registering four out of 200 local offices. The GOB holds pro-government groups to a different standard). In many cases this is the pretext for Slizhevsky's office to close an organization. In other cases, the Ministry of Justice hounds pro-democracy groups with numerous demands, occupying all the groups' time and resources and preventing them from participating in pro-democracy work. Vasily Dementei -------------- ¶15. (C) Major-General Dementei has been the First Deputy Head of the BKGB since January 2005, making him number two in an organization that routinely commits human rights abuses while combating democratic development. EU contacts claim he is the "right hand" of BKGB chairman Sukhorenko (reftel),and plays an active role in all BKGB activities. In October 2005, Dementei presented to parliament a bill designed to "combat extremism" in Belarus. However, Dementei's lengthy comments made it clear the bill was aimed against Belarus' pro-democracy groups. He specifically argued that, "politicized groups of the Republic of Belarus and some foreign non-profit organizations, public and religious figures and the non-state media," were seeking to destabilize Belarus and overthrow the regime, a claim that contributed to the climate of fear cited by international observers as a major flaw of the 2006 election. Belarus' rubberstamp parliament approved this BKGB bill, and it has subsequently been used to jail a number o f pro-democracy activists. In April 2005, Dementei told the press that the BKGB seized USD 200,000 that western governments were trying to distribute to the Belarusian opposition through former MP Sergey Skrebets. Skrebets was arrested and sentenced to 30 months in prison, ostensibly for fraud, in a politically motivated trial. Yury Podebed -------------- ¶16. (C) Colonel Yury Podobed is commander of the OMON, or special riot police, in Minsk. OMON troops, and to a lesser extent Pavlichenko's SOBR and Presidential Security, are those most often used to disrupt pro-democracy demonstrators and arrest activists. In the week following the March 2006 presidential elections, Minsk OMON units arrested hundreds of demonstrators. Numerous activists subsequently reported to Emboffs and human rights groups that the OMON troops beat and mistreated them at the time of their arrest. Video footage shown internationally after the March 25 protest showed OMON troops beating two middle-aged women and other pro-democracy activists with their truncheons. Podobed was placed on U.S. and EU visa blacklists in 2004 after OMON troops under his command savagely beat a number of pro-democracy activists. Krol