State Dominates Banking Sector

UNCLAS MINSK 000689 SIPDIS SIPDIS State for EB/IFD/OIA, EB/IFD/OIA, EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV KCOR BTIU PGOV AFIN BO SUBJECT: State Dominates Banking Sector Ref: 05 Minsk 851 ¶1. Summary: Belarus has a poorly developed capital market, and the financial sector almost exclusively consists of banks. The joint stock exchange/currency exchange lists very few companies and is mostly engaged in currency exchange for the government. The banking sector is almost completely dominated by a few large, state- owned banks. The government maintains tight control over the National Bank and banking sector. The GOB uses these banks to provide GOB-directed lending for social projects and failing state enterprises. The state then recapitalizes these banks from the budget. Even so, this lending causes problems for bank liquidity. Commercial lending is also growing, driven by falling interest rates and inflation. The National Bank has tamed inflation by effectively pegging the Belarusian ruble to the dollar, although the bank acknowledges that rising demand for foreign goods and travel is threatening exchange rate stability. Foreign currency reserves, while growing, remain low at about one month of imports. End summary. Largest Banks State Controlled -------------- ¶2. Belarus has 31 registered banks with total assets, as of September 2005, of USD 8.2 billion. The banking sector is very centralized, with the six largest banks controlling 88% of the sector's total assets. Five of these six systemically important banks are fully or majority state-owned. The GOB controls: Belarusbank (assets USD 3.37 billion, 40.8% market share and 63% of retail deposits),Belagroprombank (USD 1.3 billion, 15.9%), Belpromstroibank (USD 661 million, 8%),Belinvestbank (USD 604 million, 7.3%),and Belvnesheconombank (USD 349 million, 4.2%). The sixth, Priorbank (assets USD 937 million, 11.4% market share), is majority owned by Austria's Raiffeisen Group and minority owned by the GOB. No other bank has more than two percent market share. An IMF report stated that, "Due to the lack of a level playing field, the six largest banks are able to offer loans below market prices and thus crowd out their competitors from the market. The smaller banks have to find a niche to operate in the market. The non-competitive market environment and the frequently changing rules of the game discourage foreign investors from entering the market." ¶3. The Ministry of Economics is the GOB's main player in banking, �A;holding capital in 10 banks and controlling 66.2% of all banking capital. Officers of the NBB told Econoff that the GOB plans to retain majority ownership of these large banks as the state uses them to implement government policy. The EBRD told Econoff that even with the state playing a strong role in banking, Belarus' banking sector is very small for an economy of Belarus' size. No bank is large enough to service Belarus' larger state-owned concerns, which must then work with several banks each. ¶4. According to the National Bank of Belarus (NBB),26 Belarusian banks have foreign capital, including nine which are 100% foreign owned. Foreign capital makes up 9.3% of banking capital, despite a 2005 presidential decree ordering all Belarusian banks to have at least 25% foreign capital (Lukashenko revoked this decree on June 15). Russia is the largest foreign investor, accounting for 3% of banking capital, followed by Austria, Germany, Poland and the U.S. By law branches of foreign banks are not allowed in Belarus, but there are 12 representational offices of foreign banks in the country. Russia's Vneshtorgbank announced in late May that it is considering purchasing a controlling share of a Belarusian bank, but has not yet done so. Belarusian banks have 11 representative offices, but no branches or subsidiaries, abroad. Lack of Independence -------------- ¶5. The NBB and largest state banks are not allowed to operate as independent entities. Government officials sit on their governing boards and influence the banks' decisions. Belarusbank also has a seat on the NBB board. President Lukashenko can overrule or change any NBB decision and appoints and dismisses senior NBB officials. The NBB must coordinate its expenditures and investments with Lukashenko, as well as the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance. An IMF report found that this coordination in fact results in GOB and banking sector interference in the workings of the NBB, and effectively places the NBB under permanent government control. ¶6. The GOB routinely gives instructions to the NBB and banking sector. In February the Council of Ministers ordered Belarus' banks to attract at least USD one billion in foreign capital to lend to domestic enterprises. The Council also ordered the banks to increase their lending by 29%, to BYR 2.7 trillion [USD 1.26 billion]. In 2005 the GOB ordered certain Belarusian banks to open representative offices in China. ¶7. The NBB is not exempt from the GOB's economic dictates. Over the past two years the NBB has been forced to take control of 10 bankrupt collective farms and try to make them profitable. NBB chairman Pyotr Prokopovich announced in February that all 10 farms are now earning an average profit of 10%. [Note: This is unlikely, as the GOB allows only limited reform of such farms. More likely, the NBB is simply passing money to the farms to make them appear to be profitable.] ¶8. This high level of state control is unlikely to end soon. On June 15, Lukashenko publicly told his government, "It is necessary to do everything so that the banking sector will be under the control of the state, as this is a very important factor for the sovereignty and independence of the country, and so that we will be able to get the necessary funds for investment in our country." At the same meeting Prokopovich reported to Lukashenko that 107 state- owned companies failed to fulfill a 2005 presidential decree ordering them to switch their bank accounts from private banks to state-controlled banks. Prokopovich told Lukashenko the executives at these firms "have been punished." Conversely, Lukashenko then announced the need to create equal conditions for state and private banks, claiming, "It is time for normal competitiveness. It is necessary to stop supporting state banks so much. They themselves should create favorable conditions for attracting clients." Directed Lending -------------- ¶9. The NBB explained to Econoff that the GOB uses its four largest banks to finance state social programs, such as funding housing construction, and to provide credit at the state's direction. The NBB added that the GOB also insists all banks provide money for state programs, even private banks. The IMF reports these credits are often given to support insolvent state enterprises, causing solvency and liquidity problems at the lending banks. These four banks provide credit on preferential terms, and the loans are often guaranteed by the local or central government. These loans are often made in violation of GOB lending laws and with no consideration of risk, in which cases the GOB usually forgoes any corrective action against the bank. GOB demands to lend money also ignore the banks' capacity to issue such loans while maintaining some reserve, potentially worsening the banks' financial status. Additionally, local governments direct local bank branches to provide loans to local enterprises or programs, often without the bank's central headquarters being made aware of the extension of these credits. ¶10. Belarusbank and Belagroprombank, Belarus' two largest banks and both state-controlled, issue more loans than all other banks combined. In 2005, Belarusbank accounted for 45.3% of all lending, and Belagroprombank for 18.9%. Much of this was directed by the government. Belarusbank gave out USD 420 million in loans for housing, of which USD 261 million was soft loans given on order of the GOB. Belagroprombank issued USD 172 million in easy loans for housing. The volume of such directed loans rose 75% in 2005. In 2005 the GOB reimbursed these banks with USD 94 million from the budget as compensation for these soft housing loans. In 2005 banks also lent more than USD 698 million to agriculture, almost all of which was easy loans directed by the GOB. ¶11. The state replenishes these banks' capital from the budget and from the sale of government bonds. The IMF estimated the GOB spends at least one percent of GDP (roughly USD 300 million) each year recapitalizing its large banks. Because of this budgetary support, the state also exempts Belarusbank from maintaining adequate reserves (other banks must maintain 4% of deposits). The IMF found that this practice of directed lending causes Belarus' main banks to operate at a loss. However, their financial reporting includes the money they receive from the budget, and so shows these banks as being ostensibly profitable. EBRD reports that Belarusian banks tend to have low levels of profitability, largely because of directed lending. By law the NBB also acts as a creditor of last resort and supports the liquidity of the banking system. Consumer Lending -------------- ¶12. In 2005 consumer lending increased 22% to USD 6.1 billion, mainly to fund housing and consumption. The NBB attributes this growth to decreasing inflation and dropping interest rates (averaging 9.4% as of December 2005). Belarusian law requires 100% collateral for any loan above USD 5,000. The law allows banks to accept housing as collateral, but banks generally will not accept housing as it is nearly impossible to foreclose after a loan goes into default, especially if children live in the house. Therefore, while there is high demand for mortgage lending, there is little actual supply, according to the EBRD. Belarus also has no law authorizing mortgage lending. The NBB said banks get around this by relabeling such loans. Housing cannot be used as collateral for a business loan. On June 15, Lukashenko signed permission for banks to accept land as collateral for loans, which should increase the volume of lending. The NBB claims bad loans have dropped to 1.5% of all lending. Exchange Rate/ Low Foreign Currency Reserves -------------- ¶13. The NBB has stabilized the exchange rate as their main tool in fighting inflation. Although the NBB denies it, the Belarusian ruble is effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar, having fluctuated less than one percent over the last two years. The NBB claims instead the Belarusian ruble is loosely tied to the Russian ruble, although the Belarusian ruble strengthened 3% against the Russian ruble over the past year. The NBB admitted to Econoff that the exchange rate is artificially high and is hurting exporters. However, they said that rationalizing the rate is a political decision that needs to be made at the highest level. ¶14. In April, NBB chairman Prokopovich told the press that Belarusians' spending habits are making it more difficult to stabilize the exchange rate. Prokopovich stated, "Unfortunately, the production of quality goods and services is not developed enough in this country and lags behind the increase in real incomes of the population. The money that could remain in Belarus and work here, USD 400 to 500 million annually, is spent to support producers in other countries." He also complained that Belarusians buy foreign currency to vacation and buy cars abroad (the main demand for foreign currency). According to NBB statistics, Belarusians purchased 26% more foreign currency in the first two months of the year than a year prior, while they sold 11% more foreign currency. ¶15. Because of this strong domestic demand for foreign currency, the NBB has not been successful in increasing foreign currency reserves. The GOB has been trying to increase its volume of its reserves for some time, but with little success. The NBB's foreign currency reserves in January were USD 1.384 billion, or about one month of imports. Foreign currency reserves in commercial banks were even worse, at USD negative 323.3 million. Money Supply -------------- ¶16. Buoyed by a stable exchange rate, dropping inflation and GOB- mandated salary increases, ruble deposits increased over the year ending in May by 80% to BYR 6.2 trillion [USD 2.9 billion]. USD deposits are shrinking, and 70% of all deposits are now in rubles, up from 50% in January 2004. Prokopovich claimed the NBB has not been successful in further decreasing foreign currency deposits because, "Belarusians trust neither the NBB nor the parliament." The share of long-term deposits is still low, at 20%. The overall supply of rubles in the economy grew 59.5% on the year to BYR 8.6 trillion [USD 4 billion]. In December alone, ruble money supply grew 13.8% after Lukashenko ordered the government to spend the entire budget surplus. The NBB therefore ransferred BYR 982 billion [USD 457 million] to he Finance Ministry, and provided additional funs to the main state banks as recapitalization. The IMF told Econoff they predicted this massive increase in money to be inflationary, but the Finance Ministry and NBB acted quickly in the new year to remove some of this excess money from circulation. In January Belarus' ruble supply fell 2.8%. Credit Rating -------------- ¶17. Belarus does not have a sovereign credit rating. Lukashenko ordered his government to apply for one in early 2005, but soon changed his mind after announcing the USG would ensure Belarus received a low rating. In June 2006, Lukashenko again started discussing the possibility of applying for a national credit rating. The NBB told Econoff that they expect Belarus to receive a BB+ or B-, although Prokopovich has since told the press Belarus should expect a low rating that would only improve with time. ¶18. The NBB told Econoff that only four Belarusian banks have international credit ratings. GOB-owned Belarusbank, Belagroprombank, and Belpromstroibank all have a CCC+. Private Belgazprombank is rated B-. Banking Supervision -------------- ¶19. The NBB is charged by law with regulating and supervising the banking sector. However, the NBB does not have the ability to fully implement this oversight. By law, banks only need to disclose any owners who have invested more than 10% of the bank's capital. There is no legislation allowing the NBB to investigate whether minority shareholders, each possessing 9.9% or less, are working cooperatively, and legislation does not allow the NBB to investigate past the first level of registration to determine who might be the ultimate owners of banks operating in Belarus. ¶20. Belarusian banks have not adopted international financial reporting standards, and do not employ appraisal of assets and liabilities based on fair market value. The IMF found that many banks do not properly measure liquidity risk. Comment -------------- ¶21. International financial institutions present in Belarus told Econoff that Belarus' financial sector is small and undeveloped for an economy of this size. The IFIs claim that talented and knowledgeable people work at the mid-level in Belarus' banks and government. However, interference from the top and the state's use of banking for political ends means that the sector is not growing and will likely remain distorted. The frequent use of directed loans, with no regard to risk, makes the banking sector vulnerable to internal and external shocks. These mid-level professionals have succeeded so far in limiting the worst of the damage caused by Lukashenko's economic meddling. Belarus' banking and financial sector, though, cannot mature as long as Lukashenko uses them as a tool to keep himself in power. KROL