IMF: Belarus Faces Falling Growth

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 000600 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD PREL USTR BO SUBJECT: IMF: Belarus Faces Falling Growth MINSK 00000600 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a recent briefing a visiting IMF team acknowledged that the Belarusian economy has seen strong growth the past few years, driven mainly by the re-export of Russian oil, but also to a lesser extent to growing productivity. However, Belarus also faces a number of significant problems that will soon lead to an end to growth, if no reforms are undertaken. The IMF predicts that if Belarus' currently advantageous terms of trade remain unchanged (unlikely, given Russian pressure to raise energy costs), the economy will still run out of steam within the near future. In previous years the GOB has told the IMF that Belarus' economy is fine as is. This year, for the first time, senior GOB officials were somewhat open to the IMF's message of reform. Mid-level officials are much more open to liberalization, and their skill has successfully countered some of the damage Lukashenko would otherwise have inflicted on the economy. End summary. ¶2. (U) On May 30, visiting IMF Deputy Division Chief Balazs Horvath informed a group of foreign diplomats on the findings of the recently concluded annual IMF Article IV consultations in Belarus. Unsurprisingly, the IMF found the GOB is "not in full agreement" with the IMF on macroeconomic policy, with senior GOB officials continuing to insist Belarus' quasi-socialist model works perfectly well. However, while in previous years senior GOB officials rejected outright IMF recommendations for macroeconomic restructuring, this year the IMF found some tentative openness to discussing macro reform. The IMF delegation was also granted greater access to policymakers this year, including to economic advisors in the Presidential Administration and to several ministers. Economy Growing, For Now... -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The IMF mission announced in their press release after the visit that Belarus saw 9.2% GDP growth and 8% inflation in 2005. These are the official GOB statistics. Horvath explained the IMF agrees there was significant growth last year, but challenges these official figures. He claimed the GOB's statisticians are very professional and proficient, but the IMF has strong doubt about the data they are given. Under the Belarusian system, enterprise directors face considerable pressures to meet or exceed GOB targets, and so many likely report that they met these goals, even when they did not. Moreover, the CPI cannot accurately reflect the true level of inflation because the GOB controls so many prices at the local level, as well as imposes indirect controls on enterprise profits. Horvath added the Ministry of Statistics rejected these criticisms. He could not provide an IMF estimate of growth or inflation. ¶4. (SBU) The IMF attributed Belarus' strong growth to two factors. First, Horvath stated that in the past year Belarus saw significant productivity growth, driven by an increase in capacity utilization. He qualified this statement by saying that wages, raised by government fiat, have still grown at a higher rate than productivity every year for the past ten years. Second, and more significantly, Belarus' economic growth last year was driven to a major extent by the country's ability to buy heavily subsidized oil and gas from Russia. Horvath explained that in 2005 Belarus bought crude oil at half the world price from Russia, refined it and sold it westwards at world prices. Most of this profit goes to the GOB, which uses it to subsidize wage increases and social projects. He added that Belarus does not re-export the subsidized natural gas it buys from Russia, but that this subsidized gas allows Belarus' energy intensive goods to be sold for less. Horvath said the GOB had assumed world prices for oil would keep rising as they did in ¶2005. When the IMF pointed out that they expected oil prices were unlikely to grow much in 2006, GOB officials began to worry about loss of growth this year. GOB's Unrealistic 5-year Plan -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Horvath pointed out that the GOB's new 5-year plan, for 2006 though 2010, assumes an annual GDP growth rate of 8.5%. The IMF believes Belarus could have sustained GDP growth, given Belarus' well-educated and disciplined workforce, but not 8.5% a year. To reach this high level of growth, the GOB assumes it will be able to double investment, squeeze consumption by 6%, and the 5- year plan assumes unchanged external terms of trade--including no changes in the price for subsidized Russian energy. The plan does not envision any market liberalization or reform. In one positive step, the plan does explicitly state the goal of limiting wage growth to the level of productivity growth. MINSK 00000600 002.2 OF 003 Endemic Weaknesses -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The IMF pointed out several endemic problems with the Belarusian economy. Belarusian goods are losing market share in Russia as Russian consumers become more affluent and as Russian agriculture develops. Horvath also said that 114 Belarusian entities, all controlled by the Presidential Administration, account for over half of GDP. The GOB plans to maintain control over all these companies. Horvath said this structure is very rigid and hard to adjust to meet a changing market. According to the GOB, around 15% of Belarusian businesses are loss-making, with another 33% borderline. However, Horvath said that if international accounting practices were used, at least half of Belarusian firms would be considered loss-making. He also explained that in Belarus the state controls the largest banks, and uses these banks to provide directed loans. This practice leads to a sharp loss of liquidity in the banking sector, requiring the state to recapitalize these banks out of the state budget at the end of each year. Such recapitalization eats up a significant portion of the budget, equal to around one percent of GDP. IMF Recommended Fixes -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Horvath argued that the GOB should start structural reforms, including increasing government savings against future disruptions, now when the economy is growing. Horvath stressed that Belarus' GDP growth will decline each year and drop to nothing if no changes are made. The IMF's suggestions for reform include: --the GOB lowering taxes and expenditures; currently the government redistributes half of GDP through the budget; --limit wage growth to the level of productivity growth; --discontinue centrally directed wage increases, which mandate identical wage increases across the economy, regardless of the health of an individual sector or enterprise; --rapidly phase out directed lending; --get rid of the Golden Share practice, which scares away investment, particularly long-term strategic investment; --reduce bureaucratic red tape and the size of the government; --allow the private sector to drive growth. And the Good News: GOB Slightly Open to Suggestions and Bureaucracy Countering Lukashenko's Worst Policies -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The IMF has found that the GOB has very talented people working at the mid-level in the National Bank and Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately, there are not as many good people working in the Ministry of Economics, Horvath said. These mid-level officials understand how a free market economy works and are ready, in some cases eager, for reform. In particular, the IMF found that Belarus' monetary policy has made strong progress. However, at the policy level the GOB is still wedded to its socialist/statist model. Horvath claimed that this year the IMF mission had higher level access than ever before, meeting with several ministers and with members of the Presidential Administration. Also for the first time this year these people did not reject outright the IMF's calls for reform. Horvath believed that there is a general feeling in the GOB that the current system is unsustainable and something must be reformed. ¶9. (SBU) Horvath also pointed out that some in the bureaucracy are now successfully minimizing the harm from Lukashenko's inept economic management. For example, last November the GOB was running a budget surplus of two percent. In late November Lukashenko signed a Presidential Decree ordering his government to spend the entire surplus by the end of the year, largely by boosting salaries nationwide. This led to a massive infusion of money into the economy and created a budget deficit for the year. The IMF predicted this move would cause inflation to spike, but instead the National Bank and Ministry of Finance successfully cooperated to limit the damage. Horvath said they were able to withdraw much of this money from circulation and rebuild national deposits in early 2006. IMF Predicts Growth to End -------------- ¶10. (SBU) When pressed to make a prediction on the future of the Belarusian economy, Horvath answered that, if there is no change in Belarus' terms of trade, then the GOB will have "a couple of years of declining growth rates, well below the GOB's forecast of 8.5%." MINSK 00000600 003.2 OF 003 However, if the terms of trade change, as seems likely with the probable rise in Russian energy prices, then the Belarusian economy will see its growth end faster and its advantageous window for economic reform close sooner. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Even though the IMF saw greater interest in reform this year, Lukashenko repeats in most of his public addresses the need for Belarus to maintain his "socially oriented" economic policies. With Lukashenko strengthening his presidential control over the economy, it is probable that the GOB will not institute any serious economic reforms now while conditions are favorable. Instead, we expect they will wait until the last possible moment to act, if at all. This approach runs the risk of increasing the potential disruptiveness of economic change and souring much of the public on serious economic liberalization. KROL