MILINKEVICH ON THE LEBEDKO PROBLEM, RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000537 SIPDIS SIPDIS KIEV FOR USAID E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BO SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH ON THE LEBEDKO PROBLEM, RUSSIAN PRESSURE, AND A NEW STRATEGY REF: MINSK 520 Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: On May 22, Ambassador met with leader of the unified opposition Aleksandr Milinkevich. Milinkevich had just completed a long-delayed talk with Anatoly Lebedko, a likely contender for Milinkevich's position. Milinkevich stated this talk convinced him Lebedko would not quit the coalition, and presented only a "medium" problem. Also on May 22, Milinkevich's 10 Plus coalition is likely to adopt a post-election strategy, which will guide the coalition in its relations to NGOs, its attempts to apply pressure on the regime, and for the distribution of independent information. The strategy will also stress efforts to defend Belarusian independence against Russian pressures for unification. Milinkevich said if necessary he would even work with Lukashenko to defend Belarus' independence. Meanwhile the opposition faces continued pressure from the regime and even some allies. A Milinkevich activist in Schuchin is being falsely charged with terrorism, Milinkevich was summoned to the prosecutor over a Polish newspaper interview, and he privately noted the Lithuanian government is angry with him for thwarting their plans to "export" revolution to Belarus. End summary. Lebedko a "Medium" Problem -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador opened the meeting by explaining that rumors the USG supports potential rival 10 Plus leader Anatoly Lebedko (who traveled to Washington the week before with IRI) are false. The USG advocates there be a single united opposition. Milinkevich stated he just finished a one-and-a-half hour private talk with Lebedko, the first in many months. After this meeting Milinkevich acknowledged the coalition had some differences with Lebedko and his United Civic Party, but that this is a "medium" rather than a major problem. The main difference, Milinkevich claimed, seems to be that Lebedko insists the 10 Plus hold a new Congress of Democratic Forces, possibly for October, to decide on new leadership and a strategy for the coalition. Milinkevich argued the coalition needs a new strategy now so as not to lose the momentum and the people it gained during the March elections. On May 22 the 10 Plus will vote on a post-election strategy; Milinkevich thought nine of the ;coalition's ten member groups (exce pting the UCP) would support the plan. ¶3. (C) Milinkevich stressed that he can work with Lebedko, even though Lebedko has his own ambitions. He did not fear Lebedko would attempt to quit the coalition. Claiming some want to dissolve political parties into one movement, Milinkevich argued that the parties must continue to exist because once Belarus becomes democratic it will need various parties for parliament. However, the existence of competing parties has made it hard to run the coalition and divvy up high-level positions within the opposition. The New Strategy -------------- ¶4. (C) Promising to privately present the opposition's new strategy once it is approved, Milinkevich hinted at what the coalition might be doing. He admitted the coalition did a poor job working with NGOs during the election campaign, with too many party leaders unsuccessfully trying to give orders to NGO activists. The 10 Plus will now try meeting monthly with interested NGOs, through the Association of Democratic NGOs, to see where they can work together, as a means of bringing them into the coalition while still allowing the NGOs their independence. Milinkevich is also trying to build cooperation with newly forming youth groups, particularly those responsible for recent flash mobs. He stated that the coalition now realizes NGOs can operate in ostensibly non-political fields and still promote democratic development. ¶5. (C) Under the new strategy the 10 Plus will undertake three broad campaigns. First, they will seek to increase pressure on the regime, both domestically and internationally. In Belarus the coalition is trying to create conditions to impeach Lukashenko, and will support strikes in some businesses. Second is distributing independent information. The coalition is working with donors to expand access to free radio and newspapers. Milinkevich claimed the Polish government recently approved USD 1.5 million for television broadcasting to Belarus (out of USD 7 million in total aid). The coalition will strengthen its negative campaign against the regime, something Milinkevich said was done poorly during the elections, will distribute leaflets and posters "Za Svabodu" (For Freedom),and will try to unite workers opposed to the contract system. Last, he said the coalition will campaign for "independence." This includes independence from threats -- for example defending activists who face regime pressures, as well as independence for Belarus. Russia Threatens Belarus' Independence -------------- ¶6. (C) Milinkevich stated that Russia is applying heavy pressure on Belarus to join the Union State, and he fears Russia wants to incorporate Belarus into the Russian Federation. He said that the vast majority of Belarusians are against full union with Russia. While a majority might support economic union, only around 5% actually want to surrender Belarusian independence. Most Belarusians know that people live worse in Russia than in Belarus. Milinkevich said that he has contact with many in the nomenclatura, and they are against union with Russia as it would erode their authority. Milinkevich even admitted if necessary he would even work with Lukashenko to preserve Belarusian independence, although he admitted Lukashenko would never initiate such contact, as it would be a sign of weakness. Arguing that people cannot freely vote without free information, Milinkevich asked the USG to not recognize any future referendum on the Russia-Belarus union. Problems with Some Donors -------------- ¶7. (C) Responding to Ambassador's question, Milinkevich said many donors are being very helpful, particularly the Norwegians, who recently pledged to give a large sum of money (Milinkevich guessed at USD 1 million) to the Belarusian opposition. These donors do not have to give support directly to the 10 Plus, but can give it to other groups who still support a single democratic strategy. He stressed the importance of donor coordination. However, Milinkevich complained at length that many unspecified "imitators" among international donors cause problems. Without naming names, he maintained some problem donors are more interested in the act of providing aid than in seeing any good come from their assistance. Differences with Kozulin -------------- ¶8. (C) Milinkevich plans to meet soon with one of rival presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin's deputies. He thinks he can work together with Kozulin, but stated Kozulin has different goals. This difference is most clearly seen in the names of the campaigns. Milinkevich explained he is the leader of a coalition, an "instrument of change," but it is not his personal coalition, unlike Kozulin whose main aim is more power, not democratic change. Moreover, Kozulin and his supporters are more "radical," while Milinkevich favors "peaceful," non-violent change. Local Activist Charged with Terrorism -------------- ¶9. (C) Milinkevich explained that the head of his campaign team in Schuchin (Grodno district) has been charged with terrorism and goes to court on May 25. Milinkevich stated that before the March elections a young man asked the campaign team if he could campaign on Milinkevich's behalf in Schuchin, which he subsequently did. However, police arrested this person for allegedly fighting with a police officer and stealing construction material. In custody the young man allegedly told police that Milinkevich's local campaign team was preparing to conduct terrorist attacks. Poloff may attend the trial. (Note: Post believes these charges to be falsifications by the regime to pressure the opposition. There is no known or suspected connection between the Belarusian opposition and terrorist acts or groups.) ¶10. (C) Milinkevich is not without his own legal problems. He explained that he had to go to the prosecutor's office after his meeting with Ambassador to most likely receive a warning. He said this stems from an interview he gave to a Polish newspaper, where he said the March beating death of a Polish diplomat in Grodno was suspicious. Vilnius Mad at Milinkevich -------------- ¶11. (C) Milinkevich mentioned privately that he knows the Lithuanian government is angry at him because he spoiled their plans to create a revolution in Minsk. He claimed (and Post has heard from several other sources) that members of the Lithuanian government were pushing the Belarusian opposition to use the crowd that came out Election Night in a bold gesture, such as storming state television or marching on Lukashenko's office, feeling such a move would ignite popular feelings against the regime. Milinkevich believes such actions could only have ended in ruin and bloodshed, and resisted this pressure. He believed Belarusian society was not ready for such revolution, and needs more work. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Despite many successes in unifying and campaigning, several problems continue to threaten opposition unity. The main problem continues to be the internal power struggle between Milinkevich and Lebedko. Their differences however seem surmountable, although there will be strains. Shortly after Milinkevich departed the Embassy Lebedko contacted Post asking for a meeting. Ambassador will once again stress to him, as he has several times to Milinkevich, the vital importance of unity. Influenced by the Lebedko-Milinkevich divide, but also a symptom of a poorly organized and inexperienced coalition, the 10 Plus failed to work with many groups that wanted to help during the campaign and wasted two months developing a post-election strategy. It remains to be seen if the strategy to be approved May 22 will finally allow the opposition to take maximum advantage of the opportunities presented by Lukashenko's clearly falsified electoral victory. Krol