OPPOSITION COALITION TO STAY TOGETHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 000390 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUMBO PREL BO SUBJECT: OPPOSITION COALITION TO STAY TOGETHER Classified By: Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4(B,D ) ¶1. (C) Summary: In recent days Poloffs and Ambassador have spoken with a number of senior members of Milinkevich's 10 Plus coalition. All agreed that the coalition will continue to exist and will keep Milinkevich as the leader, despite some resistance from one coalition party. Post election the coalition is in the embryonic stages of building a new "social movement," designed to keep the populace interested in politics and supporting change. At a minimum, this movement will try to plan at least one public demonstration a month. With so many coalition members only recently released from jail, or abroad traveling, the coalition has not yet developed its strategy. Meanwhile, some in the coalition are calling for trying to attract new members, such as the youth groups that actually drove the post-election demonstrations. Despite the difficulties they face, these coalition leaders are optimistic that they have helped change the mood in the country, and believe Lukashenko will not last his full five-year term . End summary. ¶2. (C) Poloffs and Ambassador met separately with several senior figures in the Belarusian opposition's main coalition, 10 Plus, the week of April 3. Emboffs met with Sergey Kalyakin, leader of the pro-democracy Belarusian Party of Communists and head of opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich's campaign headquarters, Ludmila Gryaznova, deputy leader of the United Civic Party (UCP),and with Ales Yanukevich and Ales Mikhailevich, deputy leaders in the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF). The Coalition and Milinkevich Will Survive -------------- ¶3. (C) All interlocutors agreed that the 10 Plus coalition would endure, largely in its current form, and that Milinkevich would remain nominal head of the coalition. Kalyakin explained that the coalition's political council had met twice since the March 19 presidential election and agreed to maintain the coalition, although with some tinkering. The October 2005 Congress of Democratic Forces created three leadership organs within the coalition, a national committee, a political council, and an election headquarters. The election HQ will be disbanded, but currently is working with human rights groups to provide assistance to arrested activists, expelled students, and is paying fines for many coalition members. The HQ is also preparing legal challenges to the election results. Most recently, the Supreme Court threw out a challenge on April 5. ¶4. (C) Kalyakin strongly argued the importance of keeping Milinkevich as the coalition's leader. He said Milinkevich had an estimated 20% support in the country and was an established brand. To choose someone else now to head the coalition would destroy the previous eight months' work. Even though the UCP's Gryaznova stated she would have preferred if her party's leader, Anatoly Lebedko, had been chosen the coalition's presidential candidate, she said it would be a "nightmare" to replace Milinkevich now. Milinkevich has high name recognition, and she said, attracted the support of 31% of voters. ¶5. (C) All described a new "social movement" the coalition is forming, but none were very clear on what the movement would do other than vaguely working with the population. All explained the intra-coalition travails surrounding naming the movement. After what seems to have been serious debate, the coalition rejected the name, "Za Milinkevich (For Milinkevich)" in favor of "Za Svobodu (For Freedom)". Mikhailevich (who is well connected with the NGO community) explained that this movement is an attempt by the NGO members of the coalition to reshape, centralize and streamline the 10 Plus. He complained the coalition now is an extremely ponderous and inefficient bureaucracy, stemming from the fact that each member party feels the need to provide input and clearance. Mikhailevich stated it was this over-bureaucratization which caused the coalition to miss the deadline to get Milinkevich's platform published for free in state media. The NGOs are frustrated, he said, and are trying to change the 10 Plus away from a loose coalition of parties and into a real organization with strong local organizations. Future Actions, at Home and Abroad -------------- MINSK 00000390 002 OF 004 ¶6. (C) Yanukevich claimed that too many of Milinkevich's people are still in jail or traveling abroad with Milinkevich for the coalition to have developed a strategy. However, he believes that the team must organize at least one demonstration a month to keep up people's interest. The next such will be on April 26 for the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl. Kalyakin noted that the coalition also plans a demonstration for May 1, against the state's labor contract system. Kalyakin believed that the March 19 demonstration needed to attract ten times as many people to have made a difference. He does not expect enough people on April 26 or May 1 to challenge the regime, but thinks the post-election protests succeeded in reducing the people's fear of demonstrating. ¶7. (C) Mikhailevich explained that the civil society side (rather than the parties) of the 10 Plus will be organizing many small demonstrations and will pass out pro-democracy literature. Their strategy is based on the understanding that police can arrest one or two people passing out leaflets, but if 50 people start passing out leaflets in one place, the local police patrol will have to call on reinforcements before making any arrests. Mikhailevich estimates this gives the opposition up to 30 minutes to pass out material before they have to disperse. The coalition will also use the internet more to spread information, as it was very successful during the post-election protests. ¶8. (C) Kalyakin complained that non-coalition activists, such as Olga Karach, have been speaking at international conferences on the state of the Belarusian opposition. Even though many of these people are active in promoting democracy, Kalyakin dismissed them as knowing nothing because they are not in the coalition. Therefore, the coalition must continue its international lobbying efforts to counter such people. On the other hand, Gryaznova complained that Milinkevich is spending too much time lobbying in European capitals instead of greeting his activists as they are released from jail and planning the coalition's next steps. Local Elections Next -------------- ¶9. (C) The last local elections in Belarus were held in March ¶2003. Mikhailevich, who won a seat on the Minsk city council, explained that by law the next local elections must be held by December 2006. He thinks Lukashenko will call them for either October 2006 or early 2007 (despite the law), as it is not feasible to hold elections in the winter when the budget is being prepared. Mikhailevich stated that the 10 Plus is preparing a national campaign to mobilize voters and find strong candidates for these elections, although he expects the regime to make sure few, if any, opposition members are elected. No New Congress? -------------- ¶10. (C) Gryaznova stressed the need for a new Congress of Democratic Forces. She said that several of the groups which helped create the 10 Plus, such as the Belarusian Party "Greens", Belarusian Party of Women's Hope (Nadezhda),and the unregistered Party of Freedom and Progress played no role during the campaign. She felt they must be replaced with other groups that have become very active. Gryaznova listed four main groups that need to be attracted to join the coalition: 1) the youth groups, specifically Malady Front, which organized the tent city, 2) student internet activists, 3) entrepreneur groups such as Perspektiva, and 4) active analytical centers. Mikhailevich did not call for a new congress, but said that Protestant groups had been actively helping the coalition. Kalyakin was strongly against a new democratic congress, claiming it would be a waste of resources. Poor Cooperation with Youth Groups -------------- ¶11. (C) Kalyakin and others reinforced the impression that the coalition does not have strong contact with many youth groups. When asked about the tent city that challenged Lukashenko for several days in Minsk's main square, Kalyakin stated that the coalition only knew the youth groups which put up three of the nearly twenty tents. He improbably claimed that Russia's FSB has erected the rest of the tents MINSK 00000390 003 OF 004 to put pressure on Lukashenko. Gryaznova stated that Milinkevich's campaign team was surprised that so many people turned out to protest the elections, and was not prepared. On the other hand, she said the youth groups knew what to expect, largely because their members had participated in Ukraine's Maidan. Therefore the youth essentially controlled the post-election protests. (Note: She added that her own party's leadership did not go to the tent city until Renatas Juskis of the Lithuanian MFA called and told them to go.) ¶12. (C) Kalyakin stated that Zubr refused to cooperate in any post-election demonstrations, even though some Zubr people did demonstrate. Gryaznova said that some Zubr members were present in the tent city, but that Malady Front was the most active youth group throughout the campaign. ¶13. (C) Mikhailevich and several others have told Emboffs that the arrested youth spent their time in prison forging close ties with people from other regions. This networking opportunity strengthened the opposition and those arrested are leaving jail determined to keep fighting for democracy. Power Struggles in the Coalition -------------- ¶14. (C) Yanukevich commented on several power struggles within the coalition. He claimed that Lebedko and the UCP are not happy with Milinkevich and do not trust him. He claimed the UCP has always operated somewhat independently, even while in the coalition. Yanukevich opined that Lebedko will not take his party out of the coalition, as they have nowhere to go, but stated this divide will lead to many arguments over strategy and tactics. Mikhailevich also claimed the UCP may quit 10 Plus, but believes this is unlikely as the UCP's local structures are now too firmly enmeshed with the 10 Plus' local organizations. ¶15. (C) Yanukevich also described a battle for control of his own BPF. He stated that Ales Mikhailevich is trying to wrest control from party leader Vintsuk Vyachorka, and would ask for a vote on new leadership at the party's next meeting. Yanukevich estimated that Mikhailevich does not have the support to topple Vyachorka, and added that Mikhailevich has always tried to use his position to push party funds towards his friends and supporters in NGOs, rather than keeping it in the party. No Cooperation with Kozulin -------------- ¶16. (C) According to Kalyakin, the coalition has regular contact with rival presidential contender Aleksandr Kozulin's campaign team. He claimed his coalition is open to Kozulin's Belarus Social-Democratic Party Narodnaya Gramada joining the coalition, but did not expect Kozulin to do so. Yanukevich stated that UCP deputy Jaroslav Romanchuk is trying to bring Kozulin into the coalition, but that UCP leader Anatoly Lebedko opposes this move as that would knock Lebedko from number two to number three in the coalition. Opposition is Optimistic -------------- ¶17. (C) All expressed their optimism that Lukashenko is nearing the end of his rule. Kalyakin claimed that the mood in the country is different after the election, that people are for the first time publicly discussing Belarus after Lukashenko. People know how the regime rigged the elections, and many know that the economy is facing serious troubles. Therefore, Kalyakin estimated that Lukashenko would not last more than two years. Mikhailevich believes Lukashenko will fall within 12 to 18 months because he is quickly losing popular support. He added that Lukashenko has recently made many mistakes. His propaganda especially is backfiring, as many Belarusians now question why most of the outside world is portrayed on television as Belarus' enemy. ¶18. (C) Mikhailevich stated that he has many friends in government, and he believes at least half of the GOB's bureaucrats and police voted for Milinkevich. Police officers between sergeant and colonel are strongly for reform, while more senior officers receive too many perks from the regime to want change. Mikhailevich said he gets intensively searched every time he crosses the border, but frequently the Customs officials take him into the back, ask him a pro forma question or two, and then tell him they MINSK 00000390 004 OF 004 support democracy. Mikhailevich also maintained this feeling has spread to the courts. Reportedly, when it came time to try one of the organizers of the October Square tent city, the judge closed the court to all but himself and the defendant. The judge told the defendant he thought the tent protest was the best thing to happen to Belarus in recent years, but that he would be fired if he sentenced the defendant to anything less than seven days in jail. (Note: most of those arrested at the tent city rec eived 10 or 15 days sentences.) Comment -------------- ¶19. (C) Milinkevich's 10 Plus coalition concede they made many mistakes during the campaign, and many Belarusians who want democratic change are also quick to point these out as well. However, the coalition held and so far no other credible organized opposition force has appeared in Belarus to fight for change and challenge the Lukashenko regime. Mikhail Statkevich's European Coalition collapsed after he was arrested, and Kozulin's campaign, which appears to be largely a mercenary structure, does not appear to have legs or much organization. Milinkevich and the coalition have acquired credibility and respect from more Belarusians, but they recognize that to succeed in ultimately changing Belarus they need to take advantage of the latent dissatisfaction with Lukashenko prevalent in society, keep people interested in politics, provide independent sources of information, and avoid petty partisan bickering--all while facing continued repression from the regime. It's a big challenge, but so far they seem on th e right track. Krol