LOCAL COUNCIL DEPUTIES FACING AN UPHILL BATTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 001241 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR INR KIEV ALSO FOR USAID E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BO SUBJECT: LOCAL COUNCIL DEPUTIES FACING AN UPHILL BATTLE REF: MINSK 1056 MINSK 00001241 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Pro-democratic local council deputies from the regions of Belarus claimed to have high public support within their districts but doubted it would be enough to win re-election in what they predict will be fraudulent local council elections in January. Deputies informed Ambassador that GOB harassment was worse than what they faced in the 2003 local council elections. Despite the relentless pressure, the deputies' commitment to democratic change and concern for public welfare keeps them from giving up. End summary. High Support Cannot Beat Falsified Elections -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 24 Ambassador hosted a lunch with 13 regional independent and opposition local council deputies at her residence. DCM, Pol/Econ Chief, and Poloff also attended. Deputies stressed that the GOB had already determined the results of the local council elections scheduled for January 14, ¶2007. According to Bobruisk (Mogilev oblast) city council member Ales Chigir, Minsk officials had already sent regional and local executive committees lists of pro-GOB local council candidate hopefuls who were to be "elected." ¶3. (C) All the deputies claimed to have high public support within their districts and predicted that they could easily be re-elected if elections were free and fair. Grodno city council deputy Sergey Antusevich told Ambassador that constituents understand the value of independent and opposition deputies: despite limited influence and resources, opposition deputies make every effort to address the specific concern of constituents. Constituents from other voting districts often approach Antusevich with problems that their pro-GOB representatives ignore. ¶4. (C) Berezy (Brest oblast) district council deputy Evgeniy Prokurat told Pol/Econ Chief that independent and opposition deputies' interests correlated with those of their constituents while pro-GOB deputies supported government interests. Recognizing the need to make some concessions to constituents, pro-GOB deputies have worked with opposition deputies to settle some domestic issues, but collaboration is limited and discrete. Election Code Changes Make Manipulation Easier -------------- ¶5. (C) The changes in the Electoral Code were another GOB measure to make election manipulation easier (ref A). Pukhovichi (Minsk oblast) regional council deputy Ales Mikhalevich admitted that in most democratic countries, the elimination of second round voting would be seen as a cost- saving measure and advantageous to minority parties. However, in Belarus the plurality voting system would only work if authorities actually counted the votes. When asked by Ambassador, Antusevich claimed the public was well aware of the electoral fraud but was not willing to risk their jobs to contest it. Job Loss Remains Common Tool of Pressure -------------- ¶6. (C) Gorodok (Vitebsk oblast) regional council member Leonid Gurovoi explained to Ambassador that the authorities' most common tactic was to use the contract system to threaten MINSK 00001241 002.3 OF 003 deputies, candidate hopefuls, their supporters, and family members with job loss. It is extremely effective in the regions because virtually the only sources of employment are state-run enterprises or farms. If a deputy or candidate hopeful is self- employed, authorities use bureaucracy and government services (i.e., tax/fire inspections, fines) to force deputies' private businesses into bankruptcy, similar to what happened to Gurovoi's business. Mikhalevich explained that first-time candidates and new activists suffer the most harassment because experienced activists had long since lost their jobs and are therefore not as susceptible to the authorities' pressure and blackmail. Boosting Their Support -------------- ¶7. (C) The deputies explained that their door-to-door signature and information campaigns were the reason for their relatively strong popular support. The door-to-door schemes are so successful that pro-GOB candidate hopefuls were also using the same tactics to improve their reputation among voters. Ambassador noted that this development was a small sign of democratic change in the GOB mentality of how an election should be conducted. Support For Milinkevich, But Doubts on Congress -------------- ¶8. (C) Beloozersk (Brest oblast) city council deputies Yuras Gubarevich and Dmitriy Tretyak, Prokurat, and Verkhnedvinsk (Vitebsk oblast) regional council deputy Valentina Kudlatskaya asserted that coalition leader Aleksandr Milinkevich had large support in the regions. His recent campaign to collect signatures on the behalf of local council candidates had impressed voters and the state media's negative portrayal of Milinkevich only helped boost his name recognition. United Civic Party leader Anatoliy Lebedko and other national opposition leaders are less known and popular than Milinkevich (ref B). ¶9. (C) The deputies had mixed feelings about convening a second congress of democratic forces. Mozyr (Gomel oblast) city council deputy Leonid Orlov opined that the purpose of the first congress had long been realized and a second congress was needed to come up with a new plan. Other deputies told Pol/Econ Chief that the coalition parties and leaders were genuinely not interested in working together. Until opposition groups were serious about cooperating, another congress would likely be a waste of time and resources, or worse. (Note: The need for another congress was an issue of intense debate during the recent conference sponsored by the U.S. NGO NDI for regional UDF coalition leaders. The majority of the leaders present at the conference in Kyiv formally agreed that the UDF should organize another congress following the local elections. End note.) Nomenklatura In the Regions Skeptical of Lukashenko's Leadership -------------- ¶10. (C) According to Gubarevich and Kudlatskaya, 85% of voters in their districts believe Lukashenko can pull off a miracle and prevent the gas price increases from affecting their lives. (Note: Approximately 36% of Belarusians nationwide believe this as well (ref B). End note.) The nomenklatura, the other 15%, believes otherwise but do not want to risk their comfortable MINSK 00001241 003.3 OF 003 jobs by speaking out against Lukashenko's policies. The same story exists for regional business leaders who, according to Kudlatskaya, grudgingly carry out "stupid" economic and political orders and complain about their decreasing ability to make their own decisions. According to Orlov, the elite in Belarus is fed up with Lukashenko's rule because they are tired of being treated like robots and subject to fear and repression. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite the odds against them, the deputies displayed a level of charisma and determination that, based on their stories and our regional travel, seems to be lacking in their pro-GOB counterparts. They all seemed to possess a deep sense of commitment to democratic values and the welfare of their constituents. According to an independent public survey in November, 36.5% of Belarusians do not see local councils affecting their lives. After listening to these deputies, it is understandable why; pro-GOB deputies are "elected" to serve the GOB's interests, not those of their constituents. All the deputies expect fraudulent elections and doubt they will even pass the candidate registration stage beginning on December ¶4. However, judging from their personalities, that is not enough to stop them from trying anyway. Stewart