LUKASHENKO AND RUSSIA: A TALE OF UNREQUITED LOVE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 001184 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016 TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV BO SUBJECT: LUKASHENKO AND RUSSIA: A TALE OF UNREQUITED LOVE? REF: A. MINSK 1079 ¶B. MINSK 1019 Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Lukashenko and Putin likely will achieve little during a possible November 10 meeting in Moscow. Both countries continue to play hardball with one another in energy negotiations, which are expected to drag on until the end of the year. Belarus will eventually have to settle for increased gas prices, although Kyiv's deal has dampened fears of a crippling price jump. Russia is also pushing to recoup some of the four billion dollars in budget revenue lost annually due to Belarus' status as a de facto offshore for Russian oil companies. Sensing the beginning of Russia's election cycle, Lukashenko apparently will opt to see who succeeds Putin before deciding whether to reinvigorate the integration process. End summary. THE EMPIRE PREPARES TO STRIKE BACK AT LUKASHENKO -------------- -- ¶2. (C) In September, Transneft announced technical problems would cause it to reduce flows of oil through its pipelines to Belarus by 1.5 million tons through the end of 2006. Tatyana Manenok, energy correspondent for the independent weekly "Belorusy i rynok" confirmed to Poloff that the pipeline did need repairs. However, her sources told her the problem could be fixed within two days and Belarus offered to send its technicians to do the job. Transneft refused, and analysts believe the reduced flows are intended to pressure Belarus to share oil export duties with Russia. Manenok said rail transfers were for now taking up the slack for reduced imports via the pipeline. Still, the economic damage will quickly amount to millions, as Polish Charge Aleksandr Wasilewski explained to Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff that railroad transfers cost an additional USD 7 per ton over those via pipeline. ¶3. (SBU) Meanwhile, throughout October Belarus press devoted much attention to a memo from Russian Deputy Minister of Economic Development Arkadiy Dvorkovich asking Russian regions which products currently procured from Belarusian firms could be procured from non-Belarusian sources. Other economic moves by Russia against Belarus included duties on imports of Belarusian sugar and inspections of shipments of Belarusian chocolates. LUKASHENKO CONTINUES THE PROPAGANDA WAR -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In the week before Lukashenko's presumed trip to Moscow, Belarusian state television ramped up propaganda depicting Belarus as getting a raw deal from an ungrateful Russia. Panorama nedeli, traditionally the most-watched weekly news program, devoted a segment on its November 5 edition to Russian military bases in Belarus. The program noted Russia uses the two bases free of charge while the United States pays host countries hundreds of millions of dollars annually for its military bases abroad. Evening news on November 6 claimed that deliberately slow work by Russian customs clearing trainloads of sugar bound for Russia led to the a passenger train from Brest to Moscow having to stop at the Belarus-Russian border, thus implying Russia was de facto re-establishing border checkpoints. ¶5. (C) Lukashenko also took the unusual step of appealing directly to Russian governors, albeit simultaneously notifying the Kremlin, to request that Russian regions continue to purchase Belarusian goods. The letter bolsters Lukashenko's rhetoric in his September press conference with Russian journalists (ref A) that in all of Russia only the Kremlin is hostile to Belarus. ¶6. (SBU) Belarus is also taking steps to at least appear to satisfy the concerns of Russian industries that have been complaining of unfair competition from Belarus. The GOB announced that Russian firms will be able to compete on an equal basis with Belarusian firms for state contracts. Belarus will also host a conference on machine manufacturing, in part to address complaints raised by Russian competitors. HOW TO DIVIDE THE SPOILS OF HIGH ENERGY PRICES -------------- - ¶7. (C) With the Dutch firm ABN Amro not expected to finish its appraisal of Beltransgaz until November 20, Putin and Lukashenko will have a convenient excuse to avoid any serious discussion of the ownership of the Belarusian state gas pipeline and the linked issue of gas prices (ref B). However, local analysts are already willing to predict the final price for gas. All agree the figure of USD 140 per thousand cubic meters suggested by Russian Ambassador Surikov on November 3 is probably too high. With Ukraine having settled for gas at USD 130, both Manenok and Aleksandr Gatovskiy, an energy analyst with the Belarusian Ministry of Economics Economics Research Institute, agree Belarus will get at least a slightly lower price. The honorary chair of the United Civic Party, Sergey Bogdankevich, suggested a range of USD 70-90. ¶8. (C) In addition to fattening Gazprom's profits by increasing gas prices, Putin hopes to weaken Belarus' status as a de facto offshore for Russia oil companies. Oil exports from Russia to Belarus escape Russian export duties, now around USD 172 per ton. Belarus, after refunding VAT on oil exports, effectively charges a nominal export duty of USD 10 per ton, with none of the duty going back to Russia. Russia is pressing Belarus to raise its export duty to a level approximating Russia's rate, and to split the proceeds, with Russia receiving 85 percent. According to Manenok, Russia will likely settle for a Belarusian duty at 80 percent of the Russian level. Political analyst Valeriy Karbalevich expressed doubts over Putin's ability to push forward such a change, noting the interests of Russian oil companies and Russia's vulnerability to Belarus restricting the transit of oil to Europe. COMMENT: LUKASHENKO WANTS TO WAIT OUT PUTIN -------------- ¶9. (C) After successfully securing low gas prices for years, it is no wonder Lukashenko bridles at Russia's renewed efforts to secure its economic interests in Belarus. Unaccountable to voters or any legal body in Belarus and recently taking a shine to feel-good foreign visits to countries such as Iran and Cuba to bash the West and promote trade, Lukashenko cannot appreciate pressure from his most important neighbor. ¶10. (C) Lukashenko's public relations strategy consists of portraying Belarus as a true friend to Russia rudely being asked to make economic sacrifices by an unappreciative Kremlin leadership. This approach probably to a large degree reflects his actual understanding of the bilateral relationship. Lukashenko has made much of the closeness of the Russian and Belarusian people. Given his belief that he is genuinely popular in Belarus, he likely also believes he enjoys a similar level of sympathy in Russia, and a future Russian leader weaker than Putin may be less able to resist Lukashenko's appeals for unity when it comes to issues of vital importance to Belarus' economy such as gas prices. Stewart