MILINKEVICH PROMOTES HIS OWN MOVEMENT IN MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 001141 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH PROMOTES HIS OWN MOVEMENT IN MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR REF: A. MINSK 737 ¶B. MINSK 951 ¶C. MINSK 1109 MINSK 00001141 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On October 20, Ambassador met with opposition coalition leader Milinkevich to discuss the status of the United Democratic Forces (UDF). Milinkevich stressed that the coalition was generally united despite internal disagreements on strategy, a second coalition congress, and UDF leadership. Milinkevich accepted responsibility as UDF leader for any failures within the coalition, but also accused some of his UDF colleagues of creating a pro-Moscow opposition block. He also used the meeting to lobby for his ambiguous "For Freedom" movement as a non-political campaign to allegedly engage pro-democratic organizations and activists disenfranchised with the UDF. However, the nature of Milinkevich accusations against other UDF leaders and his complaints of UDF inaction indicated that he appeared to be more of a contributor to the UDF's internal problems rather than someone capable of solving them. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador October 20 met with opposition coalition leader and former presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich to discuss the status of the UDF and its future plans. Deputy Chief of Mission and Pol/Econ Chief also attended. Milinkevich thanked Ambassador for the meeting and praised the United States' continued and active support for democratic change in Belarus. Coalition Remains United, But Has Problems -------------- ¶3. (C) Milinkevich noted that although UDF leaders do not agree on all issues, they remain generally united in their desire for a democratic Belarus. He praised the UDF's unity in the "Solidarity" program supporting the politically repressed, but noted the UDF's failure to collaborate with regional activists or effectively conduct an information campaign. In addition, political ambitions and disagreements over strategies and congresses had created a stalemate within the UDF that has lasted six months, disenfranchising proactive individuals and organizations in the process. ¶4. (C) Milinkevich and his support base - primarily the Belarusian National Front (BNF),small deregistered parties and NGOs - believe a UDF leader with broader powers is needed to implement strategy and speed up the decision making process within the coalition. Milinkevich admitted that although he was chosen as the UDF presidential candidate, he had assumed the position of UDF leader out of necessity, but his initiatives had been hindered by infighting over what the UDF leader's responsibilities and powers were. According to Milinkevich, a UDF leadership position needed to be established with defined powers if the coalition wanted to move forward. However, the Belarusian Communist Party (BCP) and United Civic Party (UCP) oppose a more vertical UDF leadership structure, especially if Milinkevich occupied the position, and support a coalition ruled by a committee of leaders of opposition groups. ¶5. (C) Milinkevich cited the creation of a leftist block within the coalition as another serious problem (ref A). Milinkevich accused BCP leader Sergey Kalyakin and his "leftist" allies (i.e., the UCP and Belarusian Social Democratic Party (BSDP)) of promoting a pro-Russian strategy, pitting themselves against Milinkevich and his alleged "pro-EU" supporters within the coalition. Milinkevich blamed Russia for the internal conflict, claiming it was funding the BCP and BSDP to create problems within the coalition. When Ambassador inquired who in Russia was financing Kalyakin, Milinkevich pointed to nameless businessmen and politicians, supported by the Kremlin, seeking to reoccupy Belarus and Ukraine. Second Congress For Politicians, Not Activists -------------- - ¶6. (C) Milinkevich expressed to Ambassador his clear opposition to a second congress of democratic forces. Milinkevich claimed he opposed the congress not because his position as UDF leader was threatened, but because the time and resources needed for a congress should be spent on mobilizing activists and implementing UDF strategies. MINSK 00001141 002 OF 003 Seconddy, the proposed seT up gf the congress would only allow politicad parties to participate& Acaording to the Poditical Council's current plan, delegates to the congress would be ocalcouncil candidates who gathered 300 signatureS, thereby excluding most pro-democratic NGOs, reporters, and other civil society. Milinkevich noted that should this plan be implemented, the congress would not be one of demkcratic forces, but one of political parties. ¶7. (C) Note: Immediately following his conVersation with Ambassador, Milinkevich attended the UDF Political Council where UDF members agreed to hold a Congress on March 25 (septel). Pol/Econ Chief later learned from BNF deputy Viktor Ivashkevich that UDF leaders, including Milinkevich, agreed to restructure the Political Council at the congress and elect a PC head with some exe#utive responsibilities. The Political Council also agreed to expand the list of those allow%d to be congressional delegates, requiring members of NGOs and civil society organizations not affiliated with the local elections to gather 300 signatures in support of the PC-approved general mes3age of freedom. End note. "For Freedom" Movement Not a Political Party -------------- % -------------- ¶8. (C) Milinkevich explained to Ambassador that his recently created "For Freedom" movement was not his personal political party, but a campaign to reengage activists and non-political parties frustrated with or excluded by the UDF. Milinkevich first announced the move-ent to the UDF in March, but after six months, the coalition still would not ap`rove it. Therefore, Milinkevich decided to avoid the bureaucracy by initiating the movement as an individual without the Political Council's approval. According to Milinkevich, the political parties in the UDF could have created their own campaigns similar to the "For Freedom" movement, but they lacked the support hat Milinkevich has to ake any campaign succssful. However, Milinkevich noted somewhat melodramatically that his reputation was on the line and would remove himself from political lfe if the movement failed. ¶9. (C) Ambassador praised Milinkevich's desire to include more pro-democratic groups in the fight for democracy, but voiced concern that the movement appeared to be a coalition of NGOs and civil society groups running parallel, rather than supporting, the UDF. Milinkevich stressed the political neutrality of the movement, insisting that it existed to support and implement UDF strategies, promote action and unity at the local and national level, and demand free elections. According to Milinkevich, the "For Freedom" movement would be open to everyone, including members of existing political parties. (Note: Also at the October 20 UDF meeting, Milinkevich agreed to set aside his "For Freedom" campaign until after the March 25 congress, claiming that it would take several months to organize the movement. According to BNF deputy Ivashkevich, Milinkevich and those colleagues supporting the movement had not fully thought out its details, nor could they explain how the movement would be implemented. En$ note.) Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) It is ironic that Milinkevich, who seems to prefer t(e spotlight in European capitals to demonstrating his leadership at home, is criticizing the UDF for its inactivity. His earlier pledges to work actively in Belarus have generally not been fulfilled (ref B). UDF members continue to criticize openly to Emboffs Milinkevich's lackluster leadership, his absence at many UDF meetings, failure to inform colleagues of his multiple trips abroad ahead of time, and his public introduction of policies and activities without prior UDF knowledge or consent. His recent public statements in Prague on the creation of the "For Freedom" movement were particularly ill-handled and may have helped bring the other three UDF leaders (who too have done little to boost UDF activism) closer together (ref C). ¶11. (C) Milinkevich's apparent willingness to postpone the creation of his movement at least until after the January 2007 local elections and the party leaders' willingness to accept some of Milinkevich's conditions for convening a second congress suggest that the UDF leaders are attempting to minimize the rift. However, Milinkevich's status as de facto leader of the opposition coalition remains in jeopardy. Coupled with his strong and probably unsubstantiated attacks MINSK 00001141 003 OF 003 against certain UDF members and his seeming inability to stay in Belarus, Milinkevich gave us the impression that he was actually contributing more to deepening the coalition's problems rather than solving them. Stewart