BORISOV OPPOSITION FACES SEVERE REPRESSION AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001036 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC BO SUBJECT: BORISOV OPPOSITION FACES SEVERE REPRESSION AHEAD OF LOCAL ELECTIONS REF: MINSK 978 Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Poloffs recently traveled to Borisov to gauge local preparedness and the degree of cooperation of democratic forces ahead of the January 14 municipal elections. Despite blatant surveillance and frequent interruptions by GOB representatives and state media, Borisov's opposition political party leaders and independent media candidly discussed the politically repressive conditions in which they are preparing their local election campaigns. That said, the activists in Borisov demonstrated willingness and ability to work together to bring democratic change to Belarus. End Summary. Opposition Pulls Together to Prepare for Local Elections -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 13, Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met with representatives of the local chapters of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition parties, including: United Civic Party (UCP) Head Lev Margolin; UCP National Political Council member and entrepreneur Viktor Gorbachev; and Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC) Head Nikolai Barbitsky. Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Gramada" (BSDP) Borisov Head Mariya Statkevich also participated in the meeting. The entire meeting was attended, filmed, and frequently interrupted by GOB representatives and state media. (Note: One of the GOB officials was a BKGB agent that has followed U.S. Embassy personnel on previous regional trips and at opposition protests in Minsk. End note.) ¶3. (C) When Pol/Econ Chief asked how many opposition candidates would run in Borisov during January's local elections, Margolin responded that it was still too early to estimate but maintained that UCP planned to run candidates in all six regions of Belarus, including Borisov. Gorbachev informed Pol/Econ Chief that UCP would run about 250 candidates throughout Belarus but did not give an exact breakdown by region. Barbitsky admitted that BPC had met only three weeks earlier and had not yet designated candidates. ¶4. (C) Pol/Econ Chief inquired whether the Borisov chapters of the opposition parties would sign a cooperation agreement similar to those recently signed by BSDP and the UDF parties in other regions of Belarus (reftel). Margolin and �A;Statkevich responded that a formal agreement at their level was not likely because Borisov is in the Minsk region and that the Minsk-based national opposition leadership would negotiate any such accord. However, all party representatives observed that local BSDP and UDF party chapters already cooperate closely on a daily albeit informal basis. Moreover, Gorbachev added that the local opposition parties frequently assist not only their partner parties in their own region but also those in other regions. (Note: On September 14, Gorbachev, who leads a group of opposition separately told Poloffs that inter-regional cooperation among local parties was necessary in part because the coalition's national leadership withholds much of financial support that it receives from internation al sources. End note.) Repression of Opposition Political Parties -------------- ¶5. (C) UCP Margolin and BPC Barbitsky observed that their close cooperation in part resulted from the common GOB repression they face. Both explained that most jobs in Borisov's state enterprises are year-to-year contracts. If the authorities discover an employee is active in opposition politics, that employee's contract will not be renewed. MoreovEr, state enterprises will not conduct business with private enterprises run by opposition activists and candidates. Barbitsky added that the GOB's repression extended to opposition party newspapers and independent media and noted that authorities frequently confiscate copies of the opposition Communist newspaper "Tovarishch" from their party members and other readers. The opposition party activists uniformly identified the lack of access to mass media as their main obstacle to mounting successful election campaigns. Repression of Independent Media MINSK 00001036 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (C) Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met separately with independent journalist Anatoliy Bukas, Editor-in-Chief of the independent newspaper "Borisovskie Novosti," which began publishing in 1992. Bukas related to Pol/Econ Chief that his paper faces numerous distribution problems resulting from government pressure, including exclusion from the GOB's newspaper catalogue and kiosk network. He noted that Borisovskie Novosti's subscriptions have plummeted from 19,000 to 7,000 in recent years. He also detailed how local officials use economic instruments, such as restrictions on advertisements and subscriptions and special punitive tax rates for independent newspapers. (Note: Belarusian Party of Labor activist and former independent journalist Pavel Mogilich also attended the Embassy's meeting with opposition parties leaders and described to Pol/Econ Chief very similar GOB efforts to repress other independent media in Borisov. End note.) ¶7. (C) Bukas highlighted the personal and professional hardships faced by his six editors and 18 reporters, whom his paper cannot afford to employ full-time. According to Bukas, the GOB bars independent journalists from employment in state-owned companies. Furthermore, independent journalists are banned from attending official press conferences, local political, and cultural events and are often prevented from receiving information from official sources. Bukas mentioned that the local government had even refused to confirm for him the official March 19 presidential election results. Nevertheless, his paper still publishes articles on the activities of local NGOs, registered political parties, and election campaigns. The Local Government: Uncut and Uninvited -------------- ¶8. (C) The Embassy had sent a letter notifying Borisov's local government of its visit but had received no response until Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff exited their vehicle just outside the local UCP offices. A representative of the Mayor's office, a member of the GOB security services, and a state media television crew were waiting for Pol/Econ Chief and insisted on attending and frequently interrupting both meetings. Moreover, two police vehicles closely followed the Embassy's vehicle throughout Borisov despite Pol/Econ Chief's politely declining the "safety escort." ¶9. (C) Despite the rude and unwanted escort, Pol/Econ Chief courteously agreed to a last-minute meeting with Borisov's Deputy Mayor Valentina Shutko. Shutko conceded that Borisov has problems akin to those in any community but claimed that the city and national governments were solving those problems. She highlighteD accomplishments of govErnment guaranteed healthcare, education, and programs for the unemployed. She denied that state enterprises use discriminatory hiring employment practices or punitive taxes against opposition activists and dismissed such allegations as "lies." When Pol/Econ Chief asked what in her opinion motivates the political opposition, the mayor speculated that Borisov's relatively high standard of living permits opposition activists the time and resources to complain about relatively minor problems. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The level of cooperation among opposition forces in Borisov is both unusual and encouraging. The unifying factors seem both to be increased GOB pressure on all opponents of the regime and the local activists' shared commitment to focus less on partisan rifts and more on democratic change. The opposition leaders reminded us that our trips to the regions send an important signal of support to the democratic forces and urged us to continue our efforts. Stewart